



**Applying the analytical framework of  
cosmopolitanism as a model of democracy; how can  
civil society help further the democratic quality of  
European Union governance (the case of Spain 2012)?**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Arts in European Union Studies

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## ABSTRACT

As the European Year of Citizens (2013) dawns, the European Union (EU) finds itself at a crossroads. One of the largest international organisations in the world, it has built a reputation as an international community model and democratic figure judged in the context of a multi-level system. However, the EU has recently departed from both roles, as its economic practices suffer dramatically from a lack of political pressure and regulation. One after another, member states admit to major economic struggles with some admitting to failing economies, as excessive private and public debt and a lack of competitiveness has caused one of the worst financial crises in the history of the EU. The EU now faces an uncertain future: should it break apart or move forward with deeper integration and a “more Europe” attitude? In contrast to public and scholarly concern, this thesis does not treat the crisis as abstract evidence of a structural democracy deficit that signifies the end unless cured. This thesis instead attempts to draw attention to the point of departure, the European citizen, and a social cleavage that can be easily addressed despite ongoing economic insecurity. In this sense, this thesis differs from current academic thought in that it focuses less on understanding how democracy can be achieved and more on understanding how democracy, which already exists, can be enhanced. Such a line of thinking recognises that one of the great challenges to a national democracy is balancing the often conflicting requirements of protecting the rights of individual citizens whilst honouring international responsibilities that come with being signatories to international treaties. The EU faces the same challenges, adjusted for its multi-level governance structure, and its ability to be socially responsible had been severely tested long before the crisis, since the initiation of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (CFHR). Two discourses relative to the implementation of the citizens’ needs and rights set out in the CFHR were identified in the literature: *civil society*, where the third sector is utilised to educate citizens on the EU and its policies, and *cosmopolitanism*, a more recent theory of democracy that prioritises the individual rather than the nation-state in global political situations. This paper looks at how the two discourses could be combined in a governance framework that would support the EU to become a civilian power once again. It will complete this investigation through the use of case studies on two civil society organisations based in Spain and primary data collected from within the European Parliament (EP), to understand how local civil society can improve the democratic quality of EU governance whilst meeting individuals’ needs and rights. This paper will conclude that, in the case of Spain 2012, local civil society creates three core conditions for active citizen participation that, following minor adjustment to European policy-making and the construction of a pan-European space, the EU can benefit from, despite the challenging environment surrounding it.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| <b>ALDE</b> | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe       |
| <b>BCR</b>  | Belfast Conflict Resolution                         |
| <b>BoD</b>  | Board of Directors                                  |
| <b>CAP</b>  | Common Agricultural Policy                          |
| <b>CDM</b>  | Club de Madrid                                      |
| <b>CJE</b>  | Consejo de la Juventud de España                    |
| <b>CFHR</b> | Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union |
| <b>CEC</b>  | Commission of the European Communities              |
| <b>CoM</b>  | Council of Ministers                                |
| <b>CoR</b>  | Committee of the Regions                            |
| <b>CSO</b>  | Civil Society Organisation                          |
| <b>CSOs</b> | Civil Society Organisations                         |
| <b>EC</b>   | European Commission                                 |
| <b>ECSC</b> | European Coal and Steel Community                   |
| <b>EEC</b>  | European Economic Community                         |
| <b>EENC</b> | European Expert Network on Culture                  |
| <b>EESC</b> | European Economic and Social Committee              |
| <b>EFDG</b> | Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group               |
| <b>EMU</b>  | Economic and Monetary Union                         |
| <b>EP</b>   | European Parliament                                 |
| <b>EPC</b>  | European Policy Centre                              |
| <b>ESF</b>  | European Social Fund                                |
| <b>EU</b>   | European Union                                      |
| <b>EUCN</b> | European Union Centres Network                      |
| <b>EUR</b>  | Euro  |
| <b>GDP</b>  | Gross Domestic Product                              |
| <b>GNI</b>  | Gross National Income                               |
| <b>IMF</b>  | International Monetary Fund                         |
| <b>MEP</b>  | Member of the European Parliament                   |
| <b>MFF</b>  | Multiannual Financial Framework                     |
| <b>NCRE</b> | National Centre for Research on Europe              |
| <b>NPOs</b> | Non-Profit Organisations                            |
| <b>OMC</b>  | Open Method of Coordination                         |
| <b>SIF</b>  | Social Innovation Fund                              |
| <b>TCS</b>  | Transnational Civil Society                         |
| <b>UC</b>   | University of Canterbury                            |
| <b>UC3M</b> | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid                    |
| <b>UN</b>   | United Nations                                      |
| <b>US</b>   | United States                                       |

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# INTRODUCTION

## 0.1 Background to the study

As the EU continues to battle an ongoing financial and economic crisis, the predominant argument presented by media commentators is that the organisation faces a grave future. It could instead be argued that the EU now has an opportunity to recover the support of its citizens and to act collectively – as a Union. The year 2013, the “European Year of Citizens,” brings with it the message “the European Citizen Matters” and a platform upon which the relationship between the EU and the European citizen can be rebuilt. Of course, the manifestation of a sound economic plan in these uncertain times is a long-term priority for the EU. But there is truth in the words of President of the European Commission José Barroso, whose recent comments firmly emphasised that European spending is just as much about economic growth as it is about social cohesion. Barroso told the EP in Strasbourg in November 2012 that ‘compromises have to be constructive’<sup>1</sup> and this is especially important when budgetary spending amounts to only one percent of the Union’s gross domestic product.

As a form of transnational governance, the EU is represented by a body of law, usually held superior to the law of its member states, and has a founding Treaty. Legislative proposals are put forward by the European Commission (EC) and adopted by the Council of Ministers (CoM) as well as the EP.<sup>2</sup> Known as the Community Method, the EU decision-making process has a dual mandate, where the EP represents the citizens and the CoM represents elected governments of EU member states. At times, the Community Method will also draw on consultation with other bodies such as the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) or the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in a whole-of-government approach (local, regional, national, transnational). Thus, the functioning of the EU governance system is a representative democracy, where citizens are represented through the array of supranational institutions present at the European level.

Despite existing democratic principles and a proactive policy-making process, the EU continues to meet criticism that it ‘has never been democratic.’<sup>3</sup> One of the great challenges of a parliamentary

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<sup>1</sup> David Trifunov, “European Budget Talks Must Be ‘Constructive,’ EC President Says,” *GlobalPost* November 21, 2012. <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/business/debt-crisis/121121/european-union-budget-talks-barroso-euro-zone> (Last accessed 20 December, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> Commission of the European Communities, “Governance Statement of the European Commission,” (Brussels: European Union, 30 May 2007). European Union, “European Council,” [europa.eu](http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index_en.htm), [http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index_en.htm). (Last accessed 5 June, 2012); ———, “European Parliament,” [europa.eu](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en>. (Last accessed 5 June, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Alex Warleigh, *Democracy and the European Union: Theory, Practice and Reform* (Sage, 2003). 1.

democracy is balancing the often conflicting requirements of protecting the rights of individuals as citizens whilst honouring responsibilities that come with being signatories to an international organisation. The EU, in this respect, has been severely tested given that there is no European Government identifiable as the responsibility bearer and rights provider. As a result, the citizens of Europe 'do not feel the institutions act as an effective channel'<sup>4</sup> for their views and it is likely their knowledge and understanding of these institutions will be minimal. Additionally, the EU does not have a constitution, due to the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005 by France and the Netherlands and thus has failed to bring the legislative process closer to the lives of the citizens it affects.

Furthermore, it is questionable whether those formal sources of law that exist to protect the rights of citizens, such as the CFHR of the EU, provide valid grounds to review EU actions. A European Council decision to establish a CFHR was made in order to take the rights of citizens to the EU level and 'make their overriding importance and relevance *more visible* [author italic]'<sup>5</sup> to member states. The keywords *more visible* do very little to support the contention that EU law is held superior to the law of its member states. In fact, it almost counteracts the point of having a Charter as a form of law at the European level if the individual cannot enjoy the rights of Union citizenship because such citizenship cannot surpass the nation-state. Naturally, all European initiatives are essentially designed on behalf of the EU citizen and policy-makers wish to avoid adding unnecessary legislation. Yet there was recognition that the concept of Union citizenship needed strengthening and thus the Union initiated a citizenship development programme.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, the programme remains almost as unheard of today as it was at its initiation in 2000. Policy continues to do little to communicate with citizens that the EU values their participation as a useful strategy in the immediate future. While a commitment to social cohesion is promised in the form of Barroso's spoken word, there is yet to be any major movement forward, financial or otherwise, by the European institutions, which is not a promising start for the year of the citizen. The EU is at a standstill as to how to move forward. While desire for change is present, the challenge still exists to solidify the relationship between the EU and its citizens.

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<sup>4</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *European Governance: A White Paper*. COM(2001) 428 Final. Brussels, (July 2001). 7.

<sup>5</sup> Cologne European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," (Cologne: European Union, 3 and 4 June 1999), Annex IV.

<sup>6</sup> From the year 2000 to 2006, the programme '*Citizenship*' was developed to improve citizen participation within the Union. Following the year 2006, the programme '*Europe for Citizens*' was started in 2007 and runs until mid-year 2013. The emphasis in *Europe for Citizens* is less on improving participation and more on giving citizens a 'key role' in the Union's governance structure. See Audiovisual & Cultural Executive Agency Education, "Europe for Citizens Programme," Europa, [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index\\_en.php](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.php). (Last accessed 19 July, 2012).

The gap in knowledge is two-fold. First, although acknowledged as a key issue, there remains little discussion about what political and even economic rationales might exist at the Union level that justify an increased effort to bring the Union closer to its citizens. Second, any effort that has been made remains at the European level. The Treaties, the Constitution, the development programmes; there is a wealth of documentation and projects initiated at the international level but very little emphasis on citizen-led initiatives. Both gaps, when considered in conjunction, reflect the issue of democratisation versus the problem of creating a democratic milieu. Currently, there is no theoretical body of democracy that well addresses the reality of the present day EU in terms of the importance of the relationship between the Union and the ordinary European citizen. The aim of this thesis therefore, is to test a mixed theoretical model of democracy that utilises local civil society as the tool for strengthening the EU governance system on the assumption it can engage individuals in various civic activities and whose active participation can contribute to the improvement of the democratic quality of the Union. In doing so, this thesis will address the need to spark an academic discussion on the relationship between the Union and the European citizen during the Year of the European Citizen. The EU needs to stay true to its message for 2013 and become a Europe for its citizens and less of a Europe facing criticism.

## **0.2 Primary Research Question and Sub-questions**

Evidently, citizen participation in the EU's policy and decision-making processes is paramount to its success as a democratic organisation. If individuals, as European citizens, are unable to participate or are restricted in terms of their participation in the Union's governance, it reflects poorly on the democratic quality of the EU. Given that attempts to date to keep the European citizen involved in an ever-integrating EU governance system have been initiated primarily at the international level, the primary research question thus asks, *how can local civil society (defined here as "organised groups of civilians advancing public opinion and political equality"<sup>7</sup>) further the democratic quality of European Union governance (the case of Spain, 2012)?* The research question will be approached from two angles. First, it is necessary to ensure a democratic governance framework that supports both high-level and grassroots approaches and prioritises individual rights exists at least in theoretical terms. Second, the specific reference to *local civil society* demonstrates where the empirical scope of the research will be centred: can civil society act as the platform from which citizen involvement within the Union governance structure can occur? It is important to note here

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<sup>7</sup> European Economic and Social Committee, "Le rôle et la contribution de la société civile organisée dans la construction européenne (The role and contribution of civil society within the European construction)," (Document CES 851/99, September 1999).

that the choice to focus on local civil society follows the lengthy and complicated introduction of the civil society discourse to the EU.<sup>8</sup> There remains a lot to be learnt about the role civil society can play in international governance structures, given that an organisation such as the EU is characterised by its complex relationships between multiple actors, public and private. The primary research question, while inclusive of both the dependent and independent variables of the research,<sup>9</sup> introduces a number of sub-questions necessary to the research approach.

In this thesis, strengthening the democratic quality of EU governance starts with strengthening the democratic quality of democracy as a notion. Sub-question one thus seeks to find out where existing theory is unable to advance the Union democratically. It asks: *what will this advancement of democracy look like and what will be its major components?* Sub-question one directly calls into question how current models of democracy can be utilised in this research and, in particular, those with a focus on bottom-up strategies that assist in the achievement of direct citizen participation. Sub-question one will be the most important question for the research approach as it suggests how the research will contribute to the body of knowledge on enhancing the democratic quality of EU governance. The second sub-question flows from sub-question one by addressing one of the strategies often used in connection with democratisation due to the potential for impact at the ground level. It asks: *is there a political and economic rationale at the Union level to further the case for more grassroots-focused policy and thus the case for deeper engagement of local civil society?* This sub-question examines the incentives behind the need for increased adoption by the Union of social policies with a mix top-down and bottom-up governance strategies working to engage the citizen. In other words, before the question of *how* can civil society help enhance the democratic quality of the Union can be answered, it must be acknowledged whether a legislative system that supports a dependence on social policy is economically and politically desirable. This is particularly important from the political perspective, given that this push in social policy is occurring in a time of recession and in an age in which political solutions must work around budget cutting.

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<sup>8</sup> As recently as the end of 2011, an initiative was launched called *Voices and Views*, which brought together 80 stakeholders in Brussels to discuss the form of future dialogue between the European institution, civil society organisations and local authorities. It was acknowledged in an article on *Voices and Views* that one of the initiative's biggest accomplishments was the encouragement of the European Commission to use the wording 'civil society organisations' instead of 'non-state actors' in future correspondence. See Coordination Team EUROPEAID, "Voices & Views, Continuing Structured Dialogue with Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities," *Development and Cooperation* (31 January 2012), <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/continuing-structured-dialogue-civil-society-organisations-and-local-authorities>. (Last accessed 19 July, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> The *dependent variable* is the democratic quality of European Union governance and the *independent variable* is citizen participation within the European Union.

Following an examination of the wider political and economic environment, the final sub-question surfaces with regard to the concept of *civil society* and the use of that concept in this thesis: *how will the abilities of local civil society be measured?* *Civil society* is a very broad and complex concept. A clear and unambiguous definition has been adopted to retain a focus on social inclusion and thus remain non-discriminatory as to what actors can be involved. In order to reduce the scope for research, two Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) with distinctively different backgrounds have been chosen as the focal point of two in-depth case studies. Both CSOs are located in Spain, although only one can be classified as a local CSO. The other, an international CSO with its base in Spain, can be used together with the local CSO to show how they both (from different perspectives) further democratic engagement of citizens at the local level of a long-term member state. There are multiple reasons for choosing Spain. Firstly, although Spain has been fully integrated into the Union for almost 26 years, it was unable to enter between 1951 and 1986 due to its undemocratic status. According to Helena Soletto Muñoz, Professor of Procedural Law at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, forty years of dictatorship has left the Spanish unaware of their rights under a democratic Government and, consequently, Spain has a local civil society with record low participation rates.<sup>10</sup> However a culture of social participation is growing, as Spain currently faces a major economic, political *and* social crisis. An almost two year-old Government, local austerity measures, plus little help from the Union has sparked a rising public backlash and thus room to strengthen Spain's civic engagement with the Union and its internal associational life.

### **0.3 Methodology**

#### **0.3.1 Research design of the study**

To answer the primary question and sub-questions, this thesis will adopt a qualitative research approach concerned with developing, exploring and testing an intellectual proposition for increased direct citizen involvement in EU governance. Qualitative data are used to detail the primary concern of this paper: to explore in greater depth the idea of using local civil society to enhance the democratic quality of the EU. Data have been collected from the perspective of the citizens themselves and is thus "raw," of a personal nature and can be used to describe and explain individuals' points of view. Moreover, this process will require the researcher to develop rapport with the research participants, communicate with them and understand their actions as a meaningful item within the wider context of the theoretical assumptions made in this paper.<sup>11</sup> Thus,

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Helena Soletto Muñoz, Interview 19 July, 2012. Professor of Processal Law, Length: 20.12 minutes, (Madrid, Department of Private and Public Law, University of Carlos III de Madrid).

<sup>11</sup> Quentin Skinner, "Hermeneutics and the Role of History " *New Literary History* 7, no. 1 (1975): 216.

a qualitative research approach is adopted not only because it provides detailed data in its human context, but also because it can best capture the variables whilst dealing appropriately with sensitive issues.

Quantitative research is also employed in this thesis, albeit in a minor way, for two reasons. The first is to test theory. Due to the variety of data collection methods used in this study, the data will require summarising to reach generalisations and validate the research hypotheses. The second reason is to confirm and validate. This thesis will examine whether there is an economic rationale to invest greater sums in social policy, by studying the social component of the budgets of both the EU and the United States (US). Quantitative research, however, cannot provide the kind of information that provides insight into the human phenomenon as this research intends to. Qualitative research seeks that kind of “meaning;” meaning from a social point of view in that the experiences, actions and opinions people attribute to a situation are the focus of the research.<sup>12</sup> Thus, rather than engaging in a scientific realism approach that prioritises the blend of both qualitative and quantitative research, the research design employed in this thesis remains in line with a post-positivist approach that prioritises instead the use of multiple data collection methods (both quantitative and qualitative), data sources and the use of theory, all combined in a triangulation effect. The topic, the ability of local civil society (viewed as organised groups of civilians) to democratise the EU governance system, firmly engrains the research approach in a qualitative field, but it is important that a variety of techniques are used to determine the credibility of the study. These techniques will be assessed below.

### **0.3.2 Data collection methods**

Both auxiliary quantitative data and qualitative data are used within a triangulation approach to ensure validity, usefulness and contextual completeness of this research. The research design is thus complex in the number of data collection methods it employs and data sources it utilises, ranging from theoretical re-design, participant observation and archival methods to semi-structured interviews with members of elites, surveys on members of the public and case studies on civil society organisations. The two main data collection methods used are case studies and semi-structured interviews. Data from both case studies have been organised systemically into two separate sets of field notes. Each set includes interview transcriptions, observation notes, survey data in numerical form and background information on each organisation. Careful organisation of the data is essential to identify converging lines of enquiry and emerging patterns, as well as to expose new insights on the role of civil society within the EU.

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<sup>12</sup> Sharlene Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy, *The Practice of Qualitative Research* (Sage Publications, 2010). 4.

## *Case Studies*

This thesis employs the use of case studies as a data collection method to test the primary research question and sub-question on the ability of local civil society, and to provide evidence for or against the research hypotheses. Firstly, a small comparative study on the annual budgets of both the EU and the US is reported in *Chapter Three* in order to test whether there is an economic need for increased funding from the EU into social policy and social initiatives. In addition, *Chapter Four* considers two case studies of CSOs. These macro-focused studies consider whether civil society has the potential to link the individual to the Union as a European citizen; and if so, how. With this in mind, the organisations examined in both case studies were CSOs with a primary institutional base in Madrid, the capital of Spain. The first organisation, known as *Consejo de la Juventud de España* (CJE), is a locally-focused organisation that represents Spanish youth. CJE works with Spanish youth to help them realise their rights and have their voice heard on a local, national and international level. The second organisation, known as *Club de Madrid* (CDM), is an international CSO that works out of Spain and exists to promote good governance worldwide. CDM works by sharing the expertise of its members, who are all former Heads of State or Government, with current leaders in various regions in order to encourage democratic leadership. The case study approach employed in this thesis enables the researcher to compare unique and typical organisational structures by examining two different real-life cases.

Case studies are used to collect the most up-to-date information within real-life contexts and thus produce a more optimal result in an ethnographic study on human individuals. In this case, the aim was to determine whether or not civil societies, from the perspective of Spain, are beneficial to the democratic quality of EU governance in terms of enhancing local citizen participation. *Chapter Four* will detail cross-case and within-case data evaluation and analysis techniques in the form of a rich narrative, in order to find links between the research objects and the outcomes of these two case studies with reference to the original research questions. It is important to point out however that the case studies are just one data collection tool and the results are used in collaboration with other methods to support the overall research approach.

## *Semi-Structured Interviews*

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from three important research areas. First, the Presidents and Project Coordinators of both CJE and CDM each took part in one-hour interviews. The interview allowed them to speak personally of their organisation's work and also provided essential current information regarding the research topic. These interviews were of great

assistance to understanding the context of the organisations' multiple programmes directly in collaboration with the Union or funded by the Union, given that particular questions and issues could be clarified. Second, academics within the Department of Public Law from the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid engaged in twenty-thirty-minute long interviews as a method of clarifying recently collected data from the CSO case studies. Professors were selected based on their academic focus and its relevance to the Union and European citizens. Once again, as key sources of information regarding the research field, these interviews were extremely beneficial in terms of clarifying complex legal information regarding the Union's governance structure. Finally, interviews were sought with staff members of the EP to gain a transnational perspective on the idea of greater local civil society involvement. EP staff members were interviewed for their personal understanding of the political environment they work in and whether it would support a more grass-roots focused governance system.

The questions that were prepared were based on two primary considerations. First, generic questions were carefully constructed in the light of the current, past and future experience of each participant. Second, specific questions focused on themes that directly related to both the research topic and the participant's own work. Around one quarter of all questions were generic in nature, with the remaining three-quarters relating specifically to the research topic (full questionnaires are included in the Appendix). The questionnaires had been previously approved by the University of Canterbury (UC) Ethics Committee and pilot tests were conducted with a volunteer from the New Zealand NCRE. The pilot tests were recorded in order for the interviewer, who is also the researcher, to assess her interviewing skills and ability to build rapport, the flow of topics and the timing.

A semi-structured approach for all interviews allowed the interviewee to direct the discussion and the interviewer to clarify certain points with follow-up questions, thereby creating material of a greater depth and a more personal nature. This approach has its limitations however, in that building a connection and relation with the interviewee was essential to reach the outcome described above. For this reason, a face-to-face interview technique was employed in order to create a more conversational discussion and a relaxed environment in which the interviewee felt more comfortable to engage with the researcher. Interviews were also conducted in English, or Spanish (given the interviewer's proficiency in Spanish) if Spanish was the mother-tongue of the participants, to allow for the limitations of translation to be avoided. To prevent misunderstandings on the part of the interviewer, all interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone and then transcribed.



## Archival

The archival method has also been employed within this thesis in order to examine documentation of CSOs, as well as legal documentation produced by the Union regarding the role of the citizen. Both CSOs have documentation centres, where inside information in the form of the organisations' legal contracts and guides to intercultural participation are utilised as briefing materials by staff. The materials and artefacts of both centres were made available for the purposes of this research and could be examined in their natural setting. Key documents identified were the *Juventud Ciudadana en la Unión Europea* (Youth Citizenship in the European Union) from the CJE and *The Shared Societies Project: Democratic Leadership for Dialogue, Diversity and Social Cohesion* from the CDM. Both could be used to check what research had been completed on behalf of each organisation into the relationship between the Union, its citizens and the idea of building social democracy through civil society. In this sense, the archival method has been used for historical research. Furthermore, official EU documentation concerning the citizen and civil society was analysed. In particular, the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU* and *Draft Treaty for Establishing a Constitution for Europe* as law, in conjunction with *European Governance: A White Paper* as a political initiative, were studied as initiatives that exist for the protection of citizens' rights. Third, documentation produced in relation to the most recent projects initiated by the Union on behalf of the citizen has been evaluated to track contemporary events, to check for major change in parliamentary and legal decisions and to provide a deeper understanding of what is available to the citizen. Key documentation includes the *Europe for Citizens Programme 2007 - 2013, Programme Guide* and *Citizens Initiative*, which stems from the 2009 *Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union*, as well as future frameworks; the *Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020* and the *Europe 2020 Strategy*.

Comparing fundamental documentation from both the EU and CSOs engaged within this study has revealed a significant difference between the understanding of citizenship in its legal/political sense and citizenship in the social sense. In particular, the breakdown of official definitions into smaller units reveals where connections exist and gaps need to be filled that currently separate the social from the political. The archival method has thus been used to reveal any unconscious bias or unintended consequences produced in these primary sources. Secondary sources, the work of other academics and theorists, have also been utilised to back up these findings.

## *Survey*

Although a minor form of data collection in this thesis, the use of surveys as a research tool balances out the research approach by shifting data collection to methods that exert a higher level of control. Surveying was used as a highly standardised data tool to complement other methods of data collection within the case studies. Identical surveys were completed by twenty participants at the annual General Assembly meeting of the CJE, which collected data on one third of all participants at the Assembly. Participants were selected at random, although roughly an equal number of females and males were approached. The surveys collected data from a small sample size but ultimately provided information on a wide variety of individuals engaged within civil society. In this respect, surveying was used to measure public opinion of those individuals and thus may not be used as a representation of the truth. The disadvantage of using surveys is that the respondents, for different reasons, may not be completely honest when answering some questions. To avoid the high possibility of artificial responses, pre-designed questionnaires were researched when writing the survey to ensure a well-written research instrument.

A simple design was finally adopted. Questions were organised in a user-friendly manner. First, a small number of questions gathered basic statistical information, i.e. male or female, age and occupation. Over the course of the survey, the questions became more directly related to the topic, with the final question asking for an opinion on how the subject would change the governance structure of the EU if offered the opportunity. The ratio of structured versus open-ended questions was close to 50/50 (full survey included in the Appendix). Furthermore, the survey was handed out individually, allowing time to build rapport between the researcher and the subject. Conducting the surveys face-to-face also resulted in a higher completion and return rate. The response rate was high. 19 out of 20 participants returned their surveys with all questions completed and eight participants asked further questions about the research project and asked to contribute more. Influencing the response rate is the fact that participants were passionate about advancing the relations between their CSO and the Union and thus felt the research conducted for this project could help their cause. Results were recorded electronically and summarised quantitatively in terms of percentages.

### **0.4 Structure of the study**

The thesis has five chapters and a concluding section, in addition to this introduction. The introduction contains a brief contextual overview and reveals the overall design of the research project: the research questions to be answered, the methodology, data collection methods and case

studies undertaken are outlined. The rest of the thesis is structured according to theoretical and empirical levels of analysis. *Chapter One* provides a critical review of the literature that has a bearing on the problem of application of democracy in the EU in terms of the role of civil society. The second half of *Chapter One* will then analyse the theory of *cosmopolitanism* introduced in the work of David Held. Held's theory of cosmopolitan democracy, which focuses on individualisation, is used as the foundation of a revised model of democracy that will be advanced in this study. *Chapter Two* will present this revised cosmopolitan model of democracy, labelled here *civil cosmopolitanism*, which hopes to advance the democratic quality of the EU. As *Chapter Two* unfolds, the model's three vital components will become clear – morality, institutionalism and social cosmopolitanism. Together, the three components are the core of a grassroots governance strategy led by the Union that utilises local civil society in the execution of the social needs, rights and responsibilities of the ordinary European citizen. The final part of *Chapter Two* will engage the reader in a debate on possible criticisms of civil cosmopolitanism. This brings a critical perspective to the model that is required in order to test for potential shortcomings and to ascertain whether the theoretical version of the model can overcome these.

In the latter part of the thesis, a comprehensive account of the data collection methods and case studies used will be undertaken. First, the data collection methodologies reported in *Chapters Three* and *Four* will test the necessity for a model such as civil cosmopolitanism and detail the environment in which it would have to function. *Chapter Three* examines whether there is an economic and political rationale for the Union to place a greater focus on grassroots social policy. Following on from *Chapter Three* and shifting the focus from the European level, *Chapter Four* will investigate the role of local civil society in the EU and whether it successfully helps individuals exercise their rights as European citizens. In a bid to narrow the focal point of this research and strengthen the results overall, one democratic member state will be specifically focused on: Spain. Recent growth in CSOs and Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) within Spain has inspired cultural change and increased political participation in the recent decade, providing for interesting and timely case studies.<sup>13</sup> In *Chapter Four*, two Madrid-based organisations will be the subject of testing in an experiment that attempts to collect data on whether civil society can advance the organisations' goals as well as advancing Spanish citizen engagement in EU governance. *Chapter Five* will resemble a post-audit discussion of the data collected to form an analysis of whether, first, a Union-led, grassroots strategy is indeed necessary and able to improve the democratic quality of EU governance and second, whether civil cosmopolitanism is the best model to support such a strategy. *Chapter Five* will bring

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<sup>13</sup> European Foundation Centre, "Exploring Transparency and Accountability Regulation of Public-Benefit Foundations in Europe," (Donors and Foundations Networks in Europe 2011).

together the theoretical and the empirical and summarise all evidence to form two proposals for the EU. The *Conclusion* remarks upon the findings in the light of the original research question posed. This thesis will end with some suggestions for future research projects based on the discoveries made while undertaking this research.

# 1. CHAPTER ONE: THE EXISTING LEGISLATION AND LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN UNION GOVERNANCE

This chapter locates the current research firmly within the literature on the EU and the use of civil society to enhance democracy. Section 1.1 reviews previous and existing legislative initiatives that utilise the concept of ‘civil society;’ mostly in attempts to bring the European citizen closer to the EU. Although little progress has been made, the initiatives addressed in 1.1 identify two key theoretical discourses active in the EU governance model at present; civil society and cosmopolitan democracy. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 assess the *civil society discourse* and *cosmopolitanism discourse* respectively to recognise possible pitfalls in the theoretical base of the work that the EU is proposing to do. *Chapter Two* follows with a possible development plan for a theoretical model that combines certain aspects of the cosmopolitan and civil society discourses. The model proposes to build upon the liberal democratic system and create a top-down, regionally unified governance system. Use of the wording top-down is to say “elite-led,” sending a clear message that those in governmental roles and with decision or policy-making responsibilities are important to a well-functioning governance framework. At the same time, the framework is one that exists to promote regional unification. In other words, the model proposed in *Chapter Two* aims to represent a well-balanced mix of top-down and bottom-up governance strategies to suit the conditions of an international organisation as complex as the EU.

## 1.1 Citizens’ initiatives in European Union legislation

European policy has changed at various stages of the EU's growth. The EU originated in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It's growth stages are marked by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Single Market, the EURO (EUR) and finally, the CFHR. In June 1999, the Cologne European Council decided that fundamental citizen rights were to be consolidated into one document; the CFHR. Shortly after, in 2002, the EC was, for the first time, expected to engage civil society within its legislative responsibilities as part of what was labelled an *external consultation process*.<sup>14</sup> In its White Paper on European Governance, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) made a commitment towards consultation and dialogue and part of that

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<sup>14</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission: Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission*. COM(2002) 704 Final. Brussels, (2002).

commitment is the engagement of 'interested parties',<sup>15</sup> with a specific role for CSOs. For the Union, this was a big step forward in terms of its relations with civil society and ultimately its relations with its citizens. An ongoing issue for the EU is to what extent citizens should be directly involved within the Union, but it took until the twenty-first century before the role of CSOs in modern democracies was specifically linked to providing European citizens with a voice. Even then, it was clear that the role of CSOs would remain only a voice, the *interested parties* were not to receive the privilege of a vote. External parties are only ever to be addressed as a supplementary opinion to the decision-making processes of the legislative bodies, rather than a replacement opinion, as is annexed in the Amsterdam Treaty.<sup>16</sup> Still, the Union aimed to ensure each supplementary opinion would at least be heard. Within the European institutional set up, the EESC, which was initiated in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, adopted a set of rules in August 2002 on behalf of organised civil society. To enhance the consultation and dialogue process, the EESC was to act as an intermediary actor with the primary focus of ensuring the views of civil society reached the EC.<sup>17</sup> There was a clear goal, to enable interested parties to participate in the Union's decision-making processes on the understanding it would make these processes more transparent to the European citizen; a vital condition for democracy.

Until the CFHR, the idea of civil society as a tool for advancing the democratic quality of the EU attracted little attention. The adoption of the concept into Union communication was therefore clearly intended to promote the role of voluntary organisations and social spaces in Europe. Prior to this shift towards the CFHR, the EU's progression was economic and market-driven. Suddenly the extra dimension of EU-society relations existed in the EU's new focus on communication with civil society, bringing with it the message that improving the democratic legitimacy of the EU was essential. The assumption here is that the engagement of multiple actors in the EU's governance system in representation of the citizen would create greater accountability, transparency and ultimately greater democracy. Assumptions concerning the correct amount of social involvement in a political democracy have since taken off in academia. Beate Kohler-Koch, renowned for writing specifically on the EU and civil society relations, and Barbara Finke argue that the Union made a

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<sup>15</sup> ———, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, see European Union, "Treaty of Amsterdam: Amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts." *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 340 (1997).

<sup>17</sup> European Economic and Social Committee, "Rules of Procedure of the European Economic and Social Committee," *Official Journal of the European Union* L 324 (August 2002 (Consolidated Version adopted July 2010)): 53.

serious attempt to write into legislation and policy proposals a new 'participatory engineering'<sup>18</sup> governance strategy that would guarantee citizen participation. Kohler-Koch later argued the European institutions in fact aimed to advance that strategy through the creation of a European Civil Society.<sup>19</sup> For Stijn Smismans, Jean Monnet Chair in European Law and Governance and involved in CIVGOV (Organised Civil Society and European Governance), the involvement of civil society in the EU is more about finding a point of common interest between civil society actors and European policy-makers and less about advancing social interests within the EU.<sup>20</sup> Even with Smismans' way of thinking, civil society within the EU remains an innovative concept because that point of interest represents different stages of policy-making and stresses the importance of multi-level governance. The more sceptical researchers were convinced the CEC would not receive the results it desired from civil society involvement, that these ideas were merely naive and potentially damaging if such a position becomes unappealing.<sup>21</sup> The EU is not a government, merely a governance system able to fail at any time.

The experience of the EU since the White Paper's initiation was in fact disappointing. In terms of enhanced citizen participation, few positive results resulted from the engagement of civil society actors. Kohler-Koch argued systemic research into increased exchange of ideas and dialogue between the EU and civil society demonstrated the CEC at least widened the scope for participation supposedly 'by lowering the threshold of access.'<sup>22</sup> Feedback of this kind was also scrutinised for its impact on the EU and was found to have increased the willingness of the Directorate General policy units within the EC to subject their communication with civil society to scrutiny.<sup>23</sup> This was an important step towards greater accountability. All positive reform, however, was institution-based only. Despite reform in the EC's legislative strategy, confidence in the EP did not significantly increase and voter turnout at the EP elections continued to remain low, actually decreasing in 2004

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<sup>18</sup> Barbara Finke and Beate Kohler-Koch, "The Institutional Shaping of EU-Society Relations: A Contribution to Democracy via Participation?," *Journal of Civil Society* 3, no. 3 (2007): 206.

<sup>19</sup> Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat, "What is 'civil society' and Who Represents it in the European Union?" in *The New Politics of European Civil Society*, ed. Ulrike Liebart and Hans-Jörg Trenz (Routledge: Routledge Studies on Democratising Europe 2010), 20.

<sup>20</sup> Stijn Smismans, *Civil Society And Legitimate European Governance* (Edward Elgar Pub, 2006). 9.

<sup>21</sup> Christian Joerges; Yves Mény and J.H.H Weiler (eds), "Mountain or Molehill?: A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance," in *Jean Monnet Working Paper No.6/01* (Florence: European University Institute, 2001), 209.

<sup>22</sup> Beate Kohler-Koch, "Civil Society Contribution to Democratic Governance: A Critical Assessment," ed. Beate Kohler-Koch, Dirk de Bièvre and William Maloney, *Opening EU-Governance to Civil Society: Gains and Challenges* (Germany: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, CONNEX, 2008). 13.

<sup>23</sup> Barbara Finke and Christine Quittkat, "The EU Commission Consultation Regime," ed. Beate Kohler-Koch; Dirk de Bièvre and William Maloney, *Opening EU-Governance to Civil Society: Gains and Challenges* (Germany: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, 2008).

to levels lower than those of 1979.<sup>24</sup> The EU faced major issues bringing its decision-making process closer to the European citizen. Much of the problem stemmed from a lack of connection between the concept of European citizenship and the social rights promised to citizens through the CFHR. The Maastricht Treaty institutionalised and thus legalised Citizenship of the Union in 1992, defining it as 'every person holding the nationality of a member state.'<sup>25</sup> Yet, with only disagreement as to how the concept should evolve, citizenship continues to remain an institutionalised and legalised definition. In the consolidated version of this Treaty, citizens of the Union enjoy the freedom to cross borders, to vote for Members of the EP and the right to address EU institutions or address the EP.<sup>26</sup> In 2004, member states attempted to advance the definition of citizenship to bring it in line with a socially progressing EU, by including the ability to participate directly as a social right. The attempt failed, despite a signed Draft Treaty and plans for a Constitution. The following statement was released by the Council of the European Union in 2007:

The IGC (intergovernmental conference) *constitutional concept, which consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text called 'Constitution,' is abandoned. The Reform Treaty will introduce into the existing Treaties, which remain in force, the innovations resulting from the 2004 IGC.*<sup>27</sup>

The Draft Constitutional Treaty and subsequently the White Paper failed to achieve the EU's primary goal: to create a more prominent role for the citizen in the governance of the Union through the concept of citizenship. While the institutions themselves found some benefits from engaging with organised civil society, European citizens continued to face the challenge of exclusion from the "participatory engineering" structure. It is questionable who "organised civil society" was thus able to represent, given that the distance from grassroots level to the institutions at the top appeared too great to be bridged. As of December 2009, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the CFHR became a legally binding document similar to Union Treaties. The EU moved another step

<sup>24</sup> The average turnout in elections has steadily decreased over the last 30 years from 66% in 1979 to 46% in 2004, with approximately only half the population casting their vote despite the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties providing additional powers to the European Parliament. See Viviana Vánová, "Charting Voting Patterns in European Parliamentary Elections," International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, [http://www.idea.int/elections/charting\\_voting\\_patterns.cfm](http://www.idea.int/elections/charting_voting_patterns.cfm). (Last accessed 23 July, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> European Union, "The Maastricht Treaty - Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community with a View to Establishing the European Community." *Official Journal of the European Union* (7 February, 1992). Article 8, (1).

<sup>26</sup> ——. "Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union." *Official Journal of the European Communities* C325 / 33 (2002). Article 20, 2(a, b, c), 56 – 57.

<sup>27</sup> Council of Europe, *Brussels European Council: Presidency Conclusions*. 11177/1/07 REV 1, (20 July, 2007). Annex I: IGC Mandate, Point I (1), 15.



towards bridging the distance by cementing citizen rights into law. The Lisbon Treaty itemises a number of channels to secure those rights, in particular the right to direct participation, such as the need for European institutions to maintain inclusive dialogue with civil society.<sup>28</sup> Once again, researchers argued the EU was able to use civil society as an 'output-maximising logic'<sup>29</sup> to move away from internal reform, which is supposedly connected conceptually and practically with direct citizen participation. Unfortunately, several studies indicate the opposite, that contact between European Civil Society and grassroots citizens are 'tenuous at best.'<sup>30</sup> There are no real results to prove that a decade of relations between the EU and organised European Civil Society has brought the EU and its citizens closer together.

This failure could be attributed to a number of causes. First, the EU may not in fact wish to bridge the gap between the institutions and the citizens for fear credibility at the top will be undermined by the bottom. According to Giorgio Napolitano,<sup>31</sup> any proposal that heightens the power of the citizen within high-level EU institutions 'would raise major questions and difficulties.'<sup>32</sup> Napolitano's statement begs the question of what shape such difficulties would take: difficulties with institutional performance or, rather, with institutional traditions? Second, the majority of actors involved in the EU may not actually desire the greater involvement of civil society. The EU governance system is already extremely complex and extensive dialogue with outside parties might only slow all processes without actually contributing positively. It could also be argued however, that the problem occurred simply because of the lack of any real plan. 'Civil society' became the new term for 'saviour', the innovative tool that would help the EU advance as a social project as well as an economic project and therefore enhance the quality of its democracy. There is very little understanding of exactly what civil society is, how it should be integrated into the long-term objectives of the EU and how the link between the EU and civil society would translate into a link between the EU and the European citizen. Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat completed a detailed study on how civil society was defined. Their in-depth survey concluded that the image of civil society as propagated by the CEC fits only with a distinct conception of civil society.<sup>33</sup> The fundamental issue appears to be how

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<sup>28</sup> European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community." *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 306/01 (December 2007) (2009 version). Article 11, Point 2.

<sup>29</sup> Francesco Maiani, "Citizen Participation and the Lisbon Treaty: A Legal Perspective," (Aberdeen: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen, 2011), 6.

<sup>30</sup> Sabine Saurugger, "Interest Groups and Democracy in the European Union," *West European Politics* 31, no. 6 (2008): 1275.

<sup>31</sup> President of Italy and Member of the Italian Communist Party.

<sup>32</sup> Giorgio Napolitano in Committee on Constitutional Affairs, "Report on the Role of Regional and Local Authorities in European Integration," in *A5-0427/2002 (Final)* (Brussels: European Parliament, December 2002).

<sup>33</sup> Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2010, 38.

interested parties are permitted to label themselves as a CSO in accordance with EU legislation. Thus, for the authors, the role of civil society is a very contested issue.

It is not the objective of this research however to provide a clear definition of civil society. Such a definition continues to be a subject of debate among social scientists.<sup>34</sup> How the EU is to deal with the issues of social rights and regional policy still remains an open question, echoing the current inability of the EU to effectively contextualise the citizen in EU policy-making. The lack of any real master plan stems from the lack of understanding as to the social prerequisites to citizen participation, which stems from the lack of a solid governance framework to support any citizen-focused initiatives. Although a number of problems are present, they provide a basis for discussion and further research. The question still remains; if utilised correctly, can civil society enhance the democratic quality of EU governance? Two clear themes evident in the development of the EU as an integrated union over the past decade could provide an answer. First is the bottom-up process, or civil society discourse, repeatedly present in EU legislation since the CFHR, remains an innovative concept to be studied in relation to citizen participation, given the lack of understanding of what European citizenship is or could be. Second is the top-down process, or good governance discourse, which focuses on the use of theories of democratisation in terms of their contribution to a strong legislative and policy-making system. Different models of democracy will be more or less demanding with regard to the importance of a strong social component in the EU governance system.<sup>35</sup> Both theoretical discourses have received significant attention from researchers focused on international governance and are two major theories that underpin the progression of this research. Each discourse will now be discussed.

## **1.2 Civil society discourse and the European Union**

The EU has attempted numerous times to establish a stable relationship with civil society on the understanding that doing so will bring the EU closer to the ordinary citizen. According to Michael Edwards, the EU is merely following a trend. Edwards is one of the many researchers to suggest that civil society became the golden nugget in academia, the key to the locked door of social order.<sup>36</sup> American scholar Lester Salamon suggests the role of organised civil society in the twenty-first

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<sup>34</sup> The historical account of civil society and how to define it is detailed by a number of scholars; John Keane, *Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); John Ehrenberg, *Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); M Foley and V Hodgkinson (eds), *The Civil Society Reader* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2002); John Hall and Frank Trentmann (eds), *Civil Society: A Reader in History, Theory and Global Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Jeffrey Alexander, *The Civil Sphere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>35</sup> Finke and Kohler-Koch, 2007, 207.

<sup>36</sup> Michael Edwards, *Civil Society*, Second Edition (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2009). 3.

century will be as significant as, if not more significant than, the nation-state in the twentieth.<sup>37</sup> These positive projections of civil society have arisen in a period when it is recognised that there is a missing link in the success of social democracy. Civil society is deemed to play an important role with regards to the delivery of democracy by incorporating the social into the political. However, the measurable impact civil society can have on political democracies is heavily contingent on how the concept of civil society is understood. In other words, the role of civil society in the EU governance system needs to be clear before the advantage of its existence can be determined. The euphoria surrounding civil society led Bebbington and Bebbington to note that minimum distinctions should be made between formal and informal versions of civil society. Formal civil society, described by Bebbington and Bebbington as organised civil society organisations or NGOs,<sup>38</sup> has been the primary focus of EU communication regarding civil society. Informal civil society, such as social and community movements and grassroots spaces for interaction, is less of a focus, which Edwards argued was because the engagement of formal or informal civil society with governments depended on state-society relations.<sup>39</sup> Edward's argument suggests that the sole engagement of formal civil society with the EU signifies more of a structured state-society relationship between the EU and member states. However, both formal and informal civil society should be involved in the relationship between international institutions and citizens. In fact, informal civil society has been active in the EU since the end of the Cold War, linked with the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, citizens banded together to fight totalitarian regimes, for example channelling the violent tendencies of governments and citizens into peaceful relations through a process of European integration.<sup>40</sup> But also, according to Howell and Pearce, citizens were including themselves into the ever-integrating Union through direct participation to secure their own freedom and self-determination.<sup>41</sup>

At the heart of the EU's civil society logic was the formal branch of civil society or the utilisation of NGOs and CSOs to advance citizens' interests and, subsequently, democracy. Following Howell and Pearce's line of thinking, equating civil society with formal organisations would mean the exclusion of informal groups of civilians. There is therefore some concern over the concept of civil society

<sup>37</sup> Dr Lester Salamon, "The Third Sector and Volunteering in Global Perspective," ed. 17th Annual International Association of Volunteer Effort Conference (Amsterdam: Johns Hopkins University, January 15, 2001), 4.

<sup>38</sup> Anthony Bebbington and D Bebbington, "Development Alternative: Practice, Dilemmas and Theory," *Area* 33 (2001): 7.

<sup>39</sup> Michael Edwards, *Civil Society* (Cambridge: UK Polity, 2004).

<sup>40</sup> These ideas flow from the fall of the Berlin Wall and destruction of the memories associated with violent times in Europe during World War II. John Keane and Jeffrey Alexander progress the idea of civil society as a non-violent third sector within their own versions of European civil society. See Keane, 1998; Alexander, 2006.

<sup>41</sup> Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 15.

within the EU and over the uncritical acceptance of the status of NGOs. William Barndt and Thomas Carothers argue in their article on civil society that the 'fascination'<sup>42</sup> building around civil society has always been a cause for concern. It is good to understand the growing role these organisations play, but not at the cost of other players' participation within civil society or the public sphere. For Carothers and Barndt, opening civil society to a wider number of participants is not simply to further its nobility, but, similar to Bebbington and Bebbington, to create a deeper understanding of the concept of civil society. Not all participants have good intentions.<sup>43</sup> Some participants will argue for local job security or low energy costs, others for free trade and clean air legislation. The concept of civil society is interpreted and defined in multiple ways by researchers studying the same idea; that a strong civil society can ensure stronger political democracies. Even critics dispelling such argument continue to accept the position that a diverse (informal and formal) civil society can help advance democracy.<sup>44</sup> This multi-faceted discourse demonstrates how civil society for the most part has been a point of reference when discussing the struggles of political democracies today: what makes a just society, good governance, social inclusion of all citizens and non-violent relations. However, when deeper questions are asked concerning the civil society concept, it is clear that the civil society discourse is motivated by ideas entrenched in the past. The discourse is ever changing.

The way in which civil society is defined in terms of its application in Europe draws on the historical account of peaceful movements to promote inclusion and diversity within governments and on the utilisation of NGOs in present-day recovery plans to remedy economic and social failure. A recent study of civil society and European governance categorised both accounts of civil society into the role of intermediary, claiming that civil society in Europe should act as the 'transmission belt between individuals and the political system.'<sup>45</sup> Given that the major focus on civil society throughout EU legislation is communication with formal civil society, the authors of the study note that the role of intermediary in modern times is becoming 'frequently unrealistic.'<sup>46</sup> The civil society discourse is discussed in the context of how civil society can engage the European citizen with a

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<sup>42</sup> William Barndt and Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society," *Foreign Policy* 117(1999-2000): 19.

<sup>43</sup> The Russian mafia and militia groups from Montana are also part of civil society. *Ibid*, 20.

<sup>44</sup> Harvard scholar Robert Putnam released a well-known book in 1995 dispelling the argument that a weak civil society leads to a lack of civil engagement by using evidence to suggest a strong civil society in the United States can actually reflect dangerous political weaknesses. See Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (Simon & Schuster, 2001); Shortly after, Sheri Berman, in an article on civil society and the Weimar Republic in Germany, argued civil society failed to secure democracy and in fact led to a shift from populism to nationalism and the Nazi Government. See Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997). However, both authors recognise the failings of political institutions during this time and the potential for civil society to help advance democracy. See also Barndt and Carothers, 1999-2000, 21.

<sup>45</sup> Matthias Freise; Miika Pykkönen and Eglè Vaidelytė, *A Panacea for all Seasons? Civil Society and Governance in Europe*, vol. 5 (Germany: Nomos, 2010). 13.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*.

participatory regime without actually closely linking civil society to the citizen. Other researchers have also noted this mismatch between the EU and civil society. Annette Zimmer and Matthias Friese argue the EU is relying too heavily on civil society to overcome major economic and social challenges to the EU governance system and state that EU member states receives a lot of criticism for being unable to produce satisfactory results.<sup>47</sup> Taco Brandsen completed a study into the idea of NGO involvement in governance institutions located in geographic Europe and how they affect the institutional capacity by making it more innovative. He looked at Dutch social housing NGOs, which tried to influence a state-dominated system of governance to be more innovative in the area of autonomy. Unfortunately, the Dutch social housing NGOs' merits 'remain largely unproven.'<sup>48</sup> They were studied solely on the basis of their ability to act as an advisor on the direction the institutions should take to further their autonomous development. There is a predominant focus not only on the use of formally organised civil society bodies, but also civil society analysed against the perspective of institutional reform, leading to pessimistic conclusions and critical outcomes. For Cathy McIlwaine, as long as the popularity of the civil society concept continues to revolve around institutional reform in Western political democracies, such as the EU, and ignores the issue of distance between the ordinary citizen and the institutions being reformed, then advancing democracy through civil society is 'ultimately unrealistic.'<sup>49</sup>

McIlwaine raises an important point regarding the transnational dimension of EU-civil society-citizen relations. While the citizen is not directly involved, the Union can act indirectly for the citizen to compensate for any effect transnational decision-making processes have on their lives, as long as that process remains accountable and transparent. Civil society is obviously engaged to help legitimise that process, yet the point being made here is that the Union itself is a global *civic* actor, which is discussed in detail by academics interested in the normative interpretations of the role and functions of civil society.<sup>50</sup> Scholars have taken to labelling this interface between internationally-run institutions and the citizen as 'transnationally organized civil society.'<sup>51</sup> Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek

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<sup>47</sup> Matthias Friese and Annette Zimmer, "Bringing Society Back In: Civil Society, Social Capital and Third Sector," (Germany: Department for Political Science, University of Muenster, 2008).

<sup>48</sup> Taco Brandsen in Friese, Pyykkönen and Vaidelytė, 2010, 43.

<sup>49</sup> Cathy McIlwaine, "From Local to Global to Transnational Civil Society: Re-Framing Development Perspectives on the Non-State Sector." *Geography Compass* 1, no. 6 (2007): 1259.

<sup>50</sup> For a detailed account of the EU as a normative power and global civic actor, see Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002); Matthew A MacDonald, "Three Perspectives on The European Union as a Normative Power" (Dalhousie University April 2007).

<sup>51</sup> Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek, "Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation in Global and European Governance," in *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit?*, ed. Claudia Kissling, Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek (Bremen, Germany: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 9.

argue that on an international scale, civil society 'can provide an adequate political realm'<sup>52</sup> with international linkages that can help democratise global governance practices. The adequate political realm the authors speak of could resemble a political space where exchange of opinion, including public opinion, takes place. Thus, policy-making processes can be exposed to the public, offering the chance to create more informal civil society spaces, for example, a community of political action.<sup>53</sup> To assess the ability of transnational civil society (TCS) to advance democracy in global governance structures, Kissling, Nanz and Steffek developed a list of 20 empirical indicators tailored to particular settings of interaction between the international organisation and TCS. These indicators are intended to provide an account of the democratic quality of public participation i.e. transparency and accountability. The study concluded that while TCS consultation holds much promise for democratisation, the EU has not realised the full extent of its democratic potential.<sup>54</sup>

Smismans writes also that the democratic quality of the EU's governance system is somewhat defined by transnational associational life.<sup>55</sup> His own study on the concept of TCS and its relation to EU governance found similar results to those of Kissling, Nanz and Steffek in that the EU fails to recognise the democratic potential of informal civil society participation. Smismans conducted a study for the EESC on the best way to integrate TCS within the Union, which revealed the Union's primary interest was only in those CSOs able to build up the European market. In other words, the use of the TCS discourse is economically driven and is intended to further institutional interests rather than the interests of citizens.<sup>56</sup> The EU, for example, indicated at the dawn of the twenty-first century that its intention to launch collaborative relations with CSOs was founded on the need to 'improve the legitimacy of European policies.'<sup>57</sup> Of course, TCS is argued here as being a tool to help legitimise the EU, yet it remains a one-sided relationship. There is complete negation in the EC's Discussion Paper on the ability of the EU to improve citizen participation using transnational social spaces. Academics are beginning to realise that continually pushing the transnational side of the civil society discourse reveals few real benefits. Institutional reform at the Union level is limiting the positive impact civil society can have at the grassroots level. Anna Domaradzka is one academic

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid,7.

<sup>53</sup> Patrizia Nanz, *Europolis: Constitutional Patriotism Beyond the Nation State* (Manchester University Press, 2007). 1-256.

<sup>54</sup> Claudia Kissling, Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek, *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit?*, Transformations of the State (Bremen, Germany: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

<sup>55</sup> Stijn Smismans in Edward Elgar, *Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance*, ed. Stijn Smismans (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006). 3.

<sup>56</sup> Stijn Smismans, "European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional Interests," *European Law Journal* 9, no. 4 (2003). 482.

<sup>57</sup> European Commission, "The Commission and Non-Governmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership," in *Commission Discussion Paper* (Brussels: European Commission, January 2000). 2.

focused on bringing civil society to the individual level. Domaradzka argues in her work that the micro level, or local level, is where change is more visible regarding social activism in the EU.<sup>58</sup> Although Domaradzka focused on producing “typologies” of individuals involved in women’s CSOs in Poland, her study still examines civil society in the individual lives of those involved. While Domaradzka has furthered the concept of *individualism* within the civil society discourse, her work does not target the issue of assigning more ambitious goals to the discourse in terms of skills, knowledge and movement forward of society as a whole. Discussion of how civil society can really engage the individual as well as the Union in a process of democratisation will require consideration of an ethical and moral dimension that connects civil society to theories of democratisation.

### 1.3 Cosmopolitan democracy discourse and the European Union

The best way forward, given that there are multiple theories of civil society, is to bring clarity and rigour to the role of civil society on a case by case basis. In the case of the EU, there is some disappointment regarding the evolution of the European citizen in the EU institutional system. Whether civil society in all its forms can advance the EU from the bottom-up without further complicating the institutional structure at the top is a query that still needs to be addressed. Before this is possible, there must be a strong, democratic governance framework in place that is supportive of some dependency on the third sector. Democratic governance is defined in multiple ways, depending on the different democratic functions assigned to the governing body.<sup>59</sup> Following an analysis of the civil society discourse in Europe today, it is clear there is an element of informal civil society missing from the EU governance structure. Thus, the EU will be studied within the context of liberal democratic theory based on the understanding that liberal democratic theorists agree, to an extent, with the need for a clear focus on the individual human and their interests, rights and freedoms. This is not to say that in developing liberal democracy, civil society is not available to neo-liberals, conservatists, right-wing or realist theorists as a tool to further democracy, but it does argue that the advancement of civil society and the liberal democratic system together best reflects the assignment of new democratic functions, such as individualism, to the EU governance system. Cosmopolitan theory, a more recently devised democratic theory in the family of liberal democratic theories, is appearing more frequently in the works of academics focused on

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<sup>58</sup> Anna Domaradzka, "Filling the Gaps? The Role of Civil Society on the Individual Level: The Case of Polish Women's Organizations," in *A Panacea for all Seasons? Civil Society and Governance in Europe*, ed. Matthias Freise, Miika Pyykkönen and Eglè Vaidelytė (Germany: Nomos, 2010), 289.

<sup>59</sup> Keane, 1998.



applying some of the principles and values of democracy to global politics.<sup>60</sup> The theory of cosmopolitanism assumes one of the main values of democracy is the achievement of social rights by all individuals. In the words of scholar Thomas Pogge, cosmopolitanism is the view that 'every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern.'<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, governing institutions are to be shaped to recognise freedom of equality and work to realise that equality, in order to fulfil this moral concern.

Cosmopolitan theory is not a new discourse in Europe. The origins of European cosmopolitanism have followed a moral and political path, growing alongside Immanuel Kant's historic political writings (1784, 1785, 1793, 1795, 1797). Kant posits an ideal cosmopolis law, where both states *and* individuals find peace as 'world citizens.'<sup>62</sup> European integration has followed a process of institutionalisation to build a framework of governance, including treaties and charters, where the priority is achieving citizen equality. Following Kant's positing of the idea of cosmopolis law, Europe quickly became known as the birth place of cosmopolitan theory.<sup>63</sup> The European is identified as an individual, a citizen of a nation-state, a citizen of a member state and now a citizen of an international governance system, where the rule of law facilitates equality.

A cosmopolitan Europe is clear about two things: integration primarily as an ideology, as an *ideal*, and the multileveled role for the individual. Yet, this is where the clarity ends. Cosmopolitanism has also tangled the thought processes of the most advanced social scientists and political scientists since it began with Kant's idea of Europe. Namely, the continual attempt to redefine the governance system of the Union as it grows and changes has proven unfruitful. Kant described the concept of a United Europe as 'the object of desire and fantasy'<sup>64</sup> in the 1700s and it continues to be described as such by theorists such as Julia Kristeva.<sup>65</sup> Then there is the idea of the system of *Europeanization* as described by Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, who state that Europe as it is known does not really exist.<sup>66</sup> In less perplexing terms, EU governance represents an ongoing process of institutionalisation

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<sup>60</sup> Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, David Held and Mary Kaldor are some of the better-known scholars working on utilising cosmopolitan theory to advance the individual in an increasingly globalised world.

<sup>61</sup> Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002). 169.

<sup>62</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, ed. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 107-44.

<sup>63</sup> Richard Beardsworth, *Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory* (Polity, 2011). 18.

<sup>64</sup> Evi Varsamopoulou, "The Idea of Europe and the Ideal of Cosmopolitanism in the Work of Julia Kristeva," *Theory, Culture & Society* 26, no. 1 (2009).

<sup>65</sup> Europe is to be understood as a 'subject in process,' according to Kristeva's cosmopolitan Europe, where individual human existence will be central in the future. For more on Kristeva's post-structural cosmopolitan theory see Julia Kristeva, *Nations without Nationalism*, ed. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); ———, "Europhilia, Europhobia," *Constellations* 5, no. 3 (1998); ———, *Crisis of the European Subject*, ed. Trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2000).

<sup>66</sup> Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe* (Polity, 2007). 6.



(*Europeanization*), intertwining the concepts of transnationalism (governance beyond the *nation-state*) and intergovernmentalism (governance between the *nation-state*). Evidently, there remain fixed political bodies, such as the nation-state, which will continue to stay fixed as long as they exist. Yet, the application of any liberal democracy to EU governance will be unable to capture the realities of this ever-integrating body unless treated as a flexible project. For example, in Kant's theory, the existence of a *world citizen* is justification for the institutionalisation of equal treatment of others because it is used as a flexible and conceptual goal to promote universal human rights. If the idea of a world citizen becomes rigid, it clings to one dominant governance structure, effectively separating itself from all other cultures, ethnicities and religious identities to become its own class. Rigidity in cosmopolitan theory can in fact risk creating two groups of individuals, the elite citizen and the ordinary citizen. The Union is subject to constant refinement due to ongoing integration and the process of outward enlargement. The objective of a cosmopolitan framework of governance will need to be the maintenance of individual rights as the unit of moral concern. Appropriate institutional design is necessary, for example the inclusion of informal and formal civil society, to recognise those rights.

The flexible nature and adaptability of cosmopolitan theory to different global political situations explains why it is also used to understand the role of transnational governance. Cosmopolitan theorists believe the increasing importance of transnational spheres is due to the recent transformation of international society to a global society.<sup>67</sup> The roots of such debate can be found in the work of Hedley Bull. Bull made a significant contribution to the understanding of international systems and international society through his ideas on pluralism and solidarism, which in their own way add to how global governance is understood today.<sup>68</sup> His theories, on internationalist politics in particular, introduce the role of international bodies such as the EU, to whom the concept of collective decision-making is confined. Advancements alongside the EU, i.e. the continuation of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization means individuals can petition internationally and are not confined to the boundaries of the nation-state. Bull considered the creation of these organisations to be a shift from an international system to an international society.

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<sup>67</sup> Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," *Ethics* 103(1992); Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, *Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford University Press, 1998); Barrie Axford and Richard Huggins, "Globalization and the Prospects for Cosmopolitan World Society" (Oxford Brookes University, 2001); Patrick Hayden, *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*, Ethics and Global Politics (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005); Beardsworth, 2011.

<sup>68</sup> For a detailed account on the concepts of pluralism and solidarism, see Hedley Bull, *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977). Also see Samuel Makinda's analysis on Bull's concepts of the international society and international system in Samuel Makinda, "Hedley Bull and International Security," *Working Paper no. 3* (September 1997).

In an increasingly integrated world, in which threats to international security more frequently than before transcend national boundaries,<sup>69</sup> the expansion of international society is considered by some to be a necessity, not an option. Although not yet fully embraced by the international community, the idea of global society is fast becoming an overtly discussed topic in cosmopolitan-focused literature.<sup>70</sup> Global society places emphasis on the individual and a potential community of mankind rather than governments and a community of transitioning states.<sup>71</sup> According to Francis Fukuyama, the development of global society requires a clear distinction between the social, political and economic dimensions of governance in order to understand that their relation to each other makes it easy to overstate the degree to which globalisation is responsible for the integration of societies worldwide.<sup>72</sup> In this statement, Fukuyama reflects upon the fact that the nature of the relationship between these dimensions differs significantly in today's world from what it was historically. For example, power politics and hegemonic domination is a historical part of international society, but expecting a contemporary developing nation to implement the political order of neoliberal America or communist China is no longer viable. As international society transforms to global society and integration efforts are stepped up, there is a shift in priority from the interests of national governing bodies to the interests of mankind and humanity. At least for Fukuyama, there is a greater understanding, or perhaps a greater awareness, of the relationship between sovereignty and citizenship, between the political and the social. The nature of social interaction is advancing the smaller actors; they are becoming louder. Scholars of cosmopolitan theory have begun to ask what this means in terms of the democratic quality of governance being produced. The work of David Held is particularly notable in this area and of ever-increasing relevance to the EU. Held's notion of cosmopolitan democracy was introduced as a theoretical framework to explain the transition from international society to global society. Held has focused on the theory of cosmopolitan democracy to explain the need for global society as a remedy to the increasing dependency among states and among peoples on what theorists are calling a 'global equivalent of a domestic government.'<sup>73</sup> According to Held, global society as such can promote the achievement of global democracy in institutions such as the EU.

<sup>69</sup> James Rosenau provides a simple yet enlightening description of today's cross-border problems; 'intermestic – that is, issues which cross the *international* and *domestic*.' James Rosenau in David Held, *Governing Globalization*, ed. Anthony McGrew (London: Polity, 2002). 70-86.

<sup>70</sup> Barrie and Huggins, 2001; Hayden, 2005; David Held and Garrett Wallace Brown, *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (John Wiley & Sons, 2011).

<sup>71</sup> Bull, 1977, 26.

<sup>72</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "Part V: Toward a Theory of Political Development. Chapter 30, Political Development, Then and Now," in *The Origins of Political Order: From Pre-human Times to the French Revolution*. (Profile Books 2011).

<sup>73</sup> Richard Beardsworth, "Assessing Cosmopolitan Theory in World Politics," *e-International Relations* (27 May, 2012), <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/27/assessing-cosmopolitan-theory-in-world-politics/>. (Last accessed 25 July, 2012).

Held developed three models of sovereignty in his most prominent work.<sup>74</sup> Cosmopolitan sovereignty (the last of the three models) recognises that international law has become the centre piece of responses to offences often uncontrollable at the national level, such as terrorism. Held's theory poses seven principles as the political framework for global society: 'equal worth and dignity, active agency, personal responsibility and accountability, consent, reflective deliberation and collective decision-making, and inclusiveness.'<sup>75</sup> An eighth principle, sustainability, was added later.<sup>76</sup> The simplest way to understand cosmopolitan sovereignty is through its encapsulation of Fukuyama's methodology; engaging the political, legal, economical and social as separate yet related aggregates using these eight principles. Held has devised a framework for global society based on human rights and the rule of law that aims to respect the differing economic and political systems existing around the world. As a theory, Held's cosmopolitan democracy theory has challenged international realist theory in two predominant ways. First, the role of the individual in global governance has greater priority than the interests of the nation-state. In liberal democratic systems, the state is a legal structure of power dedicated to national, and more recently international, political systems, whereas cosmopolitan democratic theory associates the state with political authority. Second, Held's theory supports societal transformation in line with the traditions, cultures and interests of that society. In Held's words, a framework was required to take off from where the end of international society has left democracy struggling to overcome shifts in global politics.<sup>77</sup>

#### **1.4 Moving forward: A brief discussion**

In the last decade, the EU has changed tactic in terms of its governance structure, to engage organised civil society in its legislative process. Although a small change, it is highly significant for a number of reasons. First, this action comes at a time when the international system is shifting away from powerful state interests and a subsequent hegemonic culture to look within the nation-state to the development of local societies and communities. Second, it demonstrates the EU is undergoing a transformation phase of its own, from a representative to a participatory governance system, by attempting to bring the social dimension alongside the predominant economic dimension. Unfortunately, the EU has struggled to use civil society effectively as an intermediary between itself and the citizen. Consequently, the EU is finding itself without a European community, European identity and the confidence of the European citizen. There is room within the EU for democratisation

<sup>74</sup> David Held, "Law of states, law of peoples: Three models of sovereignty," *Legal Theory* 8, no. 1 (2002). 1-44.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>76</sup> David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities*, (Polity Press, 2010). 69.

<sup>77</sup> ———, "9/11, and the End of the American Century," *openDemocracy* (9 September 2011), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/david-held/911-and-end-of-american-century>. (Last accessed 23 May, 2012).

during this social crisis. There is no need for the multiple theories surrounding this topic to become too complicated. Despite differences in opinion, the general understanding by academics and researchers is that a just and democratic governance system is difficult to achieve today without the involvement of strong associational spaces. The desired strategy is therefore to see both the international and local levels working together.

At the local level, the EU focuses on inclusive and constructive dialogue with its civil society partners. Over time, a mounting body of evidence is slowly accumulating that suggests civil society is no longer a fluffy concept but an empirical tool to help advance the public sphere. However, there remains heated but slightly unhelpful debate over which model of civil society is most appropriate to state-society relations in the context of the international political system today. Narrowing the concept of civil society to a single model could restrict or weaken the movement of other areas of civil society. For example, the dominant focus of the CEC on relations with formally organised civil society disregards the fact that informal civil society is just as much related, if not more related, to the development of the EU. The current use of the civil society discourse within the EU is exclusive of civil society spaces at the grassroots level, or local civil society. The motivation to engage formal civil society is to democratise the Union at the Union level only: there is no real focus on the individual citizen. This is by no means however a reason to turn away from the civil society discourse as a suitable democratisation tool for the EU, but is instead a reason to re-engage civil society focusing on the grassroots level. Part of the change required here is a mental shift in academia, where the rigid perception of civil society as helpful to global democracies only where TCS is involved needs to become flexible and inclusive of other perceptions of civil society.<sup>78</sup>

Such thinking highlights a lack of a concrete social plan that breaks down the efforts to utilise the local public sphere within TCS. The capacity for citizen participation and the enhancement of democracy refers less to political equality via public control and more to legitimising policy at the European level. Currently, no local level is engaged within the governance structure of the EU. At the international level, global democratic theorists are attempting to find ways to democratise democracy in order to help institutions such as the EU develop appropriate governance strategies in times of change. Heldian cosmopolitan theory aims to bring international society one step closer to achieving global society. While his intentions are good, Held's cosmopolitan democracy remains a risky framework. In the process of refurbishing democracy, Heldian cosmopolitanism is also


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<sup>78</sup> Nanz and Steffek, 2007; Elgar, 2006. See also Kissling, Nanz and Steffek 2007; Paul Magnette, "Democracy and the EU: Why and How to Combine Representation and Participation?," in *European Governance and Civil Society*, ed. Stijn Smismans (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006); Stijn Smismans, "Commentary: Europeanization, the Third Sector and Other Civil Society," *Journal of Civil Society* 6, no. 1 (2010).

challenging the role of the world's most prominent actor – the state. There are challenges and opportunities involved with this theory. The challenge will be the incorporation of two contrasting yet inseparable themes of modern politics: the global and the individual rather than the global and the state. The opportunity is that in recognising the importance of these two themes, cosmopolitanism increases the chances of universal participation and Kant's world citizenship. Herein lies an additional problem. In removing the role of the state, the global and the individual are expected to meet within global society and a global community. To gain "membership" of the global society, the eight Heldian principles of global democracy must be adopted, which immediately calls into question the relationship-building tactics of cosmopolitan democracy and their representation of individual identity. There is a risk of hypocrisy, whereby Heldian cosmopolitanism overrides its own promotion of inclusive societies and respect of difference. Currently, there is too much of the international level engaged within the discourse.

Despite these potential issues with the nature and reach of the civil society and cosmopolitan democracy discourses, both have ignited sophisticated debate over the ability to achieve citizens' interests and rights on a global scale. Unfortunately, both have lost their focus on the individual. There are three core ideas to take forward with regard to the EU – the idea of citizen participation, the effect that cosmopolitanism will have on democracy and the ability of the EU institutions to legislate accordingly in response to both of the above. This research thus aims to blend adapted versions of the two predominant theoretical discourses that deal with these three ideas into a cosmopolitan governance framework, which utilises both the legislative structure of the Union (top-down) with civil society as the local stakeholder (bottom-up). The framework, which will be outlined in *Chapter Two*, aims to bring together debate on two core concepts, civil society and cosmopolitanism, that share similar ambitions and failures, but are yet to work together to achieve and overcome both of those. Two hypotheses can be devised from the analysis above, which will form the basis of empirical investigation carried out in the latter part of this paper. The first of these is that in the current international political environment there is both a political and economic incentive for the EU to invest in more grassroots-focused legislation that engages the ordinary citizen. The second hypothesis states that the role of the ordinary citizen within the EU can be encapsulated more effectively by local, rather than transnational, civil society. Empirical assessment will thus cover the ability of both the transnational sphere and the local sphere to work together. The thesis will conclude that civil society, when utilised correctly in a governance framework, can enhance the democratic quality of the EU by creating three core conditions for direct citizen participation. Figure 1 below outlines the conceptual framework within which the study described above will take place.

**Figure 1: Conceptual Methodological Diagram**



## 2. CHAPTER TWO: CIVIL COSMOPOLITANISM AND ITS CRITICS

The purpose of *Chapter Two* is to clearly define what constitutes a model of civil cosmopolitanism, how it builds upon Heldian cosmopolitanism and what its application would mean for the EU. The core element of any cosmopolitan model of international democracy is the individual as the unit of moral concern. Thus, a cosmopolitan framework of international governance needs to be theoretically designed to ensure a governance system within which the individual can wholly participate. This chapter introduces a model of *civil cosmopolitanism*, an advancement, rather than a reinvention, of Held's cosmopolitan democracy, which has the goal of democratising the international governance structure of the EU so that it meets the universal right to participate. The components of civil cosmopolitanism steer away from Held's focus on global society and the rigidity of world citizenship and bring the cosmopolitan discourse closer to the ground level. Civil cosmopolitanism is a socially-orientated model, turning internally towards local society and community, as well as encouraging the EU to invest in grassroots strategies that recognise the capacity of local institutions to create a form of participatory democracy within the EU. In this sense, it reflects a flexible side of cosmopolitan theory by providing a framework that supports the work of elites alongside regional cohesion.

Civil cosmopolitanism is a mixed model of democracy comprised of three components that, when combined, set it aside from previous models of liberal democratic thought. The three components are *individual morality*, *local institutionalism*, and advancements to David Held's political theory of cosmopolitan democracy to include *social democracy*. Parallel to Held's work, the model's primary ambition is to create a framework in which the individual can be linked with the global; or in the case of this research where the individual can be linked with the Union. Its three components have been designed to support this strategy and provide some context as to how the model would contribute to improving democracy within the EU. Firstly, the model's theoretical purpose is to ingrain individualism based on the principle of morality within political theory and the EU system. Second, the model's practical purpose is to connect local and just institutions, built to support individualism, with the Union's governance mechanisms. Finally, civil cosmopolitanism aims to enhance global political democracy in general by equating the social dimension with its political counterpart, before moving forward with the political transformation from international to global society as Held advocates. The three components demonstrate in isolation the ways in which model aims to improve the democratic quality of the EU. The components, in conjunction, also provide a local context for civil society and its relation to the Union. This chapter details the model in theoretical

terms as a seminal observation regarding new ways of approaching the issue of democratising the governance system of the EU. Civil cosmopolitanism then remains to be explored in terms of its development as a feasible governance model in the following chapters of this thesis.

## **2.1 The principle of morality**

Firstly, civil cosmopolitanism is built to be applied to the governance structure of the EU because of its ability to incorporate expansion, i.e. EU enlargement and the fluctuations that come with the EU being an international organisation. In practice, it is not always clear how best to incorporate expansion. Cosmopolitans might favour further integration for the universalistic values it promotes, but also reject it on the basis it encourages administrative technocracy with the increase of elites and political representatives.<sup>79</sup> In both cases, the motive behind acceptance or rejection is the desire to achieve the most moral path of integration for the individuals involved. Individualism, defined here as the importance of the individual, is treated within a model of civil cosmopolitanism as a cross-cut ideology that turns the concept inward. That is to say, as well as focusing on the cohesion of individuals “outside” states within the Union, the EU would focus on furthering the cohesion of individuals in existing member states of the Union. To achieve the most moral path, the ideology of individualism is built on the concept of *morality*. In other words, the choice to further or lessen the integration of individuals into the Union’s governance system requires the Union to follow an ethical or moral decision-making process.

To be clear, the principle of morality is not defined in terms of the universality of rules or a set of Heldian or Kantian preconditions within a political body,<sup>80</sup> but rather morality is defined in terms of producing, teaching and encouraging ethical behaviour. The production of ethical behaviour ideally follows those basic social, political, cultural and economic rights of any given society in the interest of diversity.<sup>81</sup> The moral decision-making processes of the EU regarding the integration of the individual will thus be preoccupied with creating just and fair societies to stimulate the production of ethical behaviour. In a civil cosmopolitan governance system, morality importantly realises the rights of individuals (elites and citizens) exist at all times and not just when certain preconditions are met. In a real life setting, the principle of morality requires the EU to focus on individualism at both the

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<sup>79</sup> Adam Brinegar, Seth Jolly and Herbert Kitschelt, "Varieties of Capitalism and Political Divides over European Integration," in *European Integration and Political Conflict*, ed. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 72.

<sup>80</sup> See the works of R.M. Hare, who built his ideas in part on Kant’s. See R.M. Hare, *Language of Morals* (Oxford 1952). R.M Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford 1963).

<sup>81</sup> C. H. Whiteley, "On Defining Morality," in *The Definition of Morality*, ed. G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker (Great Britain: Taylor & Francis, 1970), 22.



top level and the bottom level, overseeing the elite and the citizen working together, which creates space to experiment with the relationship between the political and the social and their ability to produce just and fair societies. The principles of justice and fairness are important to a civil cosmopolitan governance framework because their application to European societies is with the intention of producing an environment in which democracy can flourish. In addition, this type of framework advances the democratic quality of the EU's existing governance framework by prioritising the legitimisation of society over the legitimisation of EU institutions. Free and just societies provide the base for the second and third components of the model.

## **2.2 Institutionalism – State-building and local civil society organisations**

From the perspective of individual morality, that the EU projects the building of strong societies is important for three connecting reasons. First, building a strong role for the individual will be paramount to the cohesion of individuals as European citizens within the EU. Second, the role of the individual will be constructed from the perspective of ethical behaviour, so as to ensure all individuals' rights are included. Third, the necessity of engaging in ethical behaviour will be in response to the need for greater participation of all individuals in a contemporary EU. Questions remain, however, as to the structure and arrangement of the institutions within local society that will supervise and support the creation of transnational arrangements between the Union and the individual. How is a transnational process to be carried out locally within the Union? Institutionalisation, in the sense of state-building, is the second important component of civil cosmopolitanism. Institutions are the regulators of the ethical behaviour expected within the principle of morality. They are expected to convey all the qualities of legitimacy, which is not a reality at present.<sup>82</sup> Given that civil cosmopolitanism aims to further the idea of individualism within political theory, there is no theory at present adequately equipped to consider either the appropriate arrangement of formal and informal local-body institutions or their impact on the EU's social objectives. Part of the reason for this lack is because EU-level institutions, unlike those of traditional international organisations, have been granted the powers to achieve these objectives, as defined in the EU's founding treaties, without local-body institutions.<sup>83</sup> Following the recent crisis of confidence regarding these high-level institutions (dubbed the Eurozone crisis), a civil cosmopolitan

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<sup>82</sup> Andrew Follesdal, "Democracy, Legitimacy and Majority Rule in the EU," in *Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship*, ed. M. Nentwich and Albert Weale (Routledge, 1998), 34-48.

<sup>83</sup> Jörg Monar, "The European Union's Institutional Balance of Power After the Treaty of Lisbon" (University of Sussex, 2010), 1. Monar is the Director of European Political and Administrative Studies Department at the College of Europe, University of Sussex.

governance framework necessitates that the EU place greater emphasis on the role of local-body institutions in EU governance, which is a timely and necessary decision.

How the component of institutionalism works is therefore increasing the chance for citizen advocacy and mobility by making local institutions central to EU policy making. Institutions would be structured formally or informally, but in order to solidify the concept of morality they must be just. The idea of *just institutions* stems from Pogge's basic concept that all members involved in EU governance are citizens, regardless of their social, economic or political status, and citizens have the responsibility to other citizens to impose the most fair and just social situations upon them.<sup>84</sup> The EU as a system of high-level institutions is likely to be predominantly concerned with injustices in the form of evident human rights violations, i.e. the consistency of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the European Convention on Human Rights. Under civil cosmopolitanism, the type of injustices the EU is expected to be concerned with is the production of excessive political or economic inequalities at the local level, which can come at the expense of social rights. The elite owe it to the ordinary citizen to institutionalise justice. Given that the EU would be expected to find a place for local institutions in the policy-making process, it would subsequently be compelled to make individuals, regardless of their status, the primary focus of its mandate.

### **2.3 Social cosmopolitan theory and democracy**

Connecting both the *moral* and *institutional* components of the model is a third and final component of *social cosmopolitanism*. In contrast to the dominant view of cosmopolitan theory, analysed in *Chapter One*, in which the individual can strive to become a world citizen in the wider world, social democracy does not presuppose any separation of the individual from their own society or require a homogenous world citizenship. Before further analysing this component, it is important to be clear about why social democracy matters. Why does it matter that the political systems of the EU are further connected with local societies when politicians at the EP, for example, are paid to represent these citizens? Why should a system of participatory democracy (defined as democracy in which 'decision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public groupings'<sup>85</sup>) be considered necessary when a system of representative democracy (defined as self-determining democracy,

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<sup>84</sup> Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism: A Defence," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 5, no. 3 (2002): 87.

<sup>85</sup> Originally it was American student radicals in the 1960s who urged a revival of "participatory democracy." Their definition, used in this thesis, was developed and published in James Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets*, Second Edition (Harvard University Press, 1994). 333.

where people have the 'right to select their own leaders'<sup>86</sup>) is already functioning and used to conduct EU decision-making processes? The simple answer is the inability of a purely representative form of governance to keep up with social democratisation efforts and an ongoing integration process. Quite simply, the current governance model of the EU will struggle to incorporate the pressures and expectation of its citizens that are becoming louder with each new day of the crisis if it is bound by the parameters of high-level decision-making processes. Civil cosmopolitanism has been designed specifically to account for a changing social environment, in which public groups are banding together and pushing for social change from the elite. The component of *social democracy* calls for the EU to widen its governing structure to include the voices of these public groups. Their participation will be vital to a successful EU governance system and improve the quality of democracy at the EU.

Despite the ongoing global upheaval and Eurozone crisis that has rocked the political and economic side of the EU, civil cosmopolitanism advocates the events will merely result in the realisation that deeper social integration in the EU is necessary. If applied to the EU, a model of civil cosmopolitanism would entail more inter-state cohesion to ensure the EU continues developing as a global civic actor. From the perspective of representative democracy, democratisation efforts are restricted to furthering the power of the EP only, an action of institutional reform already proposed in several treaty revisions.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, an increase in legislative powers is purposeless if the EP suffers from lack of public interest.<sup>88</sup> Civil society has a more socially-orientated set of standards that move away from a focus on the EP. The component of social democracy does of course expect the EU to make changes at the institutional level because the social dimension needs to catch up to the political dimension before the political dimension can and should be advanced. However, the legitimisation process is carried out at the ground level. The EU then needs to welcome the prospect of change by engaging with the actors within the societies of its member states that are working to achieve direct participation and social democracy. Social cosmopolitanism remains a new and somewhat elusive concept; its existence in civil cosmopolitanism brings the EU to the forefront of the citizens' perspective of the global crisis and gives rise to further testing in order to assert the potential of the social dimension in democratisation efforts.

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<sup>86</sup> The definition of representative democracy, 'representative pluralistic government,' was provided by President Ronald Reagan in an Address on democracy in 1987. See United States Department of the State, "Promoting Freedom and Democracy in Central America," (Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987).

<sup>87</sup> For example, Altiero Spinelli's (pro-European integration Member of the European Parliament) resolution on the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, see European Union, 1984.

<sup>88</sup> Alex Warleigh, "Substantive Democracy and Institutional Change: The Paradox of Codecision," in *Paper to the EUROPUB Conference 'European Governance and Democracy: What Prospects, Opportunities and Threats?'* (Brussels: Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research, Queen's University, Belfast, November 2002), 11.

## 2.4 Networking, the glue behind the model

When the three components are combined, civil cosmopolitanism is an advancement of global cosmopolitan theory. The aim is to apply that advanced form of cosmopolitan theory, which defines more clearly the link between the individual and the global; between the bottom and the top, to the EU governance system. In this study, the link that requires further defining is the component of social democracy, which calls for the EU to address the rise in public backlash throughout the world today. The EU must respond and make itself accessible to its citizens. It is a difficult situation to face during a pressing financial crisis and with the struggles of the current EU governance system. Civil cosmopolitanism stands to create change by demanding the EU focus on the building of strong local communities, i.e. building a local civil society platform that enables social integration to be at the heart of democratisation efforts directed at the EU. Practically, in order for this strategy to be tied together as an effective unit of stability, it is necessary there be an appropriate communication system between all actors, in particular between the local and international. In the model, this communication system is termed *networking*. Manuel Castells's idea of "the network state" and on networking and relation-building in general were investigated due to their relevance to the EU. Castells defines the *network state* as 'a state characterised by the sharing of authority...along a network'<sup>89</sup> and proceeds to outline the importance of recognising difference at the state level in terms of power and status. The network has no nodes and thus no centre, meaning that all nodes are interdependent, so that even the most powerful node cannot ignore the others.<sup>90</sup> This is relevant to Europe's social crisis today, where, despite being a hegemonic power, Germany's fate rests on the weakness of Greece and Cyprus. Castells's networking system separates itself from a centred political structure of power and hierarchy, the structure most commonly referred to in international relations theory.

The idea of networking finds a similar point of relevance within civil cosmopolitanism, for example the establishment of interdependent nodes of communication between individual and civil society as well as civil society and EU institutions. Networking is the glue between the various actors in that it will allow for debate, discussion, disputation and mediation in order to progress societal transformation. Civil cosmopolitanism advocates for a more highly structured networking system than that envisaged by Castells, given that it has an institutional centre – local civil society. It is proposed that the individual citizen connects with the EU most effectively through local civil society.

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<sup>89</sup> Manuel Castells, "European Unification in the Era of the Network State," *openDemocracy* (12 December 2001), [http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europefuture/article\\_347.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europefuture/article_347.jsp). (Last accessed 21 May, 2012).

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

Thus, the networking system within civil cosmopolitanism can be defined as *relation building that extends opportunities for individual engagement arranged around an institutional centre*. It is these seemingly unimportant individual voices that often find themselves excluded from governance structures, when in reality inclusivity and diversity contribute the most to the preservation of Held's ideal rightful share in the process of governance today.<sup>91</sup> When put into practice, the aim of relation-building in the networking system is to resemble the natural growth process of a tree, where the tree trunk resembles a communications matrix from which multiple branches of interaction between public and private actors can grow.<sup>92</sup> These multiple branches will extend interaction opportunities to minorities, which form the institutional centre, or the trunk. The networking system is the part of the model that will be of tangible benefit to the EU, given that the EU currently faces a tough communication challenge with the ordinary citizen at the local level. The system's workings are built with the specific task of enhancing the democratic quality of international governance structures by communicating the needs of all individuals, without stopping at national borders.

## 2.5 A critical perspective on cosmopolitan democracy

As a theoretical model, civil cosmopolitanism aims to support a transnational governance structure that needs to cope with societal transformations in order to advance public accountability. Civil cosmopolitanism alters existing cosmopolitan theory, thus it is appropriate to consider arguments that disagree with the propositions made in this model, if for no other reason than to assess its credibility. Disagreement is expected, particularly given that civil cosmopolitanism is expanding a theory known on the world stage for originating in Europe, the hub of Western politics. There is no doubt that such a positive assumption about the role of the individual citizen will be challenged by Eurosceptics in more ways than one. As a theory of methodological individualism, there are four areas in general where critical opinion of civil cosmopolitanism has been predicted.

<sup>91</sup> David Held, *Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance* (Stanford University Press, 1995). 273.

<sup>92</sup> The idea of relation-building being similar to the process of cultivation was first mentioned in William Connolly's work on citizen networks. See William E. Connolly, "Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism," *Political Theory* 28, no. 5 (October 2000); ———, "Cross-State Citizen Networks: A Response to Dallmayr," *Journal of International Studies* 30 Part 2 (June 2001); Linda S. Bishai, "Liberal Empire," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 1(2004): 64.

### 2.5.1 An unjustified imposition of the cosmopolitan account, a realist perspective

Realist critique of cosmopolitan theory has long existed. As an avowed realist, Danilo Zolo believes that the state is the only actor in the system that can possess legitimate political power.<sup>93</sup> Zolo would explicitly deny that a model of civil cosmopolitanism, which draws heavily on networking to endorse civil society, has any footing to stand on. He would instead claim that state sovereignty will allow the nation-state to uphold its power and leave little room for a civic network. Zolo, who has produced a series of articles and books on cosmopolitan theory and its relation to global governance, uses examples of the Holy Alliance and the somewhat disastrous UN interventions into Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) to demonstrate the lack of desire for liberal democracy on the international political scene. Zolo specifically questions the credibility of cosmopolitan theory and whether it can be anything but 'an inherently hegemonic and violent undertaking.'<sup>94</sup> There seems little point in attempting to further transnational governance from the bottom-up when war, power and elitism have existed in the roots of society for all of history and continue to flower today. Furthermore, a solution that begins with civil society is inept in a world run by power-politics. For theorists such as Zolo, the issue is not one of the nation-state being rendered obsolete, but rather of the failure of social cosmopolitanism to see that social transformation from a grassroots perspective only intensifies the characteristic of domination.<sup>95</sup> Thus civil cosmopolitanism may point to individualism on the understanding that protection of difference will protect individual rights, but also on the understanding that it risks setting a standard for societal homogenisation.

One important point to note regarding a realist critique of cosmopolitanism is that, although realist scholars argue strongly that existing models are undesirable, the *goal* of most cosmopolitanists is not argued as undesirable. Zolo does not claim the protection of individual rights is of no interest to the international system, but argues instead that the current models advocating their importance should be revised.<sup>96</sup> There is no doubt that theory needs to be adaptable to changing circumstances in the international political world. As recognised by civil cosmopolitanism, society is where the aspects of ethics, participation and ultimately democracy can best be deepened. In this sense, realist theory can be criticised for its own exclusionary tendencies and inability to incorporate social democracy. Zolo's examples of the American War on Terror in Iraq, the invasion of Haiti and other hijackings of the international system used to argue against cosmopolitanism are actually examples

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<sup>93</sup> Danilo Zolo, "A Cosmopolitan Philosophy of International Law? A Realist Approach," *Ratio Juris* 12, no. 4 (1999); ———, "Towards a 'Weak Pacifism'," in *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 131.

<sup>94</sup> Danilo Zolo, *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 15.

<sup>95</sup> Robert Fine, "Taking the 'Ism' Out of Cosmopolitanism: An Essay in Reconstruction," *European Journal of Social Theory* 6, no. 4 (2003): 464.

<sup>96</sup> Zolo, 1997, 44.

of the very reason cosmopolitan theory needs to exist: the democracy deficit where the nation-state fails on its own. In reopening the case for local civil society, civil cosmopolitanism is offering the opportunity for a non-threatening governance model that advances public accountability and participation within EU member states at the European level. In contradiction to realist criticism of social transformation as abstract domination and universalist, therefore, civil cosmopolitanism has constructed grassroots cosmopolitanism; cosmopolitanism from the perspective of the actor *being* liberated, not from the perspective of one actor liberating another. As it was Zolo himself who questioned *how* cosmopolitan theory can overcome human aggression, there can be no issue with a theoretical attempt to revisit the themes of human equality and globalism.

### **2.5.2 Wishful thinking? Constructing a model of the EU as it ought to be**

Despite projecting itself as a mixed model and thus attempting to produce a cosmopolitan democracy that appears desirable at the top and bottom, civil cosmopolitanism is likely to face the argument that desirability does not necessarily equate with feasibility. As a model, it may be rejected based on the fact that it merely seems desirable, rather than setting the conditions for a strong democratic governance framework for the EU. Although the focus of social cosmopolitan theory in the model is to engage the ordinary citizen within European-level governance, there has been no mention of anything legally binding during this process of societal transformation. Robert Fine, a leading European scholar on the history of social and political thought, supposes that a process of social or political transformation imagined within any theoretical framework will face practical difficulties when it comes to representation, enforcement and of course, implementation.<sup>97</sup> With a flourishing civil society, is the nation-state expected to establish cosmopolitan party systems and governmental departments? If not, how does civil society guarantee the component of morality and ethical behaviour and avoid irrelevancy in the political world? As a point of comparison, Timothy Brennan aligns the situation of the cosmopolitan social community to that of the cosmopolitan economic community. The difference between the two is that the economic community is linked to the global by way of market flow – capital and trade. The link between local and global is a reality. In contrast, Brennan states that the social community is an ‘exported ideological product.’<sup>98</sup> It is merely a set of unrealistic, overwhelmingly liberal ideals with no connection to the financial model of cosmopolitanism, in which institutions are emerging to govern commodities, exchange rates, interest rates, prices and sale of goods; the way the world goes around in general.

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<sup>97</sup> Robert Fine, *Cosmopolitanism: Key Ideas* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>98</sup> Timothy Brennan, "Cosmo-Theory," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 100, no. 3 (Summer 2001).61.

However, the EU is living proof that transnational liberal spheres work successfully. Of course, EU governance is directed and managed by a number of treaties, EU statutes and other laws, which need to set a clear mandate for the engagement of local civil society. Yet, this is not necessarily a call for more legislation. No increase in legally binding documentation is going to fix a social issue. Civil cosmopolitanism will need to remain very clear on the limits of cosmopolitan theory in this way. It does not attempt to create binding international law, agreeing with critics here that the vision of enacting global justice remains in the conceptual. Instead, it attempts to recognise the EU as it is legally and as it could potentially be socially. This was part of the decision to implement a local model that promotes basic rights of individuals, rather than trying to recreate human rights hand-in-hand with international politics. Following this analysis, there remains little credibility in Brennan's argument that cosmopolitanism, from a social perspective, corresponds to an ideological product only. Human rights, preservation of identity, political participation, ethics, cultural beliefs and individualisation, all ideological products referred to in social cosmopolitanism, have already been legally constituted in EU documentation.<sup>99</sup>

### **2.5.3 A strategy based on exclusion**

The issue of local civil society brings the analysis of civil cosmopolitanism as mere idealism to a final point. The expected compatibility of the model to many different local situations is unrealistic. Predominantly, if the EU opens up to further enlargement and deeper integration, there can be no promise by civil society to empower the grassroots and encourage citizen participation where there is conflict in the interests of different members in a society, for example in cases in which some citizens are sceptical of the EU while others might want "more Europe." Heikki Patomäki argues that the impartial characteristics of cosmopolitanism ignore these differences and instead split the world between heroic morality and differing geographic and historical dimensions. He supposes the possibility of de-contextualized individuals,<sup>100</sup> or ethereal figures, that attempt to bind these geographic differences together through the guiding hand of ethicists. These lines of contention spark the argument that cosmopolitan theory 'cannot capture the political "realities" of the international realm.'<sup>101</sup> Civil cosmopolitanism would be viewed as holding a sort of unconscious

<sup>99</sup> For example, the European Court of Human Rights. See the European External Actions Service; *The European Convention on Human Rights*, Rome. Council of Europe, (November 1950); *Charter of Fundamental Rights*, see European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union." *Official Journal of the European Communities*, Document C 364/01 (December 2000). The Charter became legally binding with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, see European Union, 2007; European Union, "European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights." *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 386/1 (20 December 2006a).

<sup>100</sup> David Held and Heikki Patomäki, "Problems of Global Democracy: A Dialogue " *Theory, Culture & Society* 23, no. 5 (2006): 120.

<sup>101</sup> Held and Wallace Brown, 2011, 123.



belief of itself as the perfect model. Its foundation is built on a democratic system perceived to promote autonomy and inclusion, yet this inclusion is a forced one deemed acceptable because of the natural desires of the model. Thus it is actually exclusionary, reflecting a closed system project applicable to Europe only. Martin Munro and Robbie Shilliam demonstrate how independence in Haiti, arriving two decades after that of the US, accelerated Haiti ahead of America and challenged European ideas.<sup>102</sup> Yet, examples from the Caribbean are not included in the majority of European-focused cosmopolitan projects.<sup>103</sup> Cosmopolitan projects are therefore based on the exclusion of the *Other*, and focus only on a reference to the European self, thus projecting an unwelcome atmosphere to non-natives within European societies. The authors' purposeful use of a non-Western example of peace building aims to highlight that not all projects of emancipation are devised from a European perspective of the 'self.'

The problem with Patomäki, Munro and Shilliam's arguments is that they fall in line with claims that civil cosmopolitanism advocates the construction of a homogenous European society and culture. Patomäki, Munro and Shilliam all make valid points, but the vital details of a civil cosmopolitan model override this criticism. The model merely breaks down cosmopolitanism to review history and extend upon what has and has not worked between the local and international level. This means looking at the successes of the European model and considering where there are gaps between high-level governance and local-level citizen participation. It also means looking at the failures. Civil cosmopolitanism has grasped the side of Europe that was constructed through colonialism, slavery and imperialism, hence the focus on social rights and recognition of difference. The moral, institutional and social components of civil cosmopolitanism are designed to automatically assume difference through identity, and historical and cultural preservation. As a more flexible version of cosmopolitanism, it can be moulded when applied to various societal types.

## 2.6 Summary

Civil cosmopolitanism is a governance model designed to address a missing link in the relationship between the EU and its citizens, that is, the lack of focus on the social dimension of politics where the individual and the elite can better connect. The idea is that by creating a strong social space the democratic quality of EU governance will be enhanced by progressing EU values of equality and inclusion, promoting culture and establishing a shared identity. The model predicts that, in order to

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<sup>102</sup> Robbie Shilliam, *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity* (Routledge, 2010).

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, 161.

ensure a high quality of democracy, engagement of local civil society – organised groups of citizens – will play a role in ensuring institutions exist and strong societies stem from growth on the ground. Utilising local civil society as a tool, civil cosmopolitanism's three components and central networking system combine to create an EU that is more accessible to the general European citizen by making individualism and societal transformation a core focus of EU policies and initiatives. If the EU wishes to continue promoting the message that it is a global civic actor, its governance system must work to deliver that message. For example, the policy and decision-making processes in a civil cosmopolitan governance system are designed to work with the ground level and reflect the processes of an institution that cares greatly at the top about the citizen on the ground.

To summarise the points of criticism, two strong arguments against the model's assumptions arise. The first of these states the nation-state is the only true community where the individual can thrive. The second finds problems in the transcendent individual reasoning apparent in cosmopolitan theory. Scholars of the latter argue that the trouble with community development incentives led by individuals is that they hold the individual in an elitist light, which creates an unrealistic sense of governance and can even remove political equality, for example when the Draft Constitution did not go ahead. Both arguments encapsulate modern anti-cosmopolitanism, a movement that argues it is simply not rational to expect humanity to be guided by a universal reason simply because, for an anti-cosmopolitanist, 'there is no such reason.'<sup>104</sup> The EU, however, is guided in part by a hope for perpetual peace, where a single European citizenship and a single European identity is part of a Union mindset. This does not mean to say that having international citizenship and international rights is to override national status and differing moral spheres of activity i.e. communities. Quite the contrary; individuals are primarily citizens of their nation-state and initiatives that strengthen the nation-state from the ground up are an important part of global justice in promoting communal autonomy and cultural difference.

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<sup>104</sup> Richard Shapcott, "Anti-Cosmopolitanism," in *International Ethics: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 56.

### **3. CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES BEHIND INVESTING IN “GRASSROOTS” AT THE UNION LEVEL**

In light of *Chapter Two*, one can form the assumption that, when put into practice, civil cosmopolitanism's dual aim is to engage strong and just societies through local civil society and balance competing nationalist and internationalist claims by focusing on the citizen. In order for that to become a reality, there is more than likely a need at the transnational level to understand two things. Firstly, whether there is significant value in policy that mixes traditional top-down governance strategies with bottom-up governance strategies, such as the engagement of local civil society. Second, whether there is a need to produce more mixed policy of this sort as advocated for by civil cosmopolitanism. To assess the accuracy of this assumption, *Chapter Three* will address hypothesis one, whether there currently exists a political or economic incentive at the Union level to further the case for more grassroots-focused policy and thus the case for deeper engagement of local civil society. In other words, is the time right within the EU system to introduce a governance structure such as the one proposed by the civil cosmopolitanism model? Part of the examination into the EU governance structure involves looking at what social policies exist, what initiatives are being introduced, and whether the end results match up with proposed objectives by EU staff or not. In this analysis, the aim is to shed light on the political and economic workings of the Union in its current form (a transnational federation of nation-states) to discover if there is a need for increased adoption by the Union of social policies with a mix top-down and bottom-up governance strategies working to engage the citizen. That is, to understand how social policy currently supports a civil cosmopolitan governance structure and where there may be room for development.

#### **3.1 Creating room for citizen participation and social cohesion at the Union level**

##### **3.1.1 Citizenship initiatives beyond the Eurozone crisis**

The issue of citizenship in the EU is a timely one. The economic crisis, although described as the worst in the EU's history, has been referred to as a 'wake-up call'<sup>105</sup> by President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso in his 2012 *State of the Union* speech. Correcting the financial markets and stabilising the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is of course an essential part of the recovery, but what Barroso speaks of is a wake-up call concerning the loss of coherency

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<sup>105</sup> José Manuel Durão Barroso (President of the European Commission), "State of the Union 2012 Address," in *Speech / 12 / 596*, ed. European Commission (Plenary Session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg: European Union, 12 September 2012).

at the political level and subsequently the gradual loss of community. The EU is a community project not a governmental project, but the point of departure during this crisis is the community. In other words, the role of the citizen and the flourishing of communities need to be of central concern to the EU in its future plans. European leaders share a similar perspective on the issue, evident in the significant shift of governance initiatives with regard to their prioritisation of social cohesion and regional development. The EU and member states have been cooperating through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on social inclusion initiatives since the year 2000, but results in relation to citizen participation and cooperation within the Union are generally considered insufficient by most stakeholders.<sup>106</sup> While it is questionable why there was never a move to ensure satisfactory results, the underlying problem is likely to be an overall lack of direction in social policy, a mix of good and bad policy. Such a conclusion is drawn following the release of the EC's *Europe 2020*, a strategy proposed to significantly help Europe become a unified body. The clear-cut objectives and ambitious goals of *Europe 2020* point to the gap in previous Union institution strategies: few long-term targets in policy or initiatives and no common goals.

*Europe 2020* is built around three priorities for growth - smart, sustainable and inclusive - where the key to all three is innovation.<sup>107</sup> One of the three priorities in the seven-year strategy is inclusive growth; the innovative investment in economic, social and territorial cohesion. To discourage social exclusion and encourage citizens to take an active role in the Union, the EC has set the target of 20 million fewer people at risk of poverty.<sup>108</sup> Given that the population of the EU in its entirety (27 countries) currently stands at just under 504 million,<sup>109</sup> the EC has set the ambitious target of lifting 4% of the population out of poverty. If the EU adopts *Europe 2020*, the goals will be clear and the targets for social inclusion will be set. There remains an unanswered question however; what strategies will be in place to oversee their efforts? There will be those who argue that *Europe 2020* was a necessary proposal simply because the economic crisis ruined what social and economic strategies were already in place to oversee the achievement of EU targets. Yet, when proposed pre-crisis and post-crisis social policies at the Union level are taken into consideration, one could suggest that there remain structural weaknesses, regardless of the crisis.

<sup>106</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies / Directorate-General for External Policies, "EU Policy Challenges 2009-2019: A Report to the President," (Brussels: Policy Departments, European Union, 2009), 33.

<sup>107</sup> European Commission, *Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth*. COM(2010) 2020 Final, (Brussels: European Commission, March 2010). 3.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Eurostat, "Population EU (27 countries) at 1 January," Total Population (Brussels: European Union 1 January 2012).

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1> (Last accessed 12 October, 2012).

In terms of social and cohesion policy, the EU has predominantly focused on *Citizenship*, a programme initiated in the year 2000 to enable citizen participation in the EU. When the programme was extended in 2006, the name was changed to *Europe for Citizens* and the objective extended from improving citizens' participation to 'giv[ing] the citizen a key role'<sup>110</sup> in the EU. Given that the programme has continued for twelve years, its success is evident in the fact it has received sustained investment, with a financial envelope of 215 million EUR until mid-2013.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, the EC has already had its proposal to expand the *Europe for Citizens* programme adopted. The programme now has the capacity to encourage civic participation at the Union level during the 2014-2020 period, demonstrating clear recognition that the promotion of citizen participation is necessary for the Union to function successfully and democratically. Another important factor is that all proposals for the programme have focused on two predominant action areas: active citizens and active civil society.<sup>112</sup> The programme focuses on creating greater opportunity for citizen-led projects and initiatives and for CSO involvement, as part of the overall objective of linking the European citizen and the EU. One key measure of the success of the EC's recently launched continuation plan for *Europe for Citizens* will be the extent to which it can increase awareness and change the perception of the EU amongst European citizens.

The importance of direct citizen involvement at the Union level in *Europe for Citizens* has been acknowledged in the continuation of the initiative. However, despite the existence of a long-term economic and social crisis, *Europe for Citizens* remains the only community-led development plan that promotes civic participation and active remembrance (remembrance of the fundamental values that make up the EU's foundation, such as freedoms and rights of the European citizen). Furthermore, a mid-term review of the programme carried out in 2010 demonstrated shortcomings and problems related to 'unmet demand.'<sup>113</sup> Given the ambitious targets set for social inclusion and growth in *Europe 2020*, it should be considered whether the new citizenship proposal for 2014-2020 will be enough. The proposed financial envelope (budget) alone has increased by a mere 15 million EUR.<sup>114</sup> The financial envelope not only fails to reach a symbolic "one Euro per citizen" goal, or a total of around 500 million Euros, it is also less generous than the current 2007-2013 financial envelope when inflation and proposed increases to the overall EU budget for 2014-2020 are taken

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<sup>110</sup> European Commission, "Education and Culture > EVE > Platform: Citizenship," European Commission, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education\\_culture/eve/alfresco/faces/jsp/browse/browse.jsp](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/eve/alfresco/faces/jsp/browse/browse.jsp). (Last accessed 28 July, 2012).

<sup>111</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies, "Culture and Education: Europe for Citizens (2014-2020)," in *Structural and Cohesion Policies*, ed. Policy Department B (Brussels: European Parliament 2012a), 7.

<sup>112</sup> ———, "Education and Culture > EVE > Platform: Citizenship."

<sup>113</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012a, 7.

<sup>114</sup> European Commission, "Proposal for a Council Regulation: Establishing for the Period 2014-2020 the programme "Europe for Citizens"," (Brussels: European Union, December 2011). 3.

into account. If anything, the lack of funding further highlights the issue of the lack of strategy to oversee the means taken to achieve the long-term goals set out in the EU's 2020 plan. On 1 October 2012, the office of Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Hannu Takkula (Committee for Education and Culture) submitted a written question to the EC requesting information as to why *Europe for Citizens* would continue to be the only initiative of its nature at the Union level when there was a clear link between civic participation and democratic governance. The response, which was not received until December 2012, mentioned that several other political initiatives are taking place in this domain, but then failed to list anything other than the Year of the European Citizen (2013).<sup>115</sup> Unfortunately, there have been no new debates, awareness-raising activities on EU citizens' rights or additional projects scheduled to get underway during 2013. The EC's awaited response was addressed by the Chair of the Committee on Education and Culture, who pointed out that essentially all initiatives are designed on behalf of the citizen.<sup>116</sup> The Chair highlighted the idea is to avoid adding unnecessary legislation to the policy mix in order to move forward with simplified policy overall. Regardless, it is difficult to see how policy is currently communicating with citizens that the EU values their participation as a useful strategy in the long-term.

In light of the above, there are two clear priorities at the Union level with regard to social policy and the development of citizenship. Continued efforts to encourage citizen participation are evident with the *Europe for Citizens* initiative and innovative features of the single methodology for regional funding. The Union remains rigid, however, with regard to considering additional initiatives. It may be that in effect every programme initiated by the EC stands to benefit the EU citizen, but initiatives that explicitly engage the individual as an EU citizen have been acknowledged as having proven results for democratic engagement and active remembrance on a European level.<sup>117</sup> While the push for financial easing within the EU budget might reduce the administrative burden for citizens and EU members, as predicted,<sup>118</sup> it might also restrict the focus on enhancing citizenship to immediate outputs and results. The overall size of the financial envelope is simply not substantial enough to sustain the big picture goals that *Europe for Citizens* was set up to achieve. In this sense and as a

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<sup>115</sup> Viviane Reding: Vice-President and Commissioner responsible for Justice; Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, 13 December 2012. See Reding, "Answer Given by Ms Reding on Behalf of the Commission" in *Question for Written Answer: Active Engagement of the Citizen* <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-009775+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (Last accessed 7 January, 2013).

<sup>116</sup> European Parliament Committee on Culture and Education, "Establishing Programme "Europe for Citizens" for the Period 2014-2020" (paper presented at the Meeting of the Committee on Culture and Education, ASP 3E2, European Parliament, Brussels, 2012).

<sup>117</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012a.

<sup>118</sup> European Commission, "Simplifying Cohesion Policy for 2014-2020," (Brussels: European Union, February 2012a).

flow-on effect, accomplishing the ambitious social targets of the 2020 strategy also becomes a lot more challenging and requires a lot more innovation.

### **3.1.2 European Parliament, the inside view**

The EP is the only representative body within the Union that directly represents the European citizen. There are around 6000 staff members working on behalf of separate European states, as MEPs, advisors or assistants for one of eight political groups and for the many sectoral committees and delegations for relations with foreign countries. As a unified political body, it puts citizenship and citizen-focused governance strategies at its very heart. Analysing citizenship from the point of view of parliamentary individuals is likely to reveal any cleavages that exist in the Parliamentary body with regard to social and cohesion policy. Their personal and political views are very important to understanding if there is an overarching desire for an increase in mixed governance strategies that promote grassroots participation and broader participation in the decision-making system. In general, it is difficult to study the impact individuals can have in the Union as it is hard to piece together data. With regional and social cohesion policy however, the multitude of actors, including MEPs, national political representatives, think tanks, local body organisations and citizens, means a wide range of opinions can be gathered and the opportunity for comparison exists. The issue of Party preferences, nationalism and cleavages within the Union is important for two reasons. First, it will help to understand whether individuals from countries with higher social standards are likely to push for policies encouraging integration and protection of citizens at the Union level and vice versa. Second, there is no pan-European Party at the EU level to work for the European citizen as a whole; thus there is no overall stance on community development. Gaining an understanding of how social policy is currently perceived within the Union can occur instead from direct contact with the parliamentary actors. Overall, understanding the opinions of EP staff may highlight potential gaps between what is desired by the EU and what ends up being produced by the EU.

Using a standardised open-ended interview structure, four parliamentary staff members<sup>119</sup> were interviewed in the week starting 1 October 2012 and three members of a think tank connected to the Parliament were interviewed in the week starting 15 October 2012.<sup>120</sup> With the short timeframe and small number of interviewees, it was important to select a mix of political parties, nationalities, positions, responsibilities, Committee representatives and an even number of men and women

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<sup>119</sup> Member of European Parliament Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Member of European Parliament Hannu Takkula, Policy Advisor for Regional Development to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (request to remain nameless), Policy Advisor for Regional Development to the Group of the Greens (request to remain nameless).

<sup>120</sup> Independent Expert Michael Keating, Director of the Centre for the Study of Migration, Inter-Ethnic and Labour Relations Nicos Trimikliniotis, Member of the Committee of Regions Luc Van den Brande.

(currently only one third of MEPs are women). Participants were asked the same set of questions<sup>121</sup> to gain insight into the real position of the political representatives on what type of Union they wanted to see for future generations. The overall feeling is that there is too much contrast within the EU, that there is now a two-speed integration process. One Policy Advisor for Regional Development for the Group of the Greens, of Austrian nationality, stated he personally believed continued integration was the way forward. He argued that the EU was supposed to represent a single set of top-down institutions working with communities from the bottom up and that to reach a functioning governance of this type requires further integration.<sup>122</sup> A Policy Advisor for Regional Development from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) centre Party, of Bulgarian nationality, agreed that the EU is supposed to reflect a mixed top-bottom governance model, but stated it has lost the bottom-up aspect. She explained how the problem with regional development has become 'an issue of accountability.'<sup>123</sup> The EC relates with the CoR and the CoR listens to the umbrella organisations, but given that the focus has been predominantly at the Union level, blame has fallen on the EC only, when there needs to be responsibility at the local level. Both interviewees requested anonymity to protect their jobs. Their views similarly reflect a desire for regional development to be a greater focal point in EU policy or, it is argued, the bottom-up aspect will be lost.

Speaking from the perspective of an umbrella institution in Madrid, Professor of Processal Law Helena Soleto Muñoz mentioned in an interview in July 2012 that many nations such as Spain have turned inward to concentrate on national issues. Ms Muñoz works for the UC3M on mediation and conflict projects that are funded by the EU. While organisations such as the UC3M are trying to form enhanced relations with the EU, she notes there 'isn't really a platform they can congregate on',<sup>124</sup> at the local level, especially during times when the nation has turned inward. She strongly emphasised the fact that Spain has emerged from a forty-year dictatorship and citizen initiatives remain a strange concept. The EU needs to encourage programmes such as *Europe for Citizens* if it wants to engage the Spanish and given that programmes such as ERASMUS (education exchange programme) have been so successful, it is difficult to understand why additional like-minded initiatives wouldn't be a primary focus. MEP Hannu Takkula from Finland, Member of the Committee for Culture and Education, picks up on Ms Muñoz's point about the success of ERASMUS. Mr Takkula is a leading advocate for the role of education in enhancing citizen participation in the EU. According to Mr

<sup>121</sup> See Appendix for interview questions.

<sup>122</sup> Interview with Policy Advisor from the Group of the Greens, Interview 5 October 2012. Length 20.21 minutes, (Brussels, European Parliament).

<sup>123</sup> Interview with Policy Advisor from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, Interview 5 October 2012. Length 15.01 minutes, (Brussels, European Parliament).

<sup>124</sup> Interview with Helena Soleto Muñoz, Interview 19 July, 2012.



Takkula, the problem is that citizens are unaware of the EU's potential because the Union currently faces what he calls an 'unbearable communications deficit.'<sup>125</sup> This returns to Ms Muñoz's point about the lack of public space where citizens and the EU can communicate. Educating EU citizens' on their role within the Union should thus begin with establishing political spaces as a base for communication and relation-building efforts. The European Policy Centre (EPC), a Brussels-based think tank working with the EP on new integration policy, argues that getting people involved in the EU remains the number one challenge. In the EPC's 2011 Annual Report, Director of Studies Josef Janning noted the crisis has 'offered such an opportunity'<sup>126</sup> for the EP to involve citizens, to make a case for the Europe they wish to see. However, there is by and large a sense of agreement that the social dimension is lacking somewhat from the governance structure of the EU in the sense that the citizens are not heard. In the United Kingdom for example, the House of Lords has expressed the need for a freeze on the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) until the citizen voice advocating for greater investment in research, innovation and job creation is heard.<sup>127</sup> If, however, it makes sense to advance the social aspect and connect citizen participation to the economic and political policy-making process of the EU, it begs the question as to why the EU is not jumping to the task. The obvious difficulty is that social policy is somewhat more complicated than political and economic policy. As Nicos Trimikliniotis from the EPC pointed out in an interview, dealing with real social interactions is something policy-makers struggle with because 'they think in boxes.'<sup>128</sup> Policy-makers are confined by the regulations and financing constrictions placed upon them to the extent that even the best legal instruments are unlikely to properly depict a social situation. In this sense, it has been described at the EPC as 'an illusion'<sup>129</sup> to think that civic participation could be tailored in an abstract manner in Brussels at the EP because it has to be tailored to local situations, hence the need for local political spaces.

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<sup>125</sup> Interview with Member of the European Parliament Hannu Takkula on the Role of Education in Democratisation of the EU, Interview 1 October 2012. Member of the Committee for Culture and Education, Length 35.06 minutes (Brussels, European Parliament).

<sup>126</sup> Josef Janning in European Policy Centre, "Annual Report 2011," ed. King Baudouin Foundation and the Compagnia di San Paolo (Brussels: Europe for Citizens Programme of the European Union, 2011), 9.

<sup>127</sup> Government of the United Kingdom response to Para 266, Part Two of the European Union Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 Draft Agreement, in United Kingdom House of Lord's EU Committee, "EU Multiannual Financial Framework Report: Government Responses Grid," (London: Government of the United Kingdom, May 2012), 1.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Nicos Trimikliniotis on EU Integration and Social Policy, Interview 17 October 2012. Director of the Centre for the Study of Migration, Inter-Ethnic and Labour Relations, untimed, (Brussels, European Policy Centre).

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Luc Van den Brande on his role as President of the Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs, Interview 17 October 2012. Member of the Committee of Regions (retired from his Presidency role in September 2012), untimed, (Brussels, European Policy Centre).

An attempt has recently been made to move more definitively in the direction of a regional development model that combines bottom-up with top-down approaches. In 2012, the CoR organised a consultation that focused precisely on adapting the governance framework of the EU. On this matter, the CoR suggested that the EC pursue coordinated action with local actors.<sup>130</sup> The overall response from Parliamentary representatives was positive, except for those in the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFDG). While he remained unavailable for comment, Nigel Farage, a British MEP from the EFDG, spoke in the EP on 7 September 2012 and criticised any future plan that encouraged more coordination and centralisation, calling it ‘fanaticism.’<sup>131</sup> Mr Farage’s comment is fuelled by a concern that democracy in the nation-state is being undermined, based on the idea that too much political power is being accumulated outside of national governments. These comments, however, focus specifically on the prospect of shifting EU governance to the authority of the Community Method only. Advancing the Community Method does not have to mean allocating excessive power to any actor in the EU governance structure. Unfortunately, no action has been taken to date following the CoR’s consultation. At this stage, while the fate of the Euro remains in doubt and political discussion of a possible Banking Union continues, progress should focus to some extent on the part of the crisis that can be attributed to the EU’s social failures. This is not to say an overhaul of the Community Method is required, but rather the policy that addresses the Community Method could be analysed in terms of effectiveness within the community. Chair of the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and MEP for Spain Juan Fernando López Aguilar spoke passionately about his belief in policy that engages citizens through bottom-up strategies. For the EU to remain faithful to its values, with democracy first and foremost among those values, it needs to be faithful to itself as a social model of governance in order to deliver for the EU citizen.<sup>132</sup> When asked whether he felt the opportunity now existed for the EU to advance the role of the citizen and progress the EU’s value of democracy, his answer was simple; the EU ‘must advance the role of the citizen,’<sup>133</sup> it must make this shift in governance.

The personal opinion of experts engaged with and from within the EP points to one predominant issue: policy must connect with the citizen and attempts to do so cannot be successful to this effect if consultation is not widely sought. Discourse analysis conducted in *Chapter Three* demonstrates

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Nigel Farage in European Parliament, "Nigel Farage Destroys Barroso's State of Union" in *Debate: State of the Union Address by Commission President José Manuel Barroso* (Strasbourg, France: YouTube, 12 September 2012). [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vms\\_vd\\_yWgY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vms_vd_yWgY) (Last accessed 19 October, 2012).

<sup>132</sup> Interview with Juan Fernando López Aguilar on Advancing the Democratic Quality of EU Governance, Interview 4 October 2012. Chair of the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and Member of Parliament in the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, Length 15.46 minutes (Brussels, European Parliament).

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

how vital the voice of the local is perceived to be in the current climate. These findings point to the possibility of failure in the 2009 Lisbon strategy, which, as noted in *Chapter One*, strove to further civic participation in the EU by altering the structure of EU institutions. With the primary focus being a power reshuffle at the top, it is likely there was not enough involvement of *all* actors. As Luc Van den Brande from the CoR mentioned, the EU should prepare itself for a shift from multi-level governance to “multi-actorship.”<sup>134</sup> It is no longer about new institutions, it is not about opening up new discussion after eight years of debate on Lisbon and institutional reform, it is about duty and responsibility being met and room being given to the important factors i.e. inclusion, health, entrepreneurship and education. The following part of *Chapter Three* will address the economic workings of the EU budget for regional development and social cohesion in the current climate and what incentives exist to further invest in strategies committed to these important factors.

### **3.2. Funding citizen participation: what does the future hold?**

#### **3.2.1. The structure (social expenditures) in the budgets of the EU and the US**

To gain a more accurate perspective on what constitutes adequate funding for regional development and social cohesion initiatives, a brief comparison between the European budget for social cohesion and the same budget of another major international player could be helpful. Looking at the experience of the US makes economic sense, given that the institutional arrangement of the EU has been described as ‘not unlike’<sup>135</sup> the monetary policy-making process of the US. The Federal Reserve System of the US, designed in 1913, offers regions in the country a direct say in policy decisions by diverting power away from a central hub. The executive role of the EC can be compared with that of the US President and the citizen-representative role of the EP with that of the US House of Representatives. To compare the structure of social cohesion funding of these two actors firstly requires a definition of social cohesion. In preparation for the 2012 Draft Budget, the EC defined funding for social cohesion as funding covering ‘issues which are of key concern to the citizens of Europe, including health, consumer protection and civic protection.’<sup>136</sup> For example, projects and programmes put forward for the 2012-2020 period include *Europe for Citizens* (investing in European citizenship), *Creative Europe* (protecting Europe’s cultural sector), *Health for Growth* (funding actions under the Health umbrella) and the *Annual Work Programme* in the area of Consumer Policy (enforcing consumer rights). All of these policy initiatives were devised with the purpose of funding

<sup>134</sup> Interview with Luc Van den Brande, 17 October 2012.

<sup>135</sup> Jahyeong Koo and Mark A. Wynne, "Business Cycles under Monetary Union: A Comparison of the EU and US," *Economica* 67(2000): 349.

<sup>136</sup> European Commission, "Statement of Estimates of the Commission for 2012 (Preparation of the 2012 Draft Budget)" in *Political Presentation, Document 1 SEC (2011) 498* (Brussels: European Union, 20 April 2011), 33.

community-initiated projects related to each category. The programmes are specifically linked to development in local societies, where civil society can play a role in their fulfilment. Similarly, the US Office of Management and Budget created a Social Innovation Fund (SIF) in 2009, where funding social cohesion is to fund 'opportunities for Americans to serve their community and country...to develop, evaluate and scale up successful ideas.'<sup>137</sup> Both definitions refer largely to investment in citizenship initiatives to meet citizens' needs, as well as community-led development to address critical societal challenges.

The US Federal Budgets and EU Budgets from the last two years (2010, 2011 at the time of writing) were analysed based on the amount of funding directed towards social cohesion: citizenship and community-led development. Over the last few years, the EU has contributed around 1.14% of its Gross National Income (GNI) towards its annual budget.<sup>138</sup> In 2010, the EU produced a budget worth 141.5 billion EUR and increased this to 141.9 billion EUR in payments in 2011, which, although small in terms of money actually allocated, amounts to a 2.9% increase.<sup>139</sup> Table 1 below shows the amount of funding allocated to social cohesion policies from the 2010 and 2011 EU budgets:

**Table 1: Social Expenditure in the European Union Budget 2010-2011\***

| Costs Itemised by<br>Policy Area  | Expenditure<br>Estimate 2010<br>(billion EUR) <sup>140</sup> | % Change from<br>Budget 2009 | Expenditure<br>Estimate 2011<br>(billion EUR) <sup>141</sup> | % Change from<br>Budget 2010 |
|-----------------------------------|--|------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| <i>Sustainable Growth</i>         | 64,3   | +3.3                         | 64,5   | +0.4                         |
| Cohesion                          | 49,4   | +2                           | 51,0   | +3.2                         |
| Convergence                       | 40,4   | +3.7                         | 42,5   | +5.0                         |
| Regional                          | 7,6  | -6.2                         | 7,1  | -6.8                         |
| competitiveness and<br>employment |  |                              |  |                              |
| Territorial cooperation           | 1,2  | +6.7                         | 1,3  | +5.6                         |

<sup>137</sup> United States Office of Management and Budget, "A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise," (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 2009), 111.

<sup>138</sup> European Commission, "EU Budget 2011 Financial Report," (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012b). Executive Summary, 8.

<sup>139</sup> ———, "Budget 2011 in Figures," (Brussels, Financial Programming and Budget, 3 October, 2012). [http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2011/2011\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2011/2011_en.cfm). (Last accessed 4 October, 2012).

<sup>140</sup> Figures in Table 1 from European Commission, "E.U Budget 2010 in Figures, Building a Social Europe," (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009).

<sup>141</sup> Figures in Table 1 from European Commission, 2012b, [http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2011/2011\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2011/2011_en.cfm). (Last accessed 4 October, 2012).

|  |     |       |     |       |
|--|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| <i>Citizenship, Freedom, Security and Justice</i>                                | 1,7 | +10.5 | 1,8 | +8.0  |
| Freedom, security and justice, <i>including</i> fundamental rights and liberties | 1,0 | +16.2 | 1,1 | +13.2 |
| Citizenship**  | 0,7 | +2.8  | 0,7 | +0.0  |

\* Figures in Table 1 listed in footnotes 140 and 141

\*\*including media, culture, consumer protection

Two notable figures stand out from Table 1: the significant decrease in funding of *regional competitiveness* and the increase in funding for *citizenship, freedom, security and justice* from the allocation of 2009. Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, funding for the states that had joined the Union was easily accessible. The near collapse of the financial system in the recent financial crisis has resulted in a decrease in regional funding due to reduction in allocations to the new member states.<sup>142</sup> Yet, despite the crisis, there has been a near 11% increase in the funding allocated to the citizenship policy area in 2010 and an 8% increase in 2011. The simultaneous occurrence of these two funding changes (an increase in *citizenship* funding and a decrease in *regional competitiveness* funding) indicates recognition that the EU is not simply a Union of financially competitive states; it is also a social project. Economic unison can only really occur if social unison is achieved. What can be seen occurring is an important reorientation of European finances from economically-focused social cohesion policy to socially-focused social cohesion policy. Freedom and respect for fundamental rights are issues of central concern to citizens<sup>143</sup> and similarly should remain core objectives of the EU given that the Charter of Fundamental Rights has the same legal value as the Treaties.<sup>144</sup> It would be interesting to know if a turn of events is the reason behind such a funding change and whether further enquiry will reveal the reason is an inconsistent and incoherent approach to funding citizenship issues to date. An international comparison could be useful here. Public policy in the United States has also recently seen an increase in the channelling of funds to social policies. The SIF was created specifically to encourage a successful non-profit sector. In 2010, the US had a budget total of roughly 3.5 trillion USD, which was increased to 3.6 trillion USD

<sup>142</sup> ———, 2009.

<sup>143</sup> Initiatives such as 'Youth on the Move,' 'Europe for Citizens' and 'European Platform against Poverty' have sprouted in response to concerns that social policy is too economically-focused.

<sup>144</sup> Armelle Arnould, "The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty, in Particular Article 6 TEU, on Member States' Obligations with Respect to the Protection of Fundamental Rights," in *University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper 2010-01* (Luxembourg: Faculty of Law, Université du Luxembourg, 29 July 2010).

in 2011 (2.7 trillion EUR and 2.77 trillion EUR respectively<sup>145</sup>).<sup>146</sup> Both budgets were close to one quarter of the entire US Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table 2 below shows the amount of funding allocated to social cohesion policies from the 2010 and 2011 US budgets:

**Table 2: Social Expenditure in the United States Budget 2010-2011\***

| Costs<br>Itemised by<br>Policy Area   | Expenditure<br>2010 USD<br>(in millions) <sup>147</sup> | Expenditure<br>2010 EUR<br>(in millions) | %<br>Change<br>from<br>2009     | Expenditure<br>2011 USD<br>(in<br>millions) <sup>148</sup> | Expenditure<br>2011 EUR<br>(in millions) | %<br>Change<br>from<br>2010 |
|---|---|--|---------------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------|
| <i>Corporation<br/>for National<br/>and<br/>Community<br/>Services<br/>Social<br/>Innovation<br/>Fund</i> | 1,150<br><br><br><br><br>50                             | 0,884<br><br><br><br><br>38              | +23.2<br><br><br><br><br>+100** | 1,416<br><br><br><br><br>60                                | 1,090<br><br><br><br><br>46              | +30<br><br><br><br><br>+20  |

\* Figures for Table 2 listed in footnotes 147 and 148.

\*\*The SIF was initiated in 2009, with 2010 being the first year funding was directed at the programme.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Eurozone area remains the world's largest economy despite troubling financial conditions.<sup>149</sup> From a purely quantitative perspective, the level of financial distribution for social cohesion should be much more limited relative to GNI in the United States than in the Eurozone. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, however, that while both the EU and the US have reformed budgetary procedure to incorporate an increased interest in social innovation, this mind-shift is more predominant in the US. Of course, the EU MFF lays down an expenditure ceiling for the budget each year, which is the maximum amount that can be spent. However, the EU remains divided in its investment at local level, with cultural, innovation and cohesion policies relying on different budgets (1.7 billion EUR for Citizenship and 64.3 billion EUR for

<sup>145</sup> Converted using XE Currency Converter, 5 October 2012. <http://www.xe.com/ucc/>

<sup>146</sup> United States Office of Management and Budget, "Updated Summary Tables," in *Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2010* (Washington U.S Government Printing Office, May 2009). Table S-1. Budget Totals.

<sup>147</sup> Figures in Table 2 from United States Office of Management and Budget, 2009, 144.

<sup>148</sup> Figures in Table 2 from United States Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the U.S Government: Fiscal Year 2011," (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2010).

<sup>149</sup> International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain," in *Global Prospects and Policies* (International Monetary Fund, April 2012), 5.

Sustainable Growth in 2010). The US, on the other hand, directs all cohesion funding towards a new initiative set up, the SIF, as the source of socioeconomic development. A recent study on American and European funding distribution shows that a key element behind decisions affecting levels or direction of social cohesion funding is the idea of “social justice.”<sup>150</sup> The variance in funding will arise from the difference in landscape, for example expenditure ceilings, but also from the different conceptions of what will create social entrepreneurship. This difference will matter the most when it comes to clarity of structure and transparency of the policy agenda. In the US for example, President Obama’s decision to allocate seed capital of 50 million USD to the SIF is to encourage direct investment in non-profit programmes and civic participation throughout the country. Thus, to return to the original question of whether some turn of events has overseen the shift in focus of social cohesion funding from regional competitiveness to citizenship taking place in the EU, the answer is most likely no. If the EU shares a similar motive to the US, the increase in socially-focused policies is because social justice is believed to occur through the achievement of citizen advancement rather than regional advancement. This is a point being realised within the EU and causing reason for economic change.

A general, even if brief, comparison of the EU and US budget allocation for social cohesion is worthwhile mainly because it draws attention to areas where the case could be strengthened for continued economic reform. First, the figures in Tables 1 and 2 highlight that the distribution of social cohesion funding is changing in recognition of the growing value of social entrepreneurship. There is one important and obvious factor to point out here: that both the US and the EU have reacted to this recognition by allocating more funding to social policies. Empirically, however, the figures show the EU is lagging in terms of increased funding, measured as a percentage increase from previous years (in particular moving from 2010 to 2011). This is by no means to say that spending more will induce better results. It is about effective decision-making with regard to distribution. This is because the main difference in both budgets is the different composition or breakdown of social expenditure. For example, the EU does not contribute to financing of the state because it is a community project, not a government project like the US. In contrast to the US, which is focused on financing state social policies, the EU uses its budget to service mainly regional social policies and the CAP. Given that funding in the US must cater to a number of areas EU funding does not cover, financing social cohesion and the SIF follows a simple layout: find the most effective programmes that promote social justice and provide the funding to recreate their success in other parts of the country. In this sense, the EU can learn a valuable lesson from the US. It could be argued

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<sup>150</sup> Alberto Alesina and George-Maruis Angeletos, "Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe," in *Institute Research Working Paper No. 1983*, ed. Institute for Economic Research (United States: Harvard University 2003), 3.

that it is better to ensure funding of the community method is distributed wisely rather than divided into solutions more complex than effective.

Second, given that the EU budget exists to finance mainly regional policies, conceptually the projects underway in the EU compared to those in the US should be characterised by a higher degree of social entrepreneurship. For example, the Belfast Conflict Resolution (BCR) project, for instance, had 378 million EUR of funding over two years to 'forge long-term, sustainable intercommunity partnerships'<sup>151</sup> at grassroots and transnational level in this European capital. The BCR is a specific, community-led local development project, yet there are few of these projects scattered throughout the various social policy areas of the EU.<sup>152</sup> The US SIF on the other hand, funds projects under the Corporation for National and Community Services umbrella, where national services and programmes could include education and retirement schemes. On the understanding that perhaps a better distribution of social funding will be more effective than an increase in social funding, the incentive exists for the EU to fund the third sector as a means of social development, where projects like the BCR effectively utilise funds for the purpose of social growth. The third sector is essentially marking itself as striving for more democracy in the EMU; a proposition the EU can easily support as a community project. Social expenditure will need to target communities as a whole, while remaining politically realistic. The refined focus on citizenship and on the concept of social entrepreneurship remains fuzzy, but while this may appear to be a problem, in reality it can represent an opportunity. There is an incentive for researchers, economists, sociologists and policy-makers to rethink social concepts and how funding can generate a greater degree of social innovation.

### **3.2.2 Toward the Europe 2020 Strategy**

Evidently, it could be argued the major actors in global politics are beginning to grasp the substantial contribution of community-based initiatives to the development of good governance regimes. The fact remains, however, that the EU continues to find itself in a time of extreme economic crisis. In June 2012, the European Council concluded a number of substantial cuts in future EU budgets will be necessary to restore normal lending to the economy.<sup>153</sup> The Council's movements were later criticised and an increase in spending was proposed by some MEPs during debate in the EP, in order for the EU to remain a responsible governing body to its citizens. How the EU will move forward is

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<sup>151</sup> Joe Marley, in Directorate-General for Regional Policy, *Investing in Our Regions: 150 Examples of Projects Co-Funded by European Regional Policy* (Brussels: European Commission, 2010). 300.

<sup>152</sup> 150 examples found from 2006 – 2010. Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> General Secretariat of the Council, "European Council Conclusions," in *EUCO 76/12* (Brussels: European Council, 28/29 June 2012).



still unknown and a central question for all involved, particularly with regard to economic policy. Two major agreements are currently being released: the Budget 2013 and the MFF 2014-2020. Prior to any final decisions regarding these agreements, the focus has been on Budget 2012, which set a concrete budget size and spending ceiling for 2012, being 147.2 billion EUR in commitments (+3.8% increase from 2011).<sup>154</sup> At first glance, the figures provide comfort that expenditure will continue at a reasonable level. With regard to citizenship policies and social cohesion, the EC itself predicted these policies 'will be continued, or even intensified, in the 2009-2019 period.'<sup>155</sup> A ten-year period has been emphasised based on the understanding that social policy takes time to be implemented, given that it is of a voluntary nature and tends to seek long-term results. Programmes such as *Europe for Citizens*, *Youth in Action* and *Creative Europe* (the only ones in their respective fields) are acknowledged through funding for the link they establish between the Union and citizens, youth and culture in the crucial task of reaching out to the citizens. Three years into this period further analysis demonstrates the 2012 Budget is still described as an 'austerity budget',<sup>156</sup> according to Commissioner Lewandowski, with far less understanding of long-term investment than initially expected. Table 3 below breaks down Budget 2012 in terms of social expenditure:

**Table 3: EU Budget 2012 Commitment and Payment Appropriations for Regional Development**

| Heading  | Billion € |      | % of total budget | % change from 2011 |          |
|--|-----------|------|-------------------|--------------------|----------|
|  | CA*       | PA** |                   | CA                 | PA       |
| 1. Sustainable Growth  | 67.5      | 55.3 | 45.9              | +4.7               | +3.2     |
| 1a. Competitiveness for growth and employment                  | 14.7      | 11.5 | 10.0              | +9.1               | -0.2     |
| 1b. Cohesion for growth and employment                         | 52.7      | 43.8 | 35.8              | +3.5               | +4.1     |
| 2. Preservation and management of natural resources            | 60.0      | 57.0 | 40.8              | +2.2               | +1.9     |
| <i>of which Direct aid &amp; market related expenditure</i>    | 44.0      | 43.9 | 29.9              | +2.6               | +2.5     |
| <i>of which Rural development, environment &amp; fisheries</i> | 15.9      | 13.1 | 10.8              | -1.3               | -0.1     |
| 3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice                  | 2.1       | 1.5  | 1.4               | (*) +10.9          | (*) -1.3 |
| 3a. Freedom, security and justice                              | 1.4       | 0.8  | 0.9               | +15.9              | -2.5     |
| 3b. Citizenship  | 0.7       | 0.6  | 0.5               | (*) +2.1           | (*) 0.4  |

<sup>154</sup> European Commission, "Budget 2012 in Figures," European Union

[http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2012/2012\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2012/2012_en.cfm). (Last accessed 6 October, 2012).

<sup>155</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies / Directorate General for External Policies, 2009, 138.

<sup>156</sup> Janusz Lewandowski (Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget), *Statement of Commissioner Lewandowski on the Adoption of the 2012 EU Budget* (Brussels, 2012).

| Heading                            | Billion € |      | % of total budget | % change from 2011 |      |
|------------------------------------|-----------|------|-------------------|--------------------|------|
|                                    | CA*       | PA** |                   | CA                 | PA   |
| 4. EU as a global player           | 9.4       | 6.9  | 6.4               | +7.4               | -4.0 |
| 5. Administration                  | 8.3       | 8.3  | 5.6               | +1.3               | +1.3 |
| <i>of which for the Commission</i> | 3.3       | 3.3  | 2.3               | +0.2               | +0.2 |

\*Commitment Appropriations \*\*Payment Appropriations

Source: European Commission: Financial Programming and Budget (accessed 30 September 2012) <http://ec.europa.eu>

Contrary to the recent trends in European policymaking, where social cohesion has been given a prominent role in the development of the Union, citizenship funding received a 2.1% increase from 2011, the lowest increase other than administration (1.3%) and preservation of rural development (-1.3%). *Citizenship, Freedom and Justice* receives the lowest percentage of the total budget, at just 1.4% of the total. Economic activities on the other hand receive as much as a 9% increase in some areas, for example competitive growth and employment. As the fourth year of the financial period 2009 to 2019 begins, EU-funded projects initiated in 2009 will begin to gather speed as their long-term objectives begin to take shape. If this has not been taken into account in the 2012 Budget, there is already some concern the EC will find itself in a position where it will have to pay higher amounts to beneficiaries than at the beginning of the financial period.<sup>157</sup> Given the low financial commitments towards citizenship for 2012, the risk exists that the EC will run out of funds and it will fail to fulfil its role as a community project.

Analysing the two most recent US and EU budgets has shed light on the fact that both actors recognise the need for a clearer focus on distribution of social cohesion policy. In the present timeframe however, there is little evidence of intensification in financial support for various actions close to citizens. In a statement released by the EC, social cohesion funding was described as ‘remain[ing] broadly stable’<sup>158</sup> for the 2012 period. Given that, as indicated earlier in this research, the predominant social initiative remains *Europe for Citizens* and has thus been delegated the “crucial task” of reconnecting the citizen with the Union, it seems somewhat of a contradiction that funding levels are “stable” only. Talk of *austerity* budgets and *stable* financial provisions indicates the issue is likely to be centred on the financial crisis. While there is a somewhat silent agreement that development of the Union cannot be successful without investment in closer coordination with the citizen, the path of action is restricted by the panic associated with the economic crisis and the need for immediate and tangible results. There is instead a need for a clearer focus on long-term

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> European Commission, 2011, 33.

economic development and the principle of subsidiarity, one of the main tools for construction of the EU, which in turns means there is a need for a clearer focus on social cohesion policy. In an interview with Panorama Magazine, Jacques Delors (former President of the European Commission 1985-1995) argued for a similar focus, stating that social policy 'should not be sidetracked by the need to respond to the crisis.'<sup>159</sup> According to Delors, the Union can only respond to the crisis through the bottom-up dimension. Thus, there is not only a need for a more effective distribution of funding for social policy but also a need for that funding to reach the citizens on the ground. The economic rationale behind this reform proposal could only be that devoting a significant share of the budget to citizenship as a well-structured policy area would be financially responsible and beneficial overall. Beneficial in the sense that it would be democratic and the importance of citizenship and inclusion of the local level to the future of Europe lies in the concept of the EU as a democratic society. In other words, the incentive exists to fund social policies, such as coherence, justice, participation and liberties, with a grassroots influence so as to integrate them at the ground level. Delors's argument also delivers the message that economic reform could be necessary, given that economic efficiency is about realising the effective utilisation of funds and the funding potential of every place. The flow-on effect will be equity; equal opportunity for citizens no matter where they are from. Currently, there is not enough short-term fiscal movement nor long-term fiscal discussion to ensure such efficiency is realised.

### **3.3. Summary: the political and economic incentive for a more socially-focused EU**

The collection of primary data is particularly important with regard to forming recommendations for the future of social and cohesion policy at the EU, especially given the number of actors involved. The EU began as an integration project and in this sense the incentive will always exist to further development of a European identity, European culture and European citizenship. However, there is evidence to suggest that the EU has progressed its economic values to a far greater extent than its social values. It is thus important to understand whether there is currently a political and economic incentive at the Union level to invest in a governance shift and progress the bottom-up or social aspect of the EU. By analysing existing initiatives and future legislative proposals in combination with the personal opinions of those working for the EP, the opportunity exists to bring together and compare detailed and up-to-date information on what social policy in the EU governance structure may look like in the future.

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<sup>159</sup> Jacques Delors, Reflections on Cohesion Policy in *Panorama* (Paris, European Commission, 2012).

The sense of urgency felt at the EU with regard to its negative image in the public eye following the Eurozone crisis has led to a shift in focus from pure economics to social inclusion and regional cohesion. Unfortunately, this has occurred to a greater level in the theoretical sense than in reality. Focusing on the immediate future, there are two main points to pull from the political initiative in place for the 2014-2020 period. *Europe for Citizens* was designed in recognition of the need to bring together *local development strategies* and *local action groups*. As the only initiative of its kind however, it appears overly optimistic to delegate to the programme the task of re-establishing the relationship between the Union and the citizen. Moreover, the large-scale and highly ambitious goals of the 2020 strategy set a number of clear targets with regard to social inclusion and regional cohesion policy that *Europe for Citizens* will not be able to achieve on its own. Thus, there is voiced recognition of a deep social problem in the EU governance system and a clear concern that if new governance strategies are not put in place then the Union will not survive. The benefit of utilising governance strategies with more of a bottom-up focus is evident; these strategies push for social inclusion and regional development because it is genuinely believed that improvements in these areas will improve the Union overall, both economically and politically. Currently, both the political and economic action being taken can be faulted for moving too slowly. One of the more necessary strategies is the development of a stronger link between the determination of the 2020 strategy, *Europe for Citizens* and the MFF. The opportunity exists here to explore the use of local civil society in the process of aligning the 2020 strategy with its task-bearers.

The perspective from inside the EP provides two additional components to the discovery above: personal preferences for reform of governance structure by those working inside the institution itself; and more reliable insights into the real position of the political actors within the EU. The general opinion supported the initiative for a shift in governance to a directive that places greater priority on the citizen and will really support social strategies, such as solidifying the link between the 2020 strategy and *Europe for Citizens*. The most common suggestion was the establishment of local level, pan-European political space as a strategy to enhance relations and subsequently democracy. Thus, the data drawn from interviews and documentation analysis highlights two primary issues in the current governance structure of the EU. Firstly, the priority of the EU is to act on the EC Europe 2020 platform through proposed strategies for the 2014-2020 period, but a number of these strategies remain undecided. It also shows that the priority of the individuals involved is to try to connect the people at ground-level to the action at the top. There is a major disconnect between what is desired by the individuals engaged in EU processes and what social policy and initiatives end up being put forward (or not being put forward). This evidence amounts to the fact that there is room and even desire for changes to be made to the EU governance structure

to make it more socially-focused. The incentive exists to engage in a governance model that builds a clear narrative to bridge the divide between the intended objectives and actual results. It is important to point out here that, with regards to integration, such a conclusion suggests a push for “more Europe” should occur. It is not about more regulation, more institutions and more common policy as Farage has suggested, but about a better-quality Europe that sees the qualitative create the quantitative. At a time of great crisis, the people are what counts. All of this information suggests that a structured top-down / bottom-up governance approach may be a more appropriate form of governance for the EU. Furthermore, in this type of approach it should be the case that citizen participation is facilitated or encouraged by supporting locally-led initiatives that remain aligned with Union law. This introduces the second hypothesis in this research, which assumes the role of the ordinary citizen within the EU governance model can be encapsulated most effectively by local, rather than transnational, institutions. These local institutions should thus be further integrated into the EU system. *Chapter Four* will test the grounds for the second hypothesis by investigating the results of two case studies on the ability of CSOs to promote the role of the citizen and further their engagement within the EU.

## 4. CHAPTER FOUR: LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY, THE CASE OF SPAIN 2012

As demonstrated in *Chapter Three*, the EU has the opportunity to adapt its governance structure to address the social cleavages that exist. The EU institutions face a political and economic crossroad, where one potential path is to increase investment in social strategies with a grassroots focus. The three components of the civil cosmopolitanism model and its overall focus on local civil society must be developed adequately to provide a strong framework that can incorporate these strategies. As mentioned above in *Chapter Three*, the opportunity now exists to explore the role of the third sector this new framework, which could change significantly if the distribution of social policy funding changes. The primary question asks whether local civil society can contribute to and be integrated into the multi-levelled framework and if so, how, and in what ways can local civil society further the democratic quality of that framework. *Chapter Four* examines this question in the context of a case study of civil society in Spain. Following an examination of Spain's civil society, the remainder of the chapter will detail how differing CSOs within Spanish civil society can contribute to the development of civil cosmopolitanism's three core components. Local civil society can help build a stronger more tangible civil cosmopolitan framework, in order to enhance the democratic quality of EU governance.

### 4.1 Defining local civil society

The choice to focus on local civil society as the platform for linking the EU and the EU citizen follows the conclusion that EU policy cannot be effective without a social element, but that social aspect cannot be achieved through a purely transnational perspective. As was demonstrated in *Chapter One*, the theories promoting civil society as the source of democracy all conclude a healthy public sector is an essential ingredient in the recipe for democratic governance. The scale of inquiry has become fixed on "the global" aspect of governance, yet as civil society expert Michael Edwards points out, even with a grand international vision the question of how a strong transnational civil society makes a society strong, civil and engaged internationally remains unanswered.<sup>160</sup> The purpose of this research is not to answer Edward's question, which has confronted studies on civil society for some time. Case studies that focus on civil society are used to understand how civil society under a model of civil cosmopolitanism could shed new light on the benefit of engaging with local rather than transnational civil society and a subsequent increase in public accountability.

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<sup>160</sup> Edwards, 2009, 84.

Consultation with local civil society to generate concrete results with regard to the ongoing goal of placing the citizen at the heart of EU decision-making processes is beginning to be recognised. This case study is a timely one as the EC has recently proposed to make 2013 the year of the EU citizen and has specifically acknowledged a need to work closely with the civil society of member states.<sup>161</sup> Ironically, civil society is the most important subject of discussion in the research, yet it is also the most complicated subject to define. A vast literature addresses solely the subject of defining local civil society. Karl Marx includes the market in his definition of civil society and suggests that civil society threatens traditional ways of conducting politics in private within the nation-state by making such matters public.<sup>162</sup> Georg Hegel, on the other hand, built a view of civil society as the social face of the state 'unsustainable without various kinds of state institutions.'<sup>163</sup> This thesis will not attempt to reproduce an internationally accepted definition of *civil society*, but rather draws on existing ideas in a way that best suits the purposes of this study. There is one important point about civil society that can be drawn from both definitions above: recognition of political institutions and first-generation rights. Thus, this paper employs a definition of *civil society* that distinguishes the importance of both institutions and citizens. Each component, *institutions* and *citizen*, will now be defined in turn.

#### *Civil Society: Civil Society Organisation (CSO)*

The institutions within civil society are known as *Civil Society Organisations* (CSOs). Given that civil society exists to represent a wide variety of public interests, the definition of a CSO must remain inclusive of multiple structures. CSOs resemble the location point of political, cultural, social and economic activity that remains independent from the state. Their existence provides for local and grassroots movements in a wealth of different fields; poverty reduction, human rights and environmentalism to name the more well-known. CSOs are thus defined as organisations that include law firms, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), think tanks, indeed any organisation or self-employed individual engaged in influencing EU policy-making and policy implementation.<sup>164</sup> This definition supports the initiative of creating a strong networking platform with which the EU can cooperate.

<sup>161</sup> Francesca Ferraro, "2013 European Year of Citizens," in *Library Briefing* (Brussels: Library of the European Parliament 18 October 2012).

<sup>162</sup> Karl Marx in Justen Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994). 124.

<sup>163</sup> Thom Brooks, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 131.

<sup>164</sup> European Union, 2006a.

While a wealth of definitions of the term *civil society* and *CSO* exist, the same cannot be said for the definition of *citizen* within civil society. The term *citizenship* is more commonly employed. Articles 17 to 22 of the Treaty establishing the European Community refer solely to 'citizenship of the union',<sup>165</sup> defined by the citizens' civil rights, duties and legal status as a citizen of a member state.<sup>166</sup> Given that the idea of *citizenship* is legal by context and political by definition, the EP is currently the most appropriate body to ensure citizenship of the Union is enjoyed by the European citizen. Thus, the development potential of a citizen's civil rights and their ability to carry out civil duties remains a responsibility of the transnational institutions. As a result, there is minimal discussion on social rights in terms of direct participation within a society and governance system. The education and social welfare systems, for example retiree policies and unemployment policies, are social rights that remain influenced by economic decisions made at the transnational level. The definition of *citizen* within civil society should separate the ability to be a *citizen* from the ability to obtain *citizenship*, leaving those legal responsibilities to the state, and should provide social cohesion and the right to participate in inclusive societies. Thus, with a greater focus on social rights, the definition of a *citizen* for the purposes of this research is *to be an active member of a community that promotes social inclusion through opportunity for participation*. It is this often neglected social side to citizenship that the Union needs to pay attention to. The role of local civil society lies in convincing the citizens of the EU that they, rather than their national governments, must enforce their social rights.<sup>167</sup>

The definition of *civil society* provided by the European Economic and Social Committee, that is 'organised groups of civilians [institutions] advancing public opinion and political equality [active members],'<sup>168</sup> accurately brings together these two core concepts, the *institution* and the *citizen*, and has been utilised in this research. It has been acknowledged by the EC that active public participation in civic forums on EU policies is essential to a democratic EU, but as *Chapter Three* demonstrated the EU is not in a position to provide additional resources. The problem is not new but is rather ongoing, as is discussed in *Chapter One*. Civil cosmopolitanism is designed to tackle the nature of the problem, that is, the lack of a social element in the governance structure of the EU, by bringing governance a step closer to the ground on which social progress is more likely to occur. The

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<sup>165</sup> European Parliament, "The Citizens of the Unions and Their Rights," European Communities, [http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact\\_sheets/info/data/citizen/citizens/article\\_7174\\_en.htm](http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/citizen/citizens/article_7174_en.htm). (Last accessed 3 July, 2012).

<sup>166</sup> European Union, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community." *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 325/33 (24 December, 2002). Articles 17 – 22.


<sup>167</sup> Idea from Dimitris N. Chrysoschoou, Kostas Ifantis, Stelios Stavridis and Michael J. Tsinisizelis, *Theory and Reform in the European Union* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999). 14.

<sup>168</sup> European Economic and Social Committee, 1999.



second hypothesis thus proposes that local civil societies can further the democratic quality of the EU by implementing EU social policy at the ground level and subsequently improving citizen awareness of and participation in the EU. *Chapter Four* presents two case studies from one EU member state to test the second hypothesis. Spain, a member of the EU since 1986, was chosen as the focal point of this study for a number of reasons. Aside from being the fourth-largest economy in the EU and a fully integrated member for over 25 years, Spain is an interesting nation because the conditions of its entry to the European Economic Community (EEC), as the EU was known at the time, meant an overhaul of Spain's governance system was necessary to ensure it became the democracy that it is today.<sup>169</sup> Spain's membership of the EU was extremely beneficial economically, leading to substantial increases to the country's per capita income due to new trade opportunities and the EEC's structural funds programme.<sup>170</sup> Social expenditure in Spain increased because of its improved economic position, but remained much lower than that of its partners within the EU. Figure 2 below shows how social expenditure advanced between 1980 and 1997 in Spain, the EU and Spain's neighbouring country Portugal:

**Figure 2: Evolution of Social Protection Expenditure, % of GDP 1980 – 1997**



Source: Eudor-Stat 1997 and Eurostat 2000.

Helena Soleto Muñoz highlighted the importance of the lag in social expenditure in Spain. Before becoming a constitutional monarchy, Spain was under a dictatorship for forty years, during which time citizens were encouraged to be completely dependent on the Government. Muñoz explained

<sup>169</sup> Jordi Pascual, "Cultural and Structural Funds in Spain," ed. European Expert Network on Culture (Spain: European Union, June 2012), 5.

<sup>170</sup> Sebastian Royo, *Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years* (Taylor & Francis, 2004). 4.

that the Government did not promote citizen action, it was paternalist, providing the citizen with what they needed while suppressing freedom of association at the same time.<sup>171</sup> Spanish society was thus very individualistic with little culture of participation in the third sector and therefore little need for social expenditure. The *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (Centre for Sociological Investigations) in Madrid completed a study in 2006 on the number of CSOs in Spain from 1999-2002 compared with other countries in the EU. The results showed the number of CSOs for every 1000 habitants was lower in Spain than in other equivalent European countries.<sup>172</sup> Civic participation in Spain is naturally more limited. In this sense, a number of questions about Spain's civil society arise; for example, has Spanish civil society developed as a response to EU integration and if so, how could Spanish civil society now further the EU? Is the application of grassroots governance strategies in the EU advocated by civil cosmopolitanism actually detrimental to Spain, which would perhaps not utilise civil society as much as some other member states and would receive less EU funding and face social exclusion? These questions and others make Spain a fascinating case study.

#### **4.2 A focus on Spain; the use of case studies in evaluation**

Case studies were used in this thesis to enable observation. The experimental design involved the study of two CSOs based in Spanish civil society, one locally-focused and one internationally-focused, both working with the goal of democratising governance systems domestically and internationally. CSOs *Consejo de la Juventud de España* (CJE) and *Club de Madrid* (CDM) were selected for the study. CJE is a bottom-up CSO focused on connecting youth with government institutions and society, whereas CDM is a top-down CSO with the primary objective of democratising governance by strengthening leadership. Two very different CSOs were chosen in order to generate wide discussion on the participatory tools available at the local level to engage citizens in the EU. Interview data from *Chapter Three* demonstrated that there is general agreement that tapping into EU citizens' ideas and expectations is the only way to create an EU that protects citizens' rights. Part of the case study was determining whether the use of local CSOs is the way forward to bringing these ideas and expectations to the EU and securing better relations between the EU and the EU citizen. The two CSOs in the case study share the same Spanish roots but have diverse ambitions and very different structures and have been chosen to assess whether participatory tools of various kinds can bring more depth to understanding citizens' concerns. As discussed in the methodology section of the introduction, both case studies involved the use of multiple research techniques to collect data. The

<sup>171</sup> Helena Soletó Muñoz, Interview 19 July, 2012.

<sup>172</sup> Laura Morales and Fabiola Mota, "El Asociacionismo en España (Activism in Spain)," in *Ciudadanos, Asociaciones y Participación en España (Citizens, Associations and Participation in Spain)*, ed. José Ramón Montero Joan Font and Mariano Torcal (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2006), 80-81.

goal was to gather data from enough sources so as to present a clear description of Spanish civil society from the perspective of CSO participants, members and staff. Methods included analysis of documentation, interviews, participant observation and the use of surveys.

#### 4.2.1. Consejo de la Juventud

Since its inception in 1983, CJE, or the Spanish Youth Council as it is known in English, has committed itself to its role as the umbrella organisation of 76 youth organisations standing for the cooperation of youth with the third sector within Spain.<sup>173</sup> As the interlocutor for youth with society, institutions and government, CJE has the prime objective of reinforcing the role of youth in social, economic and political contexts. Following a one-month period of intensive observation of CJE however, it was evident the structure of this organisation and the activities it undertakes mean it is much more than just a voice for youth. CJE is represented by a Standing Committee as its Governing Board (elected at General Assembly meetings every two years), various Commissions, youth organisations and members of the public. All were involved in organising the many meetings, seminars, information sessions, distributions, media publications, campaigns and training opportunities that took place in the month of July 2012. It can be described as a space in which cooperation, sharing of opinion and action can occur. The International Relations Commission was very active on the issue of Europe. There is strong opinion from academics inside the organisation that the EU '*ha avanzado mucho más en la integración económica*'<sup>174</sup> (has advanced significantly with economic integration) but economic integration only, which was correlated with the *sensation de alejamiento* (the feeling of separation) that many within CJE spoke of when discussing the problem of the EU. CJE hopes to propose to the EU that it should construct a new Constitution based on a Law of Fundamental Human Rights.<sup>175</sup>

Two key figures involved at the CJE were questioned specifically on the issue of a new Constitution and other of CJE's ambitions for the EU and how they believe CSOs can help. Given that the original EU Draft Constitutional Treaty was abandoned, CJE's proposition for a new Constitution may appear fruitless. In an interview at CJE headquarters in Madrid, CJE President Ricardo Ibarra discussed why people, such as Giorgio Napolitano, may conclude that attempting again to create a Constitutional Treaty after it has been rejected for being overcomplicated is a wasted effort. Ibarra believes it

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<sup>173</sup> Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Foro Europeo de la Juventud (European Youth Forum)," *Our Work, Europe* (July 2012), <http://www.cje.org/en/our-work/europa/actividades-y-campanas-del-cje/foro-europeo-de-la-juventud-sobre-europa/>. (Last accessed 12 July, 2012).

<sup>174</sup> ———, "¿Cómo está el tema sobre Europa? (How does Europe as a theme work?)," *Our Work, Consejo de la Juventud de España* (July 2012), <http://www.cje.org/en/our-work/europa/como-esta-el-tema/como-esta-el-tema-sobre-europa/>. (Last accessed 18 July, 2012).

<sup>175</sup> ———, "¿Qué Proponemos sobre Europa? (What do we propose to do about Europe?)," *Our Work* (July 2012), <http://www.cje.org/en/our-work/europa/que-proponemos/que-proponemos-sobre-europa/>. (Last accessed 18 July, 2012).

comes down to the type of participation the EU desires from its citizens. Ibarra believes that where the decision-making processes have the type of implications they do in the lives of EU citizens, it is probably more complicated to organise effective policy *without* appropriate local and regional involvement.<sup>176</sup> According to Ibarra, having a Constitution may provide the skills people need to participate directly by allocating a greater role to the institutions with substantial impact at the level closest to citizens. In Spain for example, the CJE was heavily involved in what it calls the process of citizen education, where municipalities have the main role in the governance system because the citizen is often unsure how systems and policies work at the top but generally understand how their local municipality works. Municipal and community organisations have the greatest potential to influence national Government and improve democracy because citizens have the independence to make proposals and a local space to present their argument. Head of the CJE Documentation Centre Juan Gonzalez mentioned in an interview that in principle, citizens are guaranteed similar opportunities at CJE because the objective is participation.<sup>177</sup> In fact it is part of the CJE law, which was drafted in unison with the organisation's initiation, to create such participatory opportunities for youth.<sup>178</sup> As part of the education process, for instance, the CJE uses a number of methodological workshops. One such workshop, *The Voice of the European Citizen*, brought youth together from a variety of organisations to draft ideas and establish a chat group on the mechanisms that allow defensive action of citizen rights at the European level, e.g. the *Defensor del Pueblo Europeo* (European Ombudsman). Both Ibarra and Gonzalez emphasised that the workshops are intended to act as a space for direct participation, e.g. the immediate or tangible presence of citizens, which link grassroots and high-level governance.

Evidently, with regards to citizen participation in the EU and the role of CSOs, there is a need to motivate people to participate in governance systems and this is within the responsibilities of CSOs. Second, action should be more than just a question and answer session between the top and the bottom. It is the government's responsibility to engage citizens in an education process on their rights to participate. In this process, information is circulated among civil society and then citizens have the right to make their own proposals. Therefore, both local CSOs and governing bodies such as the EU have a role to play in the creation of citizen participation. It was clear CJE intends to create the highest level of citizen participation, with those involved believing direct participation and co-management of decision-making processes is how democratic governance can develop. It is one of

<sup>176</sup> Interview with Ricardo Ibarra, Interview 12 July 2012. President of Consejo de la Juventud de España.

<sup>177</sup> Interview with Juan Gonzalez, Interview 12 July 2012, Head of the Documentation Centre at Consejo de la Juventud de España.

<sup>178</sup> Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Law 18/1983, 16 November, on the Creation of the Spanish Youth Council, an Independent Organisation," (Madrid: Consejo de la Juventud de España, 16 November 1983). Article 2 (d), 1.

the more active CSOs in Spain in a weak but developing third sector. Thus, the opinions produced by individuals involved in CJE are heavily in favour of creating a role for the citizen in the EU, but also in the effort to shift the overall Spanish mentality on the concept of citizenship.

Effectively, if local civil society was more engaged by the EU, there would be CSOs such as CJE contributing to the enhancement of democracy within Spain as well as the EU. Analysing material from the CJE documentation centre revealed the organisation's emphasis on direct forms of participation stems from its perspective on the concepts of *citizen* and *citizenship*, through which it has long recognised the importance of social rights. The link between state and individual, society and individual and even community and individual is not new, but CJE understands it differently with regard to the freedoms and rights of individuals. For example, freedom of religion, the right to justice, the right to work, the right to move across borders and freedom of expression are all civil rights institutionalised by the legal bodies, justice tribunals and organisations such as the EU. CJE refers to citizens as *members of a community* in all documentation because it also recognises the right to be accepted, to be able to participate politically, to be informed and to belong.<sup>179</sup> These core social rights are grounded in the literature produced by CJE staff and committed to in the actions of CJE members. CJE has proposed and funded activities that favour the development of the international dimension of youth associations for example, a move that caused a flow-on proposal that CJE coordinate its youth policies with policies from the EU.<sup>180</sup> Unfortunately, the CJE is still 'looking for the construction of a pan European space at local level'<sup>181</sup> in order for the latter to become a reality. Once again, it is evident that a lack of engagement from the EU with CSOs, such as CJE, due to lack of a pan-European space can cause the efforts and actions led by these CSOs to lose their value because they cannot be carried out in full. Within a model of civil cosmopolitanism, the overarching networking system has been designed to remedy this lack of relation-building and weak communication between the EU and the various actors within society. The CJE strives for the right to be accepted and the EU strives for the right to justice and thus both effectively strive for direct citizen participation within the Spanish and EU governance systems. Networking could allow for their objectives to be intertwined through a pan-European networking centre with a better chance of being achieved.

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<sup>179</sup> David Redoli Morchón, *Juventud Ciudadana en la Unión Europea (Youth Citizen in the European Union)*, Guía Didáctica para una Ciudadanía Europea (Guide Dedicated to the European Citizen) (Madrid, Spain: Consejo de la Juventud de España, 2002). 16.

<sup>180</sup> Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Materiales para el Trabajo Internacional (Tools for International Work)," (Madrid, Spain: Consejo de la Juventud de España, 1998), 14.

<sup>181</sup> Ricardo Ibarra in Consejo de la Juventud de Aragón, "Entrevista: Ricardo Ibarra, Presidente del CJE: 'Los jóvenes vivimos siempre en crisis' (Interview: Ricardo Ibarra, CJE President: 'Youth live in Crisis')," *El Periódico de Aragón* 12 July 2010. (Interview)

The CJE General Assembly, held 13-15 July 2012 in Spain, was an additional opportunity to observe members putting their commitment to core social rights into action. The point of the meeting was to discuss future CJE activities, reflect on existing ideas and offer new suggestions for projects. Around 80 attendees filled the hall of the UC3M, fulfilling the political responsibility of CSOs to give citizens the right to engage in societal issues and advance their own communities. Presidents of various youth CSOs in Spain spoke of the success of CJE in raising important themes, such as sexual education. For example, in 2004, in response to the estimated 120,000 – 140,000 people living in Spain with HIV and around 3000 new cases annually,<sup>182</sup> CJE promised a number of prevention programmes and campaigns to raise sexual health awareness. In the last eight years, all 76 youth organisations involved with CJE worked on sexual health projects with the goal of creating one overall image that would positively represent the prevention of HIV campaign. In 2007, the CJE received over 527 proposals for the campaign from citizens and ran with the proposal from Spaniard Francesc Vidal Rubí, which was “*Condonéate. Placer sin riesgo*” (Wear a condom. Pleasure without risk).<sup>183</sup> The central idea had been achieved; form a positive message that would open up a space for young people, who are most vulnerable in the area of sexual health, to encourage debate and reflection. Not only was the campaign well received by media, but the Minister of Health at the time signed a *Convenios de Colaboración* (Collaboration Agreement) with the CJE that cemented the participation of youth in the Government’s prevention of HIV plan.<sup>184</sup> The same space for debate and rate of response by citizens could not have been achieved by classical institutions of parliamentary democracy within Spain as well as the EU. Youth participation in the area of sexual education is very important, yet the Government of Spain realised it would need to sign an agreement with the CJE to connect with those young people who were participating within the CJE.

Outside of national issues, the Presidents at the CJE General Assembly spoke of the current need to address the EU financial crisis not only in terms of getting more youth into jobs but in terms of youth participation in the construction of a stronger EU citizenship within Europe. Attendees spoke passionately about the work they hoped to do to raise awareness of social rights while there is an economic lull. It was evidently important to many participants to adopt a methodology that focuses on democratising society through providing youth with the right to feel responsible and confident

<sup>182</sup> AVERT International HIV and AIDS Charity, “European HIV and AIDS Statistics,” (October 2012). <http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-europe.htm> (Last accessed 24 February, 2013).

<sup>183</sup> Consejo de la Juventud de España, “Condonéate. Placer sin riesgo.” (Wear a condom. Pleasure without risk) an article published in *Actividades y Campañas del CJE sobre Salud, SIDA y Drogas* (Activities and Campaigns of the CJE about Health, AIDS and Drugs) (Madrid: 2012). <http://www.cje.org/es/en-que-trabajamos/salud-sida-y-drogas/actividades-y-campanas-del-cje/videos-para-trabajar-en-la-prevencion-de-la-transmision-del-vih-sida/> (Last accessed 2 December, 2012).

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

about their place in society. CJE, in this respect, needs to continue to act as a space where these youth can learn of their rights, their responsibilities, understand democracy and understand politics. It was concluded that a Strategic Plan for EU Citizenship and Integration, *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía Europea e Integración*, was needed to create more types of local participation spaces like the CJE. On day two, pamphlets were handed out suggesting the plan should develop the concept of *Asociacionismo*; to unite voluntarily with a common final objective.<sup>185</sup> The plan thus attempts to further define *participation*, despite difficulties with its functional forms in diverse social contexts. *Asociacionismo* refers to three important aspects of participation: inclusion, influence and taking responsibility. Discussion showed that what mattered was the purpose for which these forms of participation are carried out, i.e. whether it is to generate awareness or to provoke processes of change and social development. For instance, a programme known as *Juventud en Acción* (Youth in Action) was specifically referred to as an example of a space for the participation of youth interested in initiating projects with a European dimension.<sup>186</sup> *Youth in Action* is sponsored by the EU under the EU's umbrella *Youth in Action Programme*, set up to create a sense of European citizenship among Europe's youth.<sup>187</sup> Here existed the opportunity to establish relations between the EU and the CJE in the joint effort to promote young people's active citizenship. Instead, the project's attempt to connect Europe's youth with the EU received criticism because a common final objective was not recognised by both the EU and member states (in the case of Spain). For the CJE, the goal was to create more types of local participation spaces with the EU through *Youth in Action* projects by further defining *participation*. For the EU, the goal was simply to 'inspire a sense of active citizenship',<sup>188</sup> with no concrete objectives to encourage inclusion of all individuals or all types of action. There is no clarity to the manner in which participation in Spain's *Youth in Action* programme should be carried out. The programme remains the responsibility of EU member states and will only continue if enacted by CSOs; there is no real link between the CSOs and the EU with regard to programme goals and thus no real direct participation of the citizen in EU processes. This was another point of evidence to show CSOs and the EU are not sharing the responsibility of encouraging direct citizen participation.

<sup>185</sup> ———, "Guía de la Participación Intercultural (Guide to Inter-cultural Participation)," in [www.cje.org](http://www.cje.org). Consejo de la Juventud de España (Madrid: AFP Gestión del Color, 2012).


<sup>186</sup> Spanish National Agency Youth in Action Programme, "Programa Juventud en Acción (Youth in Action Programme)," in [www.juventudenaccion.injuve.es](http://www.juventudenaccion.injuve.es), ed. Consejo de la Juventud de España (Madrid: Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, Spain, 2011).

<sup>187</sup> Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency Education, "Youth in Action 2007-2013" (Brussels: European Union, August 2011). [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth/programme/about\\_youth\\_en.php](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth/programme/about_youth_en.php) (Last accessed 24 February, 2013).

<sup>188</sup> Ibid, 1.

When the General Assembly attendees themselves were surveyed as citizens of Spain and the EU, it was from the perspective of understanding their wider opinion on the role of local civil societies and their ability to provide for direct participation in EU governance. If there is enough evidence to suggest that local CSOs provide for direct citizen participation and greater implementation of social policy, then the case can be made that they are worth integrating into the EU governance system on a greater scale than present. Survey participants were asked to answer six multiple choice questions by circling the choice that best suited their opinion. A total of fifteen attendees (around 25% of attendees at the CJE General Assembly) were surveyed, ten of whom were Spanish citizens. Only one survey was not returned. The rest were returned with all requested statistical information provided and all six questions answered. The results are tabled below:

**Chart 1: Classification Questions**



N (Sample size) = 14



**Chart 2: Citizens of the European Union understand what the Union is and how it functions**

Totally Disagree - Totally Agree

**QUESTION 1**

| <b>Response</b>  | <b>Number of respondents</b> | <b>% of respondents</b> |
|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Totally disagree | 0                            | 0                       |
| Disagree         | 2                            | 15                      |
| Indifferent      | 10                           | 70                      |
| Agree            | 2                            | 15                      |
| Totally agree    | 0                            | 0                       |

**Chart 3: The European citizen is involved in decision-making processes of the European Union**

Totally Disagree – Totally Agree

**QUESTION 2**

| <b>Response</b>  | <b>Number of respondents</b> | <b>% of respondents</b> |
|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Totally disagree | 2                            | 15                      |
| Disagree         | 8                            | 55                      |
| Indifferent      | 2                            | 15                      |
| Agree            | 2                            | 15                      |
| Totally agree    | 0                            | 0                       |

**Chart 4: I would like to see the European Union focus more on citizen participation**

Totally Disagree – Totally Agree

**QUESTION 3**

| <b>Response</b>  | <b>Number of respondents</b> | <b>% of respondents</b> |
|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Totally disagree | 1                            | 7                       |
| Disagree         | 0                            | 0                       |
| Indifferent      | 0                            | 0                       |
| Agree            | 4                            | 28                      |
| Totally agree    | 9                            | 65                      |

**Chart 5: How important should local civil society be in a transnational governance system?**

Not at All – Very Important

**QUESTION 4**

| <b>Response</b>      | <b>Number of respondents</b> | <b>% of respondents</b> |
|----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Not at All           | 0                            | 0                       |
| Somewhat             | 2                            | 15                      |
| Moderately Important | 0                            | 0                       |
| Important            | 2                            | 15                      |
| Very Important       | 10                           | 70                      |

**Chart 6: Local CSOs promote the social rights of individuals, for example the right to participate in international governance matters where relevant**

Not at All – A Lot

### QUESTION 5

| Response   | Number of Respondents | % of respondents |
|------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| Not at All | 0                     | 0                |
| Not Really | 4                     | 28               |
| Somewhat   | 0                     | 0                |
| A Little   | 2                     | 15               |
| A Lot      | 8                     | 57               |

**Chart 7: In order to be democratic, an international system of governance should adopt bottom-up governance strategies. That is to say, the system should focus on local institutions (such as the CJE) more than focusing on high-level institutions (such as the European Parliament)**

Totally Disagree – Totally Agree

### QUESTION 6

| Response         | Number of Respondents | % of respondents |
|------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| Totally disagree | 2                     | 15               |
| Disagree         | 0                     | 0                |
| Indifferent      | 0                     | 0                |
| Agree            | 8                     | 57               |
| Totally agree    | 4                     | 28               |

A number of participants wished to discuss their opinions on the matter in greater detail. The survey provided a section for other comments and the majority of persons expressed a desire to see the EU acting rather than just managing. These opinions were expressed in relation to the deep financial crisis currently occurring within Spain and the tense relations between Spain and the EU. When peered against the rest of the respondents' answers, these opinions show clearly that the respondents believe local civil society does not function as it should. It is not engaged with by the EU to the extent necessary to understand the views of these citizens and help them organise those views. All of the survey questions were focused in some way on whether the need for more bottom-up governance strategies exists. Over 50% of respondents agreed that direct citizen participation is currently not a priority of the EU and governance strategies that are designed to enforce social rights should be a focus of the next seven year period. 70% of respondents agreed that local civil society, in particular, should be a primary actor within these strategies and in transnational governance structures in general. The issue for the survey respondents was ultimately how to make any change when those making the final decision are at the top-level only and currently remain disengaged. Fear was expressed that although civil society might be important to the democratic quality of a governance system, it does not offer the immediate and tangible band-aid effect that some EU officials might be seeking during these difficult economic times and will thus not receive the attention it should. *Chapter Three* is of paramount importance here. It was demonstrated that there is a political desire to implement governance strategies that can bring about greater civil society involvement in the EU and economic room to fund those strategies. Evidence from *Chapter Three* shows that although current economic, political and social plans are mismatched, fixing economic, political and social issues all at once has been recognised at the Union level as the moral, just and economically sound way forward. The potential for greater civil society involvement is high.

Furthermore, there are a few examples within the CJE case study alone that demonstrate where an EU governance model that engages more with local civil society will actually enhance the democratic quality of the EU. First, there is recognition within the CJE that their CSO has a role to play in motivating citizens, youth in particular, to participate in the political decision-making process of Spain and the EU. Yet for this role to be successfully fulfilled, the governing body must also meet their responsibility to ensure the social right to participate is met. Thus, the two actors (the EU and CJE) need to be linked to create assured citizen participation, similar to the Collaboration Agreement set up between the Spanish Government and the CJE cementing youth participation in the prevention of HIV. Second, around 50% of survey participants noted that they believe CSOs are able to promote social rights for citizens, such as the right to direct participation in governmental

processes. Still, this is only half of the participants surveyed with close to a third believing CSOs don't promote these types of rights at all because they can't if the governments they are promoting them to are not interested in engagement. Given that CJE predominantly highlights its role in helping create active citizen participation opportunities in youth affairs within Spain and the EU in all documentation, it is concerning CJE followers do not feel that active participation outside of the CSO is possible. The institutions at the top are failing to incorporate this critical social aspect of a governance system and the right to be accepted and to participate directly is instead concentrated within these local institutions. This is where the *institutionalisation* component of civil cosmopolitanism will be of use. Under a model of civil cosmopolitanism, the arrangement of CJE as defined in its documentation would be utilised to supervise and support the creation of transnational arrangements between the Spanish citizen, the CSO and the Union. This introduces the third example that demonstrates how civil society can enhance democracy within the EU. The EU needs more concrete goals for citizen participation and a more solid attempt to engage with the actors where citizen participation is occurring to achieve those goals. The *Youth in Action Programme* failed at setting these clear objectives. A governance model that understands a solely representative form of governance will not keep up with the social democratisation efforts of local societies is required, such as civil cosmopolitanism, where the social cosmopolitan component accounts for ongoing integration.

#### **4.2.2 Club de Madrid**

*Club de Madrid* (CDM) is an altogether different type of CSO to CJE. The organisation itself was formed after the Conference on Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Madrid in 2001, when 35 heads of states and governments met with policy experts and academics to discuss the issue of democratic governance from both theoretical and practical points of view. CDM was the outcome of a decision made at the conference that democratic leadership is one of the most important tools to building functional and inclusive governance and should be the focus of an organisation.<sup>189</sup> Its members are thus the Presidents of the Foundations that organised the conference, former Prime Ministers (from 58 countries) and former Heads of State, some of whom participated in the conference.<sup>190</sup> It is now the world's largest forum of former democratic Presidents and Prime Ministers. In this sense, while it remains an independent non-profit Action Tank similar to CJE, it is still correct to categorise CDM as a top-down CSO. It prioritises the role of the leader in creating an

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<sup>189</sup> The Gorbachev Foundation of North America, "Closing Statement of the Organizers of the Conference on Democratic Transition and Consolidation," (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 27 October 2001), 1.

<sup>190</sup> Club de Madrid, "Democracy that Delivers - About," (Madrid) <http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/about>. (Last accessed 4 May, 2012).

effective governance system, not dissimilar to an organisation that would prioritise the role of a teacher in creating an effective education system.

As a relatively new organisation, its existence almost acknowledges that in the twenty-first century there remain issues with the leadership ability of local, national and transnational leaders around the globe. CDM President Wim Kok has explained how, for Europe, the issue, or challenge, above all others is defending a social model of Europe that respects the rule of law and diversity.<sup>191</sup> Kok details how CDM's structure and membership list means it holds the greatest expertise in democratic government and that its mission is to 'transmit its values'<sup>192</sup> to assist with the strengthening democracy worldwide, including strengthening the European social model. CDM is therefore an important CSO with regards to this study, not only because it has been founded as a local civil society institution but because it is also directly connected to those working at the EU level and in positions of high power and is thus also a transnational civil society institution. It is based in Spain and calls itself a Spanish CSO, yet its work is focused on democracy worldwide with a connection to Spain and the EU.

For the CDM's Board of Directors (BoD) (the governing body that manages the organisation's interests in accordance with decisions made during the General Assembly), the organisation's primary asset is the leadership experience of its members, of which there are currently more than 90, and their commitment to building democratic governance elsewhere. Due to the small number of CDM's staff at the home base in Spain (12 – 15 staff and a communication advisor), there is no documentation centre, but the BoD's opinions on current projects are expressed in the briefings put together by CDM staff. Given that leadership experience is of primary importance to the organisation's work, there are two main areas on which CDM focuses: democratic leadership in governance and educating leaders on promoting democracy within local society.<sup>193</sup> The former appears more focused on top-down work; supporting different governance scenarios, i.e. situations where a government may be transitioning to democracy (Middle Eastern nations), or where there are developing democracies (supposedly Russia). The latter approach, within society, suggests a more socially-focused democracy that concentrates on cohesion and citizen rights. It is the second line of CDM's work that this research is predominantly interested in; how the education of the leaders at the top on the importance of social democracy can promote social cohesion within

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<sup>191</sup> Wim Kok, "Letter from the President," Club de Madrid, [http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/letter\\_from\\_the\\_president](http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/letter_from_the_president). (Last accessed 20 July, 2012).

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Club de Madrid, "Democracy that Delivers," Club de Madrid, <http://www.clubmadrid.org/en>. (Last accessed 25 July, 2012).

society. Although the nature of the CDM organisation does not fit the parameters of the civil cosmopolitan model perhaps quite as well as the CJE, it is still of equal importance. The whole idea of civil cosmopolitanism is to connect just local institutions that support individualism (defined in *Chapter Two* as the importance of the individual) to the EU. The model's workings will only be feasible if it can be applied to a variety of local situations, institutional structures and societies. The CDM not only supports individualism by enhancing the democratic quality of EU leadership one leader at a time, but it also brings to the attention of political leaders the importance of individual rights within society.

One of CDM's main projects on social cohesion is known as *The Shared Societies Project*, an EU-funded initiative that aims to create strong political leaders who will focus on building inclusive societies. The background research to the project showed that societies are most likely to be peaceful and democratic when the value of diversity is understood, if not celebrated.<sup>194</sup> When diversity is not understood or ignored, social exclusion and discrimination are a possible result. The leadership aspect is very important to the project. CDM focuses on teaching democratic decision-making processes, as the result is more likely to be policy and practices that respect diversity, where citizen rights can be constituted into legislation. In contrast, the work of CJE would focus on the citizens at the ground level and encourage their participation in activities directed at affecting governmental decision-making processes. Although a top-down initiative, the idea is to provide leaders with the best arguments, options and tools in order to set up the conditions for an inclusive society, which will mean working with a number of actors.<sup>195</sup> For example, Former President of Chile and UN Women Executive Director Michelle Bachelet recently argued that *The Shared Societies Project* creates the opportunity for herself as a Member of the CDM to initiate a project that teaches leaders about policy that should encourage a shared gender society. Bachelet, who spoke specifically about working to construct a post-2015 Development Agenda within Europe, argued to a Global Consultation on Addressing Inequalities in Denmark that exclusion of women and discrimination based on gender has challenged the international political realm for some time.<sup>196</sup> Although women fight for their rights within society, Bachelet detailed three necessities that must be met before these individuals can secure their rights: first, leaders must take responsibility; second, policy initiatives must promote equal opportunity; and third, no gender should be economically

<sup>194</sup> ———, "The Shared Societies Project: Democratic Leadership for Dialogue, Diversity & Social Cohesion" (Madrid, 2012a), [www.clubmadrid.org](http://www.clubmadrid.org). 1.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>196</sup> ———, "Democratic Leadership for Dialogue, Diversity & Social Cohesion: A Club de Madrid Global Initiative," in *The Shared Societies Project Blog*. (Madrid, 2013). <http://www.clubmadrid.org/sspblog/> (Last updated 25 February, 2013).

disadvantaged.<sup>197</sup> Bachelet has effectively set the “conditions” for building restorative gender equality within society. The ideal conditions for a gender inclusive society are not just identified by the project’s initiator, but are already included within a future Agenda and include democratic participation, respect for individual rights, equal opportunity and non-discrimination.<sup>198</sup>

Following a week’s observation of how the organisation and its members function, it also became evident exactly what “arguments, options and tools” the CDM provides to the governments it works with. The most important tool is knowledge. CDM has a wealth of experienced members in a variety of political fields able to pass down their knowledge to new leaders in the field. Second, much of the discussion at the CDM was centred on the need to direct attention to econometric data. Leaders should use the tool of research and innovation in order to collect and develop data that demonstrates that social inclusion can, overall, enhance a society’s economic wellbeing. The incentive for these leaders is to attract funding to their region. Third a clear understanding of what will contribute to the creation of shared societies will enhance the argument or opinion of leaders. For instance, eighty-one former Presidents and Prime Ministers (members of the CDM) put together a proposal called *Call to Action and Ten Commitments*. The ten commitments are described as a list of key policy areas, put together by the members based on the findings of their research, innovative ideas and life experience in general, which are essential features of a shared society. For example, local government and international community were two policy areas agreed on at the General Assembly of CDM in Rotterdam, November 2008, as a necessary focus of democratisation efforts in the near future.<sup>199</sup> The General Assembly working groups concluded that both strong local governments and a strong international community are essential features of a shared society today and therefore policy needs to have the specific purpose of aligning the two areas. That is to say, there must be some positive result from aligning local institutions with international governmental agencies on the wellbeing of citizens and the quality of democracy of the governing system(s). The *Ten Commitments* is similar to a small check-list for leaders, but should instead be viewed as a semi-structured way of ensuring a good start to developing democratic governance by providing a framework skeleton for designing democratic policies.

From the point of view of an outsider able to observe the CDM in action, the CDM aims to integrate individualism into governance systems worldwide in two predominant ways: producing democratic

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> ———, 2012a, 2.

<sup>199</sup> ———, “A Call for Action to Leadership to Build Shared Societies,” in *The Shared Societies Project: Building a World Safe for Difference* (Madrid, 2009). 20.



leaders and through the education of leaders on citizen rights. The importance of this CSO and its contribution to further the democratic quality of EU governance is thus that it is teaching, encouraging and effectively producing ethical behaviour at the top, the key aim of the principle of morality within the civil cosmopolitan model. It has a multi-level approach, working with leaders, local institutions and citizens, to design, advance and disseminate the concept of democracy. Despite the more top-down arrangement of the CDM compared with the CJE, as a CSO it may be more likely than the CJE to have influence at the European level given the status of its membership and structure of its approach. For example, the CDM Legal Charter states that the General Assembly holds 'all the powers granted to the highest governing and representative body'<sup>200</sup> of an association by Spanish legislation. Yet, its projects' ambitions remain very much aligned with connecting political leaders to local society and to this extent could promote citizen rights more effectively than similar-minded CSOs at the transnational level.

Rubén Campos, CDM Program Coordinator at the Headquarters in Madrid, was able to expand upon this special dual position of the CDM with regards to EU relations, in an interview on 17 July, 2012. Complementary to CDM's international work, Campos explained that one of CDM's specific goals is to work with EU institution leaders and to prompt them to encourage democracy so that policies can change, where necessary, from the top down, which will then affect individuals.<sup>201</sup> Campos believes a mix of top and bottom governance strategies is effective and truly brings about change. For example, he indicated that the funding CDM receives from the European Social Fund (ESF) at the top is directed into local projects at the bottom. One such project, *Freedom of Association in the MENA (Middle East and the North of Africa)*, aims to work with the local actors of the MENA that desired a change from the prohibitive laws governing CSOs' registration processes.<sup>202</sup> The project received funding from the EU in 2007, with which it engaged more than 500 national stakeholders and CSOs in local project activities over a two year period.<sup>203</sup> The need to work hand-in-hand with citizens grows stronger every day, meaning there is a greater need to engage with and fund CSOs such as CDM in order for that funding to reach community members. Essentially, Campos reflected in his interview that, similar to CJE, CDM works in the knowledge that a democratic EU governance

<sup>200</sup> Article 13, X General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, "Legal Charter," ed. Club de Madrid (Madrid, Spain 8 November 2011). (Last accessed 20 July, 2012).

<sup>201</sup> Interview with Rubén Campos, Interview 17 July, 2012. Project Coordinator of Club de Madrid.

<sup>202</sup> Club de Madrid, "Program: Freedom of Association in the Middle East and the North of Africa." Madrid, 2007. [http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/freedom\\_of\\_association\\_in\\_the\\_mena](http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/freedom_of_association_in_the_mena) (Last accessed 26 February, 2013).

<sup>203</sup> ———, "Project Achievements and Challenges," in *Program: Freedom of Association in the Middle East and the North of Africa* (Madrid, 2009). [http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/project\\_achievements\\_and\\_challenges](http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/project_achievements_and_challenges) (Last accessed 24 February, 2013).

structure extends to individuals the opportunity to engage as an EU citizen, or in other words enjoy rights and obligations of living in a society or community that is part of a wider international body. The CDM's role in helping to make that democratic structure a possibility is ensuring the rights of all individuals (elites and citizens) exist at all times. For example, Bachelet's "core conditions" for a gender inclusive society aim to enforce the rights of all individuals, male and female, within society. A focus on individuals at the top and at the bottom means that CDM is creating a space in which citizens and elites are working together. In other words, under a model of civil cosmopolitanism, CDM's work would be used to equate the social dimension with its political counterpart in the effort to enhance global democracy. The benefit of CDM and its image as a top-down organisation is that the organisation can take its opinions straight to Brussels, to the EP, and have its voice (the voice of the leaders and the voice of the citizens) heard so that it can communicate directly with the policy-makers. This is one example of how Club de Madrid could bring *The Shared Societies Project*, for example, to the EU and bring the EU to the citizen.

#### **4.3 Local civil society and the European Union**

##### **4.3.1 Developing the core conditions for citizen participation**


Despite their differences, CJE and CDM have one resounding purpose in common: to raise awareness of the concept of individualism within the Spanish and EU communities. The opportunity to observe the decision-making organ of the CJE in action at the 2012 General Assembly was important for two reasons. The Presidents of all the participating youth organisations were very effective at engaging citizens in discussion and supporting their active engagement in past and upcoming activities or campaigns. CJE acts as a connecting institution between the citizen and local or international governance system. The CDM on the other hand, acts as the guiding hand over the relationship between governments and the citizen. The CDM recognises the roles and responsibilities of both leaders and citizens need to adopt to oversee the creation of just societies. It is within these just societies that institutions such as the CJE can sprout.

Both organisations work to improve democracy by producing democratic leadership and democratic communities. Aside from funding a few projects, the EU is yet to recognise the benefits from fully engaging with actors such as CJE and CDM. Apart from enhancing its multileveled structure, the EU stands to enhance the relationship between its political actors and its social actors and ultimately strengthen its decision-making processes. For example, if the EU utilised the leadership work of CDM, although relatively new, including projects such as *The Shared Societies Project* with branching projects like the one carried out by Bachelet, it could be effective in producing the first component

of the civil cosmopolitan model; ethical behaviour and the principle of morality. Bachelet's shared societies project creates a supportive foundation for individualism by encouraging decision-making outcomes that promote equal opportunity for men and women worldwide. It meets the primary ambition of a cosmopolitan governance framework by linking the individual with the global in a way that prioritises individual rights. The EU needs to do more to engage the European citizen. Given that both CSOs have proven successful in engaging citizens in their activities and projects, the EU stands to greatly improve its relations with its citizens and thus their understanding of its system of governance through deeper engagement with the institutions where the presence of those citizens is felt.

Thus the overall point to take from the case studies is the importance of the relationship between the EU and local CSOs within the EU governance system. CSOs create opportunities for citizen participation, but this crucial contribution to transnational governance systems is not utilised because the benefits are not fully understood. Analysing the case studies in further detail demonstrates three basic conditions of citizen participation that these CSOs fulfil, which could greatly improve the democratic quality of EU governance if the EU can establish strong relations with these CSOs. At the very least, the EU can learn from these CSOs about reaching out and engaging the ordinary citizen. The first condition is *formation* of strong institutions. CJE and CDM are both clear about what they want to achieve by pursuing citizen participation, how, in what way and in what forms. Their institutional structure and the activities, events, documentation and projects for which they are responsible were designed accordingly. The institutions are designed to act as appropriate channels for citizen participation. Second, and of equal importance, is the *organisation* of spaces for participation. These spaces are organised around what constitutes moral, free and just societies and are thus based on the idea of inclusion and the achievement of social rights. Spaces can be organised as a direct or indirect participation space, where direct participation is the capacity to physically act from within different social contexts (CJE) and indirect participation is the ability to be represented within different social contexts (CDM). Both direct and indirect spaces are organised to transform or maintain social rights, but to initiate change both types are necessary. Finally, the idea of *motivation* is incredibly important to participation. Motivating citizens has, contained within it, a necessary personal meaning. The topic of democracy, participation in the EU, the right to belong to an active community, the identity of *citizen*; these were the evident drivers behind those who actively participated in CJE and CDM and in civil society in general. Motivating the individual is a key social factor in creating participation. All three conditions fit the components of civil cosmopolitanism.

**Figure 3: The Three Core Conditions for Creating Citizen Participation**



As a physical amenity of citizen participation, CSOs can help contribute to the creation of active citizenship, a more socially based form of citizenship, within the EU, where citizen engagement remains a great challenge today.

**Figure 4: How CSOs Can Contribute to the Creation of Active EU Citizenship**




Figure 4 highlights the work local CSOs could play in the creation of three fundamental prerequisites for any political institution to encourage active citizen participation. The conditions for creating citizen participation are wholly supported within a civil cosmopolitan model. Moreover, the case studies are indicative of how the components of civil cosmopolitanism can be expanded in order to accommodate the conditions of participation supported by CSOs. This analysis will further clarify the way civil cosmopolitanism could function in practical terms.

#### **4.3.2 Civil cosmopolitanism and the conditions for enhancing democracy**

Local civil society, in the case of Spain, has been demonstrated as capable of furthering the democratic quality of EU governance through the advancement of engagement with local-level actors to bring the concept of individualism to the forefront as well as fulfil necessary conditions in terms of citizen participation. Local civil society can provide an organised space for active citizen engagement with and active achievement of citizen rights within the EU. It has created such a space by fulfilling a set of theoretical pre-conditions of social democracy: formation, organisation and motivation, which were a successful combination for the CJE and CDM in terms of attaining elite and citizen participation. To recap, civil cosmopolitanism expands upon David Held's cosmopolitanism by connecting democracy to the theory of social legitimacy. Social legitimacy understands that any move forward for EU governance, e.g. further political and economic integration, should be grounded on a choice by citizens, not on an unavoidable consequence of transnational governance that citizens must live with. In this sense, the three components, institutionalisation, morality and social democracy, were developed as part of the civil cosmopolitanism framework using the theoretical preconditions of social democracy. The local civil society case studies demonstrate where each of these components can be strengthened and provide a clearer understanding of the workings of a potential EU governance system.

##### *Formation*

First, *formation* is central to the institutional component of civil cosmopolitanism because of its focus on relation-building from the perspective of forming stronger societies. It is understood that the institutionalisation of justice is part of the domestic state-building process, yet civil society also shows justice can be achieved in CSOs where overlapping decision-making procedures are utilised. According to Pogge, this is because CSOs are inclusive of multiple actors and follow a 'cross-cultural discourse'<sup>204</sup> of institutionalisation. Pogge's idea of a cross-cultural discourse follows from the idea

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<sup>204</sup> Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 271.

that locally there are political, social, cultural, ethnical and economic aspects not able to be institutionalised at the international and sometimes even national level. For the Union to be described as the 'fully global perspective'<sup>205</sup> that Held claims that it is, the global structures must support and respect the local structures that support the institutionalisation of those aspects. Given that local institutions have not featured as a primary focus within literature on EU governance, the conditions of their existence and a brief description of their make-up is required.

Following the examination of CJE and CDM, there are certain prerequisites any political institution is expected to meet that are necessary to safeguard the citizen. The institution must be formed in a way that provides for individuals to influence agendas, avoid pressure from government elites, remain safe from psychological stress and be free and able to inform themselves, for example freely accessible information. That is to say, local CSOs provide opportunities to physically take part in the institution, for example leading community activities and assembling individuals together for discussions. This is known as *direct participation* and redirects the focus from achieving just international justice to also achieving societal justice. The aim is to form institutions that will provide for meaningful engagement of the citizen with the EU rather than merely having a percentage number of citizens represented at the EU. In other words, to form institutions that can oversee the achievement of social rights of the citizen. CSOs such as CJE and CDM are formed because they share the same objective of contributing to just and democratic governance. For local civil societies in the EU's member states in general, the EU has the opportunity to encourage the formation of strong institutions; and thus to encourage the distribution of political authority, which creates social justice at the local level.

Thus, there are two prominent characteristics of civil cosmopolitanism's institutionalisation component. First, local institutions should be built on a foundation that promotes equal opportunity and freedom for individuals to engage as citizens in society. Their position as bottom-up actors provides ample opportunity for the achievement of social justice through participation. Second, the EU is to remain at the core of the governance system. CSOs must be formed with the flexibility to network. They must be structured appropriately to liaise with key political figures as well as build relations with citizens, which is a challenging part of politics, given that many institutions tend to lean towards the top or towards the bottom. Civil cosmopolitanism advocates that the formation of strong local institutions is essential to enhance the democratic quality of EU governance, because, as

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<sup>205</sup> David Held, "Global Transformations," edited by Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (London: Polity, 2012).

was demonstrated by the CJE, they can act as the connecting point for all actors. A strong connection between the European citizen and the EU is the first step to ensuring governance and policy meet democracy and justice.

### *Organisation*

The success of the condition of *formation* relies on the social integration of member states within the EU; not necessarily to create more Europe but to provide for a balance of political authority between the local institutions and the Union institutions. The CJE and CDM are examples of the ability to organise social spaces which act as an essential starting point for social integration and civic participation. Civil cosmopolitanism proposes that the achievement of social integration will start with the utilisation of CSOs in the construction of a pan-European space, which avoids a sole focus on national or international political spaces. A well-organised pan-European space begins with local civil society for one predominant reason: CSOs allow for an elite-driven process to occur politically, whilst providing a greater emphasis on the role of the citizen in that process. They embody the balance of top-down and bottom-up strategies that civil cosmopolitanism promotes as a necessity in a democratic transnational governance structure. CSOs provide a non-threatening, easily accessible and inclusive space for individuals to participate either first-hand or through direct representation in the process of social integration. Alex Warleigh and Richard Bellamy call it 'ethics participation',<sup>206</sup> a focus on direct participation routes for the citizen as well as indirect representation. CJE, through the use of direct participation routes, and CDM, through the use of indirect participation routes, contributed to the strengthening of the Spanish third sector by engaging multiple voices in activities with clear motivations and the ultimate goal of more democratic societies. The projects initiated by both CSOs will aim to hold the EU accountable where necessary. The case studies in *Chapter Four* demonstrate that a clear relationship between elite and citizen, a clear link between top and bottom and a clear use of both direct and indirect participation methods is essential for a government's democratising potential. A civil cosmopolitan pan-European space adds a clear space where these relationships, links and methods can be established.


The organisation of a pan-European social space is also very important to the establishment of peaceful relations between the EU and local European societies, so that EU decision-making processes better fit the ideals and interests of those societies. This is where the merging of the civil society discourse with cosmopolitan theory aims to offer a much clearer and focused understanding how the role of morality and individualism can fit into the democratisation efforts regarding the EU.

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<sup>206</sup> Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, "From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of Participation- Citizenship and the Future of the European Union," *Millennium: A Journal of International Studies* 27(1998): 447.

Given that the EU was produced following major conflict and war between states that were to become its members, the issue of ethical human behaviour is important to the relationships between its actors.<sup>207</sup> The Spanish CSOs, derived in a weaker third sector environment than is the case in many EU member states, recognised the link between Warleigh and Bellamy's ethical participation and a change in the social culture of Spain and the EU. The idea of morality and behaving ethically is very important to the organising of an appropriate social space. Morality as an ideal governance trait comes from a post-World War Two concept of peace and the attainment of individual social rights. Civil cosmopolitanism combines the morality aspect of civil cosmopolitanism with the civil society discourse to further clarify the position of CSOs in the creation of an ethical space for integration. A pan-European space needs to be organised so as to ensure the EU can begin to produce policy in accordance with the attainment of individual social rights, but civil society will play a role in overseeing a fair and just distribution of those rights. Figure 5 below outlines the workings of a pan-European space, with the roles of both the EU and local civil societies in guaranteeing social rights.

**Figure 5: Local Civil Society and a Pan-European Space**



### *Motivation*

Civil cosmopolitanism takes into account the fact that citizens play a vital yet underutilised role in the development of the EU's governance structure. The formation of strong institutions and the organisation of a space for political participation are two conditions that must be met to oversee

<sup>207</sup> Oliver Richmond, "The Linkage Problematic Between "Track I" and "Track II" and the Emergence of a Third General of Multi-Dimensional Peacemaking in Intractable Conflict," (Moscow: Conference on Managing Pluralism INCORE, June 1999).



citizen participation. However, if citizens are not informed or communicated with during the policy-making processes of the EU, then it is almost certain citizen participation will continue to remain low. A major part of the discussion on the Eurocrisis today focuses on the very point that a citizen must be motivated in order to participate and this will certainly not be the case if they feel their choices are made for them.<sup>208</sup> Following an observation period of the CJE and CDM, it became apparent that motivation will never be achieved by information campaigns on the EU, no matter how compelling or how publicised they are. This is a very important observation in terms of the effect it has on the design of civil cosmopolitanism. The real difference to citizen motivation occurred when citizens were spoken to through the ambitious objectives of the CSOs. The CSOs took it on as their own responsibility and duty to motivate citizens to participate. It is proposed here that the effect will be the same for the EU, either through its policies or through engaging with local CSOs. Civil cosmopolitanism thus promotes the need for social democracy to be inherent in the characteristics of EU activities, initiatives and policy. The fact that citizen participation in the EU could result in the citizens' ability to make a difference to future EU policies should be reflected in policies and communicated to the citizens.

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<sup>208</sup> Miguel Poiates Maduro, "A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice," in *Note: Constitutional Affairs*, ed. Directorate-General for Internal Policies (Brussels: Policy Department C, Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament September 2012), 13.

## 5. CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS

The focus of this research is on analysing the democratic challenges currently facing the EU on the understanding that those challenges present an opportunity for the EU to reconnect with its citizens and move forward – as a Union. Despite an ongoing economic crisis, the need to ensure long-term stability in the banking and financial sector is not an excuse to sideline social rights in an anxious rush to produce immediate and tangible economic solutions. This research has therefore focused on the situation from a social perspective, arguing that the EU could make more of an effort with its duty as a social project to further connect with the 500 million citizens it governs. It thus proposes the use of a governance model that aims to bring together local civil societies and EU social policy to create a strong framework in which the EU can connect with the European citizen through direct and indirect citizen participation. Civil cosmopolitanism is one such framework in which EU-Citizen relations could develop because by balancing the civil society and cosmopolitan theoretical discourses, it effectively mixes top-down and bottom-up governance strategies. If such a framework is employed correctly, it will enhance the democratic quality of the EU and strengthen its governance structure in general. The framework places local civil society at the heart of democratisation efforts, claiming a major part of the EU democratic deficit is the absence of a pan-European space where such strategies can be put into practice and political authority can be distributed.

Over the course of the essay, two hypotheses are addressed to understand the scope and level of social problems in the EU and the scope and level of room for movement towards a more social model of governance. The first hypothesis questions whether there is a political and economic rationale at the EU to increase investment in top-down EU incentives that strengthen local civil societies and enhance citizen participation. A direct part of the study into hypothesis one was an in-depth look at the policy produced by the EU. Evidence from *Chapter Three* reveals that while European representatives speak encouragingly of deeper interdependence between nation-states to engage the European citizen at the transnational level, this is not translated into European policy. There is no real effort to address the social in European policy to help the citizen internalise European integration. That lack of effort could be either because it is an underfunded area or because it is not a priority area. The EU must be proactive however, and deliver in action what it has promised in the spoken word, as this is how the EU will truly communicate with its citizens and correct a core political tension: a lack of citizen trust in the EU. Furthermore, evidence suggests that existing social policy, *Europe for Citizens*, has, over time, enhanced democracy by increasing civic

participation. There is both a political and economic incentive to build upon *Europe for Citizens* and increase investment in policy targeting the grassroots level.

The second hypothesis focused on the role of the individual as key to achieving social equality within the EU. Given that *Chapter Three* found evidence of room in the EU system for new governance strategies and even a more socially-focused governance framework, the conundrum now faced by the EU is how best to engage the European citizen to correct a malfunctioning EU-citizen relationship. Furthermore, would there be any solution that could avoid overcomplicating the system of governance? The problem is well-recognised within the EU. The Directorate-General for Internal Policies at the EC noted in a recent report that the EU faces a choice between either ‘too much politics or no politics at all.’<sup>209</sup> How can the citizen participate directly without challenging the institutional make-up of the EU? *Chapter Four* outlined two case studies involving CSOs in Spain. The purpose was to understand the abilities of local civil societies; what role can they play in advancing the ordinary European citizen from the bottom-up without generating “too much politics.” Whether educating leaders on the importance of citizen participation or representing the citizens themselves, local civil society is arguably a central actor in the bid to enhance the democratic quality of EU governance. The predominant reason in the case of Spain is because the CSOs met three core conditions necessary to create citizen participation in national and international governance contexts. Due to these primary characteristics of CSOs, they stand a greater chance of being able to create participation without impinging upon the political authority of the Union. The CSOs could instead reorganise European political spaces in a non-threatening manner to oversee the emergence of a pan-European space for interaction. The space could provide a starting point for the creation of just institutions and eventually the social integration of individuals who are motivated to participate.

In the following Chapter, hypotheses one and two will be discussed in greater detail in terms of their implications for the EU and their contribution to the field of study on democracy and the EU. In particular, the results of the study in relation to hypothesis one demonstrate where EU funding of social policy needs to be distributed and where that policy needs to be clearer or redesigned in places, especially with regard to the issue of *innovation*, which is becoming a lacklustre fallback solution to achieving long-term goals. The findings from the study in relation to hypothesis two are used to further clarify how a model of civil cosmopolitanism could work and how it would oversee redirected social funding and new social policy. In *Chapter Five*, all three of the model’s components are fitted together and developed using the three core conditions to creating citizen participation. The remainder of the chapter will present two concluding proposals based on the findings of this

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<sup>209</sup> Maduro, 2012, 12.

research, which are supported by a civil cosmopolitan governance structure. The proposals will not address how the EU should move forward financially in terms of the budget, resources and revenue sources, as this is beyond the scope of the research. It will only propose two new political and social avenues that could be explored on the understanding that they have the capacity to enhance the democratic quality of the EU.

### **5.1 A Union of citizen-orientated policy initiatives**

Antigoni Papadopoulou, MEP, Rapporteur for the 2013 European Year of Citizens, recalled at a conference on the EU citizen in November 2012 that the concept of European citizenship was introduced into Union law some twenty years ago.<sup>210</sup> With respect to the progress made within this area, it is an ideal time to discuss and consider further improvements to the role of the citizen as the EU attempts to emerge from economic and social crisis. The data in *Chapter Three* drawn from interviews and documentation analysis is timely to the debate on democracy within the EU, with the release of the next seven-year budget and policy proposals currently occurring. The majority of interviewees engaged within the EP expressed the belief that the time was right to reopen the case for greater citizen involvement. Popular opinion however, has not translated into the primary concern of the policies proposed. The benefit to those on the ground is currently defined in terms of meeting the objectives set out in the EC *Europe 2020* platform, reflected in the proposed strategies for the 2014-2020 period. The core objective of the EC strategy is sustainable and inclusive growth; and there is what could be described as a headlong rush to produce policy that finds immediate growth in economic factors such as GDP, employment levels and government savings. The sense of urgency, although necessary in the latest recession, is less reflective of the long-term goal to produce sustainable and innovative growth than it is reflective of the deeper desire to return to pre-crisis business as usual. The role of the citizen is barely mentioned. This is of concern for policy incentives such as *Europe for Citizens* or *Creative Europe* in terms of the burden they must carry as the leading initiatives in the area of social justice. *Europe for Citizens*, for example, continues to remain the only initiative of its kind that specifically aims to bring Europe closer to its citizens. In defence of the Union, it can be argued that all programmes initiated by the Union are to be utilised by the citizen. This is an important aspect to keep in mind, yet even so the ambitious targets set for social and regional cohesion in *Europe 2020* face an unlikely future in terms of sustainability and inclusiveness if the EU does not depart in some way from the previous integration project.

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<sup>210</sup> European Citizen Action Service, "Final Report of the Conference 'Building the EU Citizen Pillar'," (Brussels: European Economic and Social Committee, November 5 2012), 6.

*Europe for Citizens* is successful, politically and economically, hence there is an incentive to push for more programmes of its kind. Policy with the greater social goal of establishing a connection between the Union and European citizens, such as *Europe for Citizens*, is vital so that the implementation of EU objectives is not seen as foreign to the community structure it may be overstepping and is most certainly affecting. Thus, in order to meet the 2020 goals, there is a political incentive to invest in community ownership, because increasing local citizen participation is ultimately recognised for increasing overall participation in the Union by assisting multi-level governance.<sup>211</sup> It will also stimulate the need for innovative features that include networking tools and cooperation incentives to put those policies into effect. With only 1% of GDP being directed to the EU budget, there needs to be an efficient use of funds that is connected to the citizen and integrated into the community. Either the efficient use of current funds is necessary, given that funding for the only citizen-led development programme (*Europe for Citizens*) increased by no more than 14 million Euro for the 2007-2013 period, or new revenue sources need to be sought to finance socially meaningful and innovative policies.

The opportunity therefore exists to tackle the financial challenges facing the EU and meet the need for a clearer focus on distribution of social cohesion policy funding. Measurable targets for the EU have been set by *Europe 2020*, with one of the core targets being the removal of social exclusion,<sup>212</sup> which means closing the gap between available finances and the declared ambitions for social cohesion. The implementation of sustainable and inclusive strategies called for in *Europe 2020* will require strengthening of governance so as not to repeat the difficulties encountered with the Lisbon strategy for growth and cooperation. The most important factor will be the governance framework in place to support the implementation process. A governance model that will enable the EU to support regional development to the extent required is really an essential rather than optional, including with regard to financial matters. Thus, it is proposed here that in order to achieve economic effectiveness and efficiency discussed in *Chapter Three*, financial instruments that require the skill of local and commercial actors should be used to achieve 2020 objectives. For example, microfinancing, loans and venture capital; instruments that can be depicted by their 'revolving character',<sup>213</sup> meaning their use occurs cyclically and ultimately invests back into the system. Recent data indicates that investing one or two Euros in loans finds a one to three euro return in equity

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<sup>211</sup> European Commission, 2012a, 2.

<sup>212</sup> The 'promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion is a factor in economic development and in the fight against social exclusion.' See *Europe 2020 Strategy*, European Commission, 2010.

<sup>213</sup> ———, "Investing in Regions: Using Financial Instruments to Leverage Support for Regional Policy," *Panorama (Info regio)* 43 (Autumn 2012): 8.

investments.<sup>214</sup> The current funds are not enough to extend to actions funded by these financial instruments, as evidenced in the case of Spain. As the founding coordinator of the *Agenda 21 for Culture* and Member of the European Laboratory for Cultural Cooperation, Spain has been praised for the improvements to social inclusion and social cohesion within the EU. Despite this fact, statistics on the use of financial instruments to promote social and cultural community-led development initiatives are not reported by the ESF, other than decreases to the amount of funding available.<sup>215</sup>

From both the political and economic perspective, the EU is not seriously investing in the promotion of social and cultural development in regions to encourage citizen participation in Union governance. This conclusion is arrived at despite there being enough empirical evidence to support the case for investment in social cohesion, regardless of the need for budget cuts at the present time. In fact, it is one of the more sensible investments to make, given that political, social and cultural participation in the EU is acknowledged in Union law as a right. Essentially, the EU should invest in citizenship initiatives and social cohesion policy initiated at the Union level because citizens face exclusion, especially during times of market fragmentation and global technological shifts. Developing exclusionary policy could result in the absence of social values in the EU, a lack of local democratic societies and sluggish formation of a common European identity. The use of additional financial instruments should therefore be further investigated. In recent meetings of the Committee on Budget in the EP, political support for the use of financial instruments in the MFF is described as 'consistently high.'<sup>216</sup> The incentive to seek alternative governance strategies is beginning to be circulated through the Union's institutions. The objective here is to try to make clear to all involved that the MFF 2014-2020 will need to generate new priorities for Europe: partnership, local community involvement and cooperation.

## **5.2 Fitting together the components of civil cosmopolitanism: how could the model work?**

The existence of both a political and economic incentive to invest at the Union level in policy that promotes the grassroots level is a pre-condition to the successful engagement of local civil society. It is very encouraging to see direct citizen involvement is considered a crucial part of democratic governance, even if there remains room for expansion of EU social policy. There is at least some understanding that the role of the individual is able to be better executed from the ground up, for

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<sup>214</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>215</sup> Pascual, 2012, 23.

<sup>216</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies, "Overview of the Financial Instruments Used in the EU Multiannual Financial Framework Period 2007-2013 and the Commission's Proposals for 2014-2020," in *Analytical Study*, ed. Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs (Brussels European Parliament March 2012).

example through the role of civil society in instigating citizen-led initiatives, if those execution efforts are supported at the top. Thus it makes sense to propose a governance model that balances both top-down and bottom-up governance strategies to achieve the best result in terms of democratising the EU governance system. Civil cosmopolitanism can only work if both governance dimensions are present. At the ground level, the substantial involvement of local civil society is argued here as one of the better opportunities the EU has to enhance the democratic quality of its governance system because of the ability of CSOs to achieve higher levels of citizen participation than classical governmental institutions. Local CSOs, in the case of Spain, are argued to embody the conditions for direct citizen participation: that is, formation of strong institutions, organisation of inclusive spaces within society and motivation of individuals. In other words, the CJE and CDM stand for the achievement of individual rights by contributing to the manifestation of moral and just local societies. Thus, while local civil society engagement may not be the best democratisation strategy in other transnational governance situations, in the case of the EU it can offer the creation of direct citizen participation without demanding institutional reform at the top.

Moving forward with the analysis to the question of how local civil society can help enhance democracy at the EU, the case study in *Chapter Four* also demonstrates how the employment of local civil society can advance the components of a model of civil cosmopolitanism. The theoretical ideas of what constitutes morality, a just institution and social democracy can be envisioned in a practical sense. Civil cosmopolitanism remains flexible as a theoretical project in the sense that there is room for growth or change on a territorial basis, given that the EU brings together 27 different member states. It is unwavering, however, in its promotion of a well-structured local civil society as a body with major potential to help integrate the European citizen within the EU through achievement of his or her social right to participation. Thus, as a framework for democratic transnational governance, it stands by traditional cosmopolitan theory in preserving the rights of individuals in global governance. In addition, it incorporates one essential aspect of European development through the civil society discourse; the recognition of the local and social aspect as crucial characteristic of a democratic international governance system. The previous chapter detailed how the model's three components could be significantly developed in order to best utilise local civil society to achieve practically what the model promotes theoretically. To gain a deeper understanding of the potential workings of civil cosmopolitanism, it is important to discuss briefly how the components fit together and integrate the European citizen.

First, civil cosmopolitanism moves away from David Held's global society to focus instead on local society. This follows the understanding that linking the EU with the European citizen will begin with a

social integration process, which will be reliant on local institutions where territorial minorities and cultural differences are taken into account. Thus, *institutionalism* is a primary component of the model. It is concerned predominantly with local CSOs and their ability to further the role of the individual in the EU governance structure. In order to be effective, the institutions will focus on structure. With the number of individuals and the variety of backgrounds in any local CSO, good quality *formation* is essentially a key characteristic of local institutions with an international purpose. The CSOs studied in *Chapter Four* both exhibit a focus on formation. They are structured formally, similarly to EU institutions, according to the organisations' legal statute, with a clear set of objectives. At the same time their local status allows them the informality of an open and inclusive structure for any individual who wishes to be involved. The possibility for direct or physical participation exists.

Second, the formulation of local bodies such as CSOs is also contingent on the presence of a space for their activities. Neither CDM nor CJE are officially connected with the national Government of Spain, meaning they must be able to create separate social spaces where active participation and social integration can occur. CSOs effectively represent local societies in a number of policy areas. In this sense, the institutions' ability to *organise* such spaces is essential to ensure just and free societies. Furthermore, without excessive reliance on national policy and rules, CSOs have a better chance at internalising the consequences of European integration. In essence, the organisation of sound social spaces will exist to bring together the local social component and European political component into what would be known as a pan-European space. The concept of a pan-European space will become increasingly important where the issue of integration and the formation of deeper relations between the Union and its citizens are concerned. Utilising the ability of local CSOs to organise social spaces will hopefully result in a strong pan-European space from which these relations can grow, which will help to create well-defined and beneficial democratic arrangements between the citizen and the elite. The flow-on effect is of course stronger EU-CSO relations and EU-citizen relations, which represent the foundation of a top-down, regionally unified governance structure; a mix of Union level and ground level authority to create more effective governance.

Taken together, the formation of strong local institutions and the organisation of strong social spaces brings attention to the fact that the activities of the EU would be divided between local units and international government. Each governance level, whether local level or international level, will have a role to play in the decision-making process in at least some of the fields of activity.<sup>217</sup> In Held's cosmopolitan democracy, there is a lack of adjustment between global institutions and local

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<sup>217</sup> This was intellect and visionary scholar William Riker's goal for international governance structures. See Peter C. Ordeshook and William H. Riker, *An introduction to positive political theory* (Prentice-Hall, 1973). 101.



institutions. The components of *institutionalism* and *just society* of civil cosmopolitanism bring a new perspective to ideas surrounding multi-level governance: that is, a peaceful citizens' pillar. One of the great issues of the day deeply rooted in the past is the puzzle of how to live together *peacefully* and in realisation of individual autonomy.<sup>218</sup> The components of *institutionalism* and *just society* add value, that is to say these two components inculcate a culture of peace that motivates the participation of *all* actors within the EU. This brings the discussion to the final component of *social democracy* and the ability of civil society to induce *motivation* amongst citizens. A focus on social democracy as an essential component to democratic governance aims to solidify the connection between the social and the political in international relations. Motivating the European citizen to act upon his or her rights will require local civil societies to bring the political to the citizen, e.g. to reflect European policy in their objectives as an educational tool on the theory and practice of transnational participatory democracy. The social participation of the citizen will then be transferred to the political through the ability of local civil society to preserve local culture, territorial interests and citizen identity at the EU level. For example, the high level of citizen participation in the CJE campaign against HIV impacted the decision-making process of the Spanish Government, which resulted in the inclusion of Spanish youth in the Government's HIV prevention plan. The CJE was able to transfer the social to the political whilst preserving the identity of Spanish youth at the national level. The Union has a greater chance of following its own legislation and respecting member state history, culture and tradition, as is outlined in the Treaty establishing the European Community.<sup>219</sup>

When the components of civil cosmopolitanism come together, the EU governance system is more than formulated treaties and legislation; more than the trade agreements, a central banking system and a political hierarchy. The governance system requires individuals to open their societies to new cultures, ethnicities and political systems. It requires them to take on the citizenship of the Union as well as the citizenship of their own nation-state. Thus, where state-society relations, political representatives, structures and cultural identities exist, local civil society is proposed as the appropriate sphere where just institutions and social spaces can function adequately in respect of these imaginaries. It is clear here that "Europeanisation" demands a model of thought separate from that of globalisation, as originally suggested by Delanty.<sup>220</sup> Focusing specifically on the political rights of the European citizen in a globalising world, while important, fails to capture the social world of European integration. According to Delanty, the transformative capability of the EU is restricted to a

<sup>218</sup> Edwards, 2009, 6.

<sup>219</sup> European Union, "European Union: Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community." *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 321 (December 2006). Preamble, 9.

<sup>220</sup> Gerard Delanty, "The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Significance of Europeanization," *International Review of Sociology* 15, no. 3 (November 2005).


“concept:” ‘a European people, a European society, a European supra-state or a European heritage.’<sup>221</sup> In contrast, the transformative capability of the EU within civil cosmopolitanism, while still responsive to regulation and policy wording, advances to a more organic stage. Democracy is a concept of advancing aspirations, where civil society provides the connection between the political and the social; the ability for individuals to connect as citizens. In other words, civil society allows for the encounter of the local with the global to occur from within a social context.

As a top-down, regionally unified model, civil cosmopolitanism aims, through the use of local civil society as a tool for grassroots development, to enhance the democratic quality of the EU. It focuses in particular on the social aspect of EU governance and the concept of individualism, following a lack of substantial analysis on the local dimension in international governance structures. The three components create a framework that steers away from any one concrete argument, such as the existence of an information deficit, as well as any one cure, such as the need for further EU legislation. Of course, challenging the opacity of the EU remains important, but the civil cosmopolitanism framework recognises the overarching need to reach local society. Reaching out to local civil societies may be enough given that local CSOs can represent local society through just institutional-building and organisation of social spaces. The EU’s relationship with local societies and citizens will also have a flow-on effect on the relationship with local Governments. In essence, the model works as a networking system. It acts as a multi-level networking system to ensure that the inclusion of minority voices materialises in practice through the use of constructive dialogue. It ensures the Union respects the existing traditional layers of the societies with which it is interacting by working with the bodies set up to protect those layers. Figure 6 below provides a visual summary of a model of civil cosmopolitanism as an EU-citizen networking system.

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<sup>221</sup> Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory And The Implications Of Europeanization* (Routledge, 2005). 23.

**Figure 6: Civil Cosmopolitanism: EU-Citizen Networking System**



Currently, there is no proper public European space and there exists a continued lack of citizen engagement with the EU. During the year of the European citizen and in the run-up to the European elections in 2014, there is now the opportunity to build an EU-citizen networking system with the involvement of all stakeholders concerned; not only civil society but also European institutions, national Governments, academic communities and media. Finally, the medium-to-long-term objectives of the policy and legislation produced on citizen initiatives should be reviewed at the Union level. The European institutions, through existing policy, are correct to promote the fact that European citizenship should not just be about citizens' rights but also about participation and civic engagement.<sup>222</sup> Civil cosmopolitanism takes it one step further however and promotes the view that participation and civic engagement *are* citizen rights, but it appears the institutions have failed to make that connection. These two proposals, a pan-European space for the networking system and more effective European policy, will now be developed in the final part of *Chapter Five*.

### 5.3 Proposals for a top-down, regionally unified European Union

This chapter has so far detailed the way in which local civil society, from an individualist perspective, can set the conditions for active citizen participation within the EU if the EU chooses to engage itself through policy and legislative initiatives that will support that participation. Furthermore, a

<sup>222</sup> Sophie Beernaerts from the European Commission in European Citizen Action Service, 2012, 7.

framework of governance, civil cosmopolitanism, has been developed, which aims to reflect these top-down and bottom-up strategies. There are two proposals for the EU that arise from the findings above, which, if fulfilled, suggest how the ability of local CSOs to engage citizens can be maximised and how the civil cosmopolitan framework may be politically feasible. The two proposals are reform of EU policy and a pan-European space for local civil society. The financial and economic side is not dealt with due to the unknown direction of the Euro, the Union's budget and the imposition of a European Central Bank. While the United Kingdom hopes for a freeze on the next budget, others are proposing the budget should increase from 1% to at least 3% of EU GDP.<sup>223</sup> At the risk of accusations of impracticality, the two proposals are discussed here with regard to their potential development in future research. With the dual task of retaining the European institutional balance of power as well as engaging the European citizen through direct participation, proposals that are less courageous will not fully grasp the seriousness of the democratic challenges facing the EU.

### **5.3.1 Policy that communicates with the European citizen**

*Europe for Citizens* remains the only programme that encourages direct citizen participation and active remembrance on a European level. Even then, it is not financially stable and, despite requests for a considerable increase of the financial envelope,<sup>224</sup> it is questionable whether its success will be financially recognised in the near future. There is no genuine effort to devise real human relation-building techniques. Policymakers view financial challenges and the risk of over-legislating from within their own prism and experiences. This mindset needs to change and policy must be adapted to focus more on issues at home rather than debates at the EU, in order to reflect changing realities. The opportunity exists to do things differently and the Union must communicate through its policy that the needs and concerns of future generations can be met and responded to through EU governance. The EU can enhance its democratic quality, therefore, by producing policy better aligned to the growing awareness of the importance of the local and social dimension in governance. What justifies the existence of the EU, for example, if the policy and legislative instruments do not correspond with its role as a model for social and economic development? In particular, social and cohesion policies that target regional development, such as *Europe for Citizens*, must provide for the citizens what they expect from the Union by incorporating a mix of dialogue-inducing initiatives, the possibility for new enterprises and businesses, an emphasis on merging public civil society with the EU, the direct participation of citizens in the management and monitoring of policy-making processes and investment in research and data collection. Whether this means redesigning current policy or creating new policy is a decision for the policymakers.

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<sup>223</sup> Maduro, 2012, 19.

<sup>224</sup> Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012a, 35.

There are two priorities for new policy; first, active citizen participation. Active citizen participation was present in a number of CJE projects and even the General Assembly meeting, a meeting generally thought of as closed to a board of presidents or directors. Active citizen participation in a number of EU policy arenas should aim to address the desire for the Union to foster social democracy and transparency. An active civil society program is the second priority. Within its *Shared Societies Project*, the CDM promoted communication and engagement with civil society to the leaders it educates, claiming within the MENA, for example, leaders were finding working closer with CSOs meant working closer with citizens. Engraining an active civil society program in EU social and cohesion policy could focus on eradicating structural social exclusion of individuals. *Europe for Citizens*, although unable to meet current citizen demand, has added value to the EU in terms of raising awareness of the EU and contributing to a European public sphere. These two priorities however are more than just valuable; they contribute to an overall objective of linking grassroots policy initiatives to the EU's major strategic goals leading up to 2020 and beyond. *Europe 2020* is leaning towards ambitious but necessary goals for social inclusion, economic growth and sustainability that, unless policy is strengthened, are unlikely to be met. A policy initiative that transforms how the EU interacts with local civil society e.g. more closely links the EU with local institutions, is thus an ever-increasing necessity because the way in which the EU interacts with local society is likely to be the way in which the EU will interact with national Governments. Given that the implementation of EU policy and funding is effectively made by member states' national administrations, the dependence on local civil society increases. However, if utilised correctly, this trio of relations can have a positive effect on EU-member state relations and certainly on moving forward with the goals and strategies of *Europe 2020*.

One final point concerns the achievement of citizen participation and rendering more concrete the idea of deeper relations between the EU, CSOs and national Governments. The connection between new policy, new financial instruments and the need for *innovation* to advance the two could conceal better uses of creativity in social policy. *Europe 2020*, the MFF 2014-2020, the updated *Europe for Citizens*; all of these proposals studied in *Chapter Three* rely excessively on the use of innovation and the idea of the European Union as the "Innovation Union" as the solution.<sup>225</sup> The idea behind innovation is the investment in multiple different projects with the goal of only a few finding success and, finally, for those few to be reinvested back into. This seems to be a key point about innovation that has clearly been forgotten in the excitement over the immediate results from applied innovative research, which are likely to be technological development and material economic growth. There is a risk of an excessively narrow focus on policy initiatives that produce immediate

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<sup>225</sup> European Commission, 2010.

and upfront results that appear to be driven by innovation. For example, policy focusing on citizen participation as a legitimisation tool can easily be calculated in terms of upfront costs, i.e. financial envelopes, but it is extremely difficult to know the results in advance.<sup>226</sup> Thus, it will not be a policy priority. In reality, scientists believe it is close to impossible to predict which policies and research areas will lead to innovative solutions and results.<sup>227</sup> What is true, however, is the need to invest either less in the idea of innovation, to avoid skewed perceptions about effective policy, or invest in all areas of innovation with a long-term focus, including social innovation. Furthermore, with regard to the achievement of citizen participation in such policy, the use of wording such as innovative growth and innovative technological development, to give examples, is complex, confusing, uninformative, unclear and worst of all, not motivating for citizen involvement.

### **5.3.2 A pan-European space for citizen rights, access and belonging**

Following from the previous proposal for new initiatives and a clearer focus on the long term in EU policy is a need for open resources, open education, open access and open societies to discuss these new ideas. The Spanish civil society model is a good case study because it reveals what is missing in the multi-level structure of the EU and how social investment can address that issue. There is currently no open pan-European space for local civil society to formulate strong CSOs and organise social spaces for citizen participation. The presence of an anti-EU feeling in Spain in combination with a now-booming civil society meant CJE was working on how to reintegrate Spanish citizens within the Spanish Government and, less successfully, the EU. A lot of those individuals affected by the crisis are now turning to the third sector for education on their rights and to form stronger communities. The youth involved with CJE are pushing for active participation in Spain and the EU to secure rights for their future. Thus, proposing policy focused on active citizen participation and an active civil society program is of critical importance because it indicates some understanding of the need to fix a stagnant European community. Few future proposals talk about the stagnation of community within the EU, meaning few proposals recognise that social recovery plays a large part in the creation of economic recovery.

While an ambitious proposal, the creation of pan-European space in combination with new policy proposals is necessary to give citizens a practical vision of an open environment where their participation in the EU is encouraged and facilitated. The fine points of such a space remain to be detailed. In combining the civil society and cosmopolitan theory discourses, this research has sought

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<sup>226</sup> Vesa Kangaslahti and Hannu Takkula, "Education in Times of Recession and at the Age of Innovation," *Baltic Rim Economies* Bimonthly Review 6(December 2010): 4.

<sup>227</sup> Michael H. Depledge, Jacqueline McGlade, Pierre Mottet and Sybille van den Hove, "The Innovation Union: a Perfect Means to Confused Ends?," *Environmental Science & Policy* 16 (2012): 77.

to reintegrate the social dimension, or the individual, into the EU while incorporating state and top-down governance strategies. Thus, this research proposes a pan-European space committed to the effective and multileveled distribution of political and social authority. The pan-European space would therefore serve various purposes, including being an education platform for individuals on European citizens' rights, a help centre for those involved in local civil society or enforcement of citizens' rights, a resource centre for those working at the transnational level and a place for communication, debate and discussion between all actors. Even if the nature of European policy does not shift to be more socially inclined, the existence of a legitimate European space allows the EU, as a minimum, to communicate clearly the policy it wishes to impose upon its citizens.

The pan-European space itself remains an elusive concept and should be a pivotal point of future research. Despite these uncertainties, the workings of a pan-European space are envisioned as bringing effectiveness to the Union. Civil society at the local level works to enhance the role of the citizen and elite by ensuring the conditions for participation are met. Given that the Union, due to institutional structures and legislative requirements, cannot create such conditions itself, there must be a point where the Union can engage with the institutions that can, and thus with the citizen. It should exist not only to ensure a clear distributive effect of EU policy but also to assure the citizen their voice is not simply represented by the voice of their state or political representative at the EP. It should exist both virtually and physically as a space for networking, where relations are built among the various stakeholders of EU governance to empower citizens at the bottom and advance the policy agenda for public benefit at the top. Thus, it has an overall function of connecting local, national and international politics together through the shared understanding that European issues are important to all levels.

## CONCLUSION

### Thesis Summary

In studying the enhancement of the democratic quality of EU governance at a time when the EU faces an uncertain future, this thesis tackles a challenging topic with bold proposals. At the start of this thesis, it was mentioned that some will consider the conclusions of this work to be overly-ambitious for the EU. But it should also be stressed that with the number of competing overly-ambitious proposals being released, as concern for the EU rises, it will come down to a question of which of those overly-ambitious proposals should be chosen. In positioning the idea of democratic enhancement at the local level (through the use of case studies on the Spanish third sector), this thesis has explored the possibility of utilising local civil society to maintain a direct role for the citizen within the EU. At the same time, it has questioned the likelihood that the EU could in fact support, both politically and economically, increases in the active involvement of local institutions and the ordinary citizen within EU policy and decision-making processes. The research looked at both existing EU policy and legislation as well as literature on the civil society discourse and cosmopolitan theory discourse in relation to international political structures. It was discovered that in the last decade the EU has in fact changed tack in terms of its governance structure to incorporate organised civil society in the legislative process, but that the utilisation of civil society as a democratisation tool has been ineffective due to a predominant focus on civil society in a global context, which sensationalises the transnational role of the EU and weakens its local role. In extending cosmopolitan theory, this thesis aims to make an original contribution to the field by devising a possible governance model called civil cosmopolitanism that would successfully rely on local civil societies of EU member states as an instrument for enhancing democracy, without disturbing the transnational powers of the EU.

To test the feasibility and desirability of the model, primary research was conducted in two areas: the potential for movement at the Union level in terms of changes to policy and legislation, as well as the ability of CSOs to incorporate local communities and individuals into European politics. First, research was carried out from within the EP, where face-to-face interviews were conducted with staff from various parts of the EP. The personal views and academic opinions of those working for the EU were then matched against the trend in current and new proposals for social policy being released by the EC. The outcome was a real mismatch between what those within the EP desired, and claimed to be working towards, and the actual policies, or lack of policies, currently being published. During a time when the EU needs to regain all the trust it can from its citizens, this



miscommunication is confusing to citizens and damaging to the reputation of the EU. Second, two case studies on CSOs based in the region of Madrid were carried out, which involved the use of surveys, interviews, archival research and participant observation. Conducting these case studies involved working at ground level for one to two months in order to gain a well-rounded understanding on the building of democratic societies and leaders. This empirical research demonstrated the root of the EU's ineffective use of civil society. It revealed that CSOs were in fact able to help the EU's governance system by providing training to citizens and elites on the benefits of active citizen participation. Both CSOs embodied three core conditions for active citizen participation: formulate, organise and motivate. These conditions had been successfully met in Spain, as well as other project locations such as the MENA, but not in the barely existent relationship between the CSOs and the EU. By not wholly engaging with civil society on all levels, the EU suffers from a lack of grounding in local societies where citizens are active in national and international politics. Subsequently, it also suffers a lack of common history, European culture, European identity and European discourse, where most individuals come to define the social meaning of their EU citizenship.

The results indicate current EU institutions fall short of being able to guarantee direct citizen participation or even protection of citizens' needs, rights and responsibilities. This evidence alone is not enough to suggest the EU suffers a 'democracy deficit;' in fact the tight constraints of constitutional checks and balances imposed upon its institutions ensure its legitimacy. However, in the opinion of this researcher, the democratic quality of EU governance could be improved by more closely aligning the EU with its citizens and redesigning the social dimension of EU governance. It makes sense to bring the EU back to its original point of departure; the European community. Given that, in terms of enhancing the democratic quality of the EU, academic opinion has largely concentrated on reform within the transnational institutions themselves, the purpose of this research has been to demonstrate that the social cleavage can be improved by establishing a link between the Union and the citizen from the ground up. It was argued that there is in fact room for the progression of a modified governance framework, such as civil cosmopolitanism, which, in theory, recognises that a shift in the culture of the EU governance structure is necessary to incorporate a greater grassroots influence. Over the course of the thesis, civil cosmopolitanism was developed into a top-down, regionally unified governance framework with three core components that support both the EU and the European citizen in their endeavours. In furthering the cosmopolitan theories of David Held, civil cosmopolitanism combined both Held's cosmopolitan discourse with the civil society discourse to produce an elite-led but individually-focused model. It is argued that the EU is more likely to succeed as a democracy by working as a governance system that

is both bottom-up and top-down orientated, given that the EU must co-exist within a multi-level environment. The key to the model is the role local civil society plays as an intermediary point, relation-building network and strong institutional base.

The model itself is acknowledged within this thesis as elaborate in nature and in need of further testing. However, the EU is more obliged than any national polity to maintain an image of a functioning democracy due to its own plural structures. It is therefore perceived to be realistic to expect the EU to wish to engage in more ambitious governance strategies in the immediate future that aim to address the social aspect of the crisis over the long term. This thesis suggests two strategies that would support the implementation of a governance model such as civil cosmopolitanism. First, the EU would have to openly acknowledge there is a need to work with policy that is wholly encouraging of active citizen participation and supports the role of local civil societies in creating that participation. Second, for the networking created by civil cosmopolitanism to have a greater chance of working, a pan-European space should be designed and created. Both strategies recognise two simultaneous needs: the need for attention and expertise in the area of policy-making at the international level and the need for the distribution of political authority at the local level to dispense justice, equality and individual rights.

### **Limitations**

It is acknowledged that there are limitations to the results published in this thesis. Predominantly, there are limitations that arise from data collection methods and the use of theory to tackle such an ambitious topic, given that what is proposed as a result will be considered challenging by many and impossible by some. First, these results have been reached focusing solely on the examination of Spanish civil society. It is strongly argued that Spain is one of the better choices for a case study, given its fragile state yet long-term commitment to the Union as a member state. Spanish civil society is also a relatively fledgling concept with room for academic thought. The sole examination of Spain, however, is not to say that the benefits discovered from studying a local and a transnational Spanish civil society are limited in their applicability to the civil society of other member states, whether the economy or civil society base of those member states is strong or not. Second, the research design employed in this thesis draws heavily on the work of cosmopolitan theorists and is thus predominantly theory-based in nature. Cosmopolitan theory is used as the analytical framework with which to view the issue of EU governance and questions concerning its democratic quality. The size and scope of the issue is limitless when considered in isolation, meaning the use of theory in this thesis to strengthen the validity of the research must have a clear focal point. The

aspect of cosmopolitan theory that focuses on individualisation has been combined with the civil society discourse to create a governance framework that provides clarity to the way cosmopolitan theory is perceived to help advance the democratic quality of the EU. There are two limitations with this research approach. First, it appears to be the intention of this thesis to *reinvent* existing theory. Consequently, the framework appears overly-ambitious and unrealistic. The advancement of cosmopolitan theory however was only ever intended to revitalise and *refresh* existing democratic theory, in order to contextualise it with regards to the EU. The second limitation applies to methods of testing the framework that are employed in this thesis. Data relies heavily on the opinion of survey participants and EP interviewees of which there are not a huge number. It is argued, however, that when compared to existing EU policy and initiative proposals, those who were interviewed or surveyed offered valid insight into the potential benefits of a cosmopolitan governance framework i.e. more citizen-orientated policy or a greater focus on local civil society involvement. Great care was taken to ensure a variety of EU personnel were chosen. Furthermore, testing the framework outside of the EP largely takes a sub-level approach, adopting a differing perspective to the summit approach more commonly considered in research on the EU. In this sense, this research does not offer much of a focus on the transnational institutions within the EU but, rather, concentrates on the institutions in the field. The primary research question asked how local civil society could advance the democratic quality of the EU and therefore it is expected that local-body institutions will be the core focus of the research. With regard to the EU's social cleavage however, the examination of local civil society only gives a limited view of other potential avenues to help create a more socially-orientated EU. This is why it was so important that a top-down focus be present throughout the research to ensure the study of local civil society is understood in the context of EU governance, for example, the study on EU social policy and any existing political or economic incentives to further the engagement of local civil society. The use of multiple data collection tools to compare and analyse primary material as well as the mix of a top-down and bottom-up research design ensure the research adequately tests the theoretical framework and offer options to further the democratic quality of the EU.

### **Future Research**

During these challenging economic times, there is likely to be some unwillingness to make any major decisions regarding the state of democracy within the EU. It has also been stressed, however, that the EU faces such an uncertain future that the choice is likely to be between proposals that are drastic in nature or that let the Union collapse. The latter will have significant economic and social costs for Europe as a whole. Thus, future research on topics similar to those presented in this thesis

should be continued. Primarily, this thesis offers a theoretical framework that, it is argued, represents a necessary extension of the existing EU governance structure if the EU wishes to advance democratically. Civil cosmopolitanism is not an attempt at forecasting the future of EU governance, but rather an attempt at strengthening EU governance as it currently stands. As the section on limitations clearly indicates, civil cosmopolitanism is yet to be understood as a desirable, feasible and, ultimately, secure governance framework with which to move forward. Therefore, while the political dynamics of the current crisis have been explored in this thesis and subsequent proposals have been offered, civil cosmopolitanism has not been fully placed in the context of urgency that currently surrounds the EU. The model itself requires full development at European level, which will involve further validity testing of its characteristics against the backdrop of a severe crisis.

It is also the case that the proposals put forward follow heavily from the results of the case study data on Spain. However, the proposals suggested in this thesis follow the theme that their implementation allows the ordinary citizen to make sense of the EU and vice versa. As such, any proposal that continues the theme will have a bolstering effect on itself in that, once committed to by multiple actors, it will be able to generate stronger relations between the EU and the citizen as well as a better functioning EU. This prediction flows from the assumption that the use of democratisation tools that engage the citizen, e.g. local civil society, is to provide for individuals' rights and links democracy to the theory of justice. If the proposals offered in this research are not pursued, future research investigating EU-citizen relations could look into effective socialisation strategies that empower the citizen at the global level, where the nation-state cannot ensure justice; that citizens' rights, needs and responsibilities are met. The issue is a timely one in global political literature and should be supplemented by various opinions as the European Year of the Citizen begins. For example, 2013 offers the chance to hear ideas on more attractive reform and governance strategies directly from citizens from multiple member states, which could be a promising idea for a broader study on enhancing the democratic quality of EU governance.

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## **Interviews**

Interview with Juan Fernando López Aguilar on Advancing the Democratic Quality of EU Governance. Interview, 4 October 2012.

Interview with Juan Gonzalez, Head of the Documentation Centre at Consejo De La Juventud De España. Interview, 12 July 2012.

Interview with Helena Soletó Muñoz, Professor of Procesal Law at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Interview, 19 July 2012.

Interview with Hannu Takkula on the Role of Education in Democratisation of the EU. Interview, 1 October 2012.

Interview with Luc Van Den Brande on his Role as President of the Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs. Interview, 17 October 2012.

Interview with Nicos Trimikliniotis on EU Integration and Social Policy. Interview, 17 October 2012.

Interview with Policy Advisor from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats. Interview, 5 October 2012.

Interview with Policy Advisor from the Group of the Greens. Interview, 5 October 2012.

Interview with Ricardo Ibarra, President of Consejo De La Juventud De España. Interview, 12 July 2012.

Interview with Rubén Campos, Project Coordinator of Club De Madrid. Interview, 17 July 2012.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: University of Canterbury Human Ethics Approval

**Ref: HEC 2012/14/LR**

30 April 2012

Kirsten Mander  
National Centre for Research on Europe  
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Dear Kirsten

Thank you for forwarding your Human Ethics Committee Low Risk application for your research proposal “Civil society as a means of strengthening the democratic quality of European Union (EU) governance, is a model of cosmopolitan democracy a feasible way forward?”.

I am pleased to advise that this application has been reviewed and I confirm support of the Department’s approval for this project.

With best wishes for your project.

Yours sincerely

Michael Grimshaw  
*Chair*  
*University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee*



**Appendix B: Interview questions (English Version) for Interview with Ricardo Ibarra, President of Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE)**

**12 July, 2012**

General Research Questions

Please tell me a bit about yourself before you entered into the CJE.

Congratulations on becoming President of the CJE in 2010; what is your main goal for the organisation?

In what ways do you believe the CJE as a civil society organisation (CSO) can democratise society and the region of Spain?

How does the CJE go about achieving its objectives?

Can you tell me a bit about the successes experienced by the CJE to date? What have these meant for the youth of Spain?

How do you see the CJE progressing / developing as a CSO over the next decade?

Specific Research Questions

*One of the main themes of interest at the CJE is the European Union. There is concern that integration has only produced economic results and has not formed the deep sense of political and social community as it was supposed to.*

How does the CJE plan to contribute to the construction of a more social Europe?

In the document published by CJE called ‘*El Tema Sobre Europa*’ there is reference to “*una identidad europea*” as the base of a social Europe. How does the formulation of a European identity influence the goals of the CJE?

As a regional CSO, the CJE can act as a link between the European Union and the youth of Spain. What is the role for youth in creating a social Europe?

*I mentioned in my introduction that I have designed a theoretical model to help support the implementation of a more social Europe. The model is based on cosmopolitan democracy - prioritisation of individual rights – where the creation of strong local institutions and the ability to network assumes a more democratic system of European Union governance.*

What are your thoughts on the ability of local institutions to strengthen individual citizen rights – “individualisation” - within the European Union?

On behalf of the CJE, would you encourage the implementation of such a model with regard to the best interests of Spanish youth?

**Appendix C: Interview questions (English Version) for Interview with Juan Gonzalez, Director of the Documentation Centre of *Consejo de la Juventud de España* (CJE)**

**12 July, 2012**

General Research Questions

When did you start working for the CJE?

How does the documentation centre work inside the institution?

How do you personally feel about the work that CJE does for young people?

What can you tell me about the topic of the role of youth in the European Union?

Specific Research Questions

What would you say to the argument that local civil society, such as Spain, can help advance the quality of democracy of European Union governance?

What can you tell me about the amount of material you get in the documentation centre to do with helping youth achieve their rights as citizens of the European Union? **Follow up question:** Does or should it appear a topic of importance do you think?

Can you please clarify for me why there is not a greater focus on the role of youth in the Union within the documentation centre of the CJE?

**Appendix D: Interview questions (English Version) for interview with Rubén Campos, Programme Coordinator of *Club de Madrid* (CDM)**

**17 July, 2012**

General Questions

Please tell me a bit about your involvement in Club de Madrid (CDM). What does CDM mean to you personally?

How has the organisation achieved its goal of furthering and strengthening democracy worldwide since its initiation almost 11 years ago?

Where do you see the organisation following the next decade?

As the only civil society organisation (CSO) that is made up of 90 former heads of state and democratic governance, how does CDM intend to use the asset of its membership to further democracy in the region of Spain?

The CDM is supported institutionally by the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE); as a team is there much of a commitment to practical programmes focused on the European Union?

As a non-profit organisation similar to most CSOs, what are your thoughts on the economic rationale behind the EU to invest more in social policy and local institutions?

Does the European Social Fund provide funding and how is that funding used so it best represents the individual citizen?

Specific Questions

How would you define *a citizen* and does CDM represent these individuals? How?

Can you tell me what is in the pipeline at CDM in terms of creating more of a social Europe?

The organisation works specifically with leaders all over the world to help implement or strengthen democracy. What does the organisation do by way of working with local individuals and helping them participate as citizens?

How can the Spanish citizen utilise CDM to establish a deeper connection with the European Union?

The Shared Societies Project is a great initiative to bring about more inclusive societies, but there lacks any mention of the European Union where other major international institutions are mentioned such as the United Nations and African Union, why?

How will Club of Madrid bring the Shared Societies Project to the European Union?

What does CDM hope to achieve from being a Member of the EU Civil Society Platform for Multilingualism?

**Appendix E: Interview questions (English Version) for interviews with Alicia Cebada Romero, Professor in International Public Law and International Relations, and Helena Soleto Muñoz, Professor of Procesal Law, at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M).**

**19 July, 2012**

General Research Questions

You have written extensively on the external action of the European Union. What are your thoughts on the democratic quality of the Union's governance system?

Can you tell me what feedback you have had to your suggestions for the Union to act more as a civil power model on the international stage?

Before the Union can be more civilian-orientated externally, do you believe there needs to be a similar shift internally?

Specific Research Questions

What do you know about the *Europe for Citizens* initiative?

What are your beliefs as to why the Union has not been able to create the social community and idea of a European Identity as it set out to do?

What do you think it means to be a citizen?

As a citizen of the European Union, where do you think the Union could create more opportunity for its citizens to participate in its governance structure?

What are your thoughts on the argument that local and regional civil societies should be utilised to strengthen relations between the citizen and the European Union?

Do you think civil society organisations should play a role in the governance structure of the Union?

Where do you stand theoretically in your own work with regard to international organisations such as the European Union?

Would there be any reasons why you would not wish for further research on the implementation of a grassroots-based model of governance within the Union to be carried out?

What, if any, do you think are the political reasons behind the need to adopt or reject a theoretical approach that prioritises civilian rights (economic, political, intercultural, social, civil)?

## **Appendix F: Interview questions for interviews with staff members from the European Parliament**

**1 – 20 October, 2012**

### General Questions

What is your primary goal for your nation-state as a staff member the European Parliament (EP)?

What is your primary goal for Europe?

### Specific Questions

#### *The European Union Governance Structure*

What kind of Europe do you want for yourself and future generations?

While the Union is changing and adapting its governance structure, what political incentives for a more grassroots-structured top-down / bottom-up governance system do you think might exist?

In your opinion, is the Union governance system structured appropriately to deal most efficiently with regional development?

Do you think an increase in citizen-led initiatives or an increase in citizen participation in general will further the democratic quality of the Union?

Do you think there is a need for the EU to focus on increasing citizen participation? If not, why? If so, how do you think we can increase citizen participation in EU decision-making processes / the governance system?

#### *Regional Development and cohesion policy*

What do you believe are the main challenges and opportunities for regional development within the Union over the next decade?

When we discuss social policy, it most commonly refers to social in the economic sense, i.e. employment and market policy. In the new legislative package for 2014-2020, there is a greater push for the social dimension i.e. civil liberties and the people. What do you see this doing for citizen participation and regional development in the EU?

Changes to EU policy and the structuring of funds seem to be about simplifying administrative processes to maximise outcome for beneficiaries. How do you think regions and local communities can complement this effort?

Could the push for outcome / results-based incentives be detrimental in anyway?

The future of the EU seems to be focused on internal orientation, towards more economic, social and territorial cohesion and inclusion. What do you think about this assumption? Do you think this is contrary to perhaps some of the previous policy directions pushing for EU competitiveness in a global context?

**Appendix G: Survey for Spanish civil society organisations (Original Version: Spanish) (participants were involved in the 2012 General Assembly Meeting for Youth Organisations)**

**13 – 15 July, 2012**

**El papel del ciudadano y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil**

*Prólogo:* El siguiente cuestionario se enmarca dentro de una investigación realizada por una estudiante de Postgrado de Nueva Zelanda, Kirsten Mander, quien plantea la siguiente pregunta en su estudio: *¿puede democratizar un sistema de gobierno la sociedad civil?* El foco del estudio es la sociedad civil española y su habilidad de democratizar la Unión Europea a través de proveer al “ciudadano” más acceso a la participación.

Kirsten quisiera invitarle a participar en una encuesta corta con el propósito de recopilar datos. Todas las respuestas son confidenciales y serán empleadas exclusivamente con fines de investigación. Por favor, rellene el siguiente documento con bolígrafo azul o negro seleccionando la mejor respuesta y devuélvalo a Kirsten.

*Clasificación*

Usted es: Hombre ☐ Edad: 15-18 ☐ 18-24 ☐ 25-50 ☐ 50-70 ☐ 70+ ☐  
Mujer ☐

¿Cuál es su ocupación? \_\_\_\_\_

¿Cuál es su razón para participar en la Asamblea General del CJE\*? \_\_\_\_\_

¿Es ciudadano/a español/a? Sí ☐ No ☐

*Cuestiones sobre la Unión Europea*

1). Los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea entienden lo qué es la Unión y cómo funciona.\*\*

|                                     |                      |                |                   |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                            | <b>2</b>             | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>          | <b>5</b>                         |
| <b>Totalmente<br/>en desacuerdo</b> | <b>En desacuerdo</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>De acuerdo</b> | <b>Totalmente<br/>de acuerdo</b> |

**\*Consejo de la Juventud de España**

**\*\*No hay definición de ‘Ciudadano de la Unión Europea’ en la documentación de la Unión, pero “Ciudadanía Europea” aparece definido en el Tratado de Maastricht como “es ciudadano de la Unión toda persona que posea la nacionalidad de un Estado miembro”**

2). El ciudadano Europeo está involucrado en los procesos de toma de decisiones de la Unión Europea.

|                                     |                      |                |                   |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                            | <b>2</b>             | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>          | <b>5</b>                         |
| <b>Totalmente<br/>en desacuerdo</b> | <b>En desacuerdo</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>De acuerdo</b> | <b>Totalmente<br/>de acuerdo</b> |

3). Me gustaría que la Unión Europea enfocara más sus acciones en la participación, en vez de representación, de sus ciudadanos.

|                                     |                      |                |                   |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                            | <b>2</b>             | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>          | <b>5</b>                         |
| <b>Totalmente<br/>en desacuerdo</b> | <b>En desacuerdo</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>De acuerdo</b> | <b>Totalmente<br/>de acuerdo</b> |

*Cuestiones sobre la sociedad civil (grupos de ciudadanos organizados)*

4) ¿Cuánta importancia cree que tiene la sociedad civil dentro de un sistema de gobierno democrático?

|                          |                          |                          |                          |                          |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Muchísima</b>         | <b>En<br/>general</b>    | <b>Una<br/>poca</b>      | <b>No<br/>mucha</b>      | <b>Nada</b>              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

5). Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (instituciones locales) promueven los derechos sociales de los individuos, por ejemplo, el derecho participar en los asuntos políticos nacionales e internacionales.

|                          |                          |                          |                          |                          |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Muchísima</b>         | <b>En<br/>general</b>    | <b>Una<br/>poca</b>      | <b>No<br/>mucha</b>      | <b>Nada</b>              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

6). Para ser democrático un sistema de gobierno internacional, debería adoptar una estrategia “bottom-up,” es decir, debería representar (podríamos utilizar mejor “representación” u “organismo de representación”) en las instituciones locales (p.e. Consejo de la Juventud de España) más que un foco en instituciones de alto nivel (p.e. El Parlamento Europeo).

|                                     |                      |                |                   |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                            | <b>2</b>             | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>          | <b>5</b>                         |
| <b>Totalmente<br/>en desacuerdo</b> | <b>En desacuerdo</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>De acuerdo</b> | <b>Totalmente<br/>de acuerdo</b> |

*Cuestión sobre la participación de la sociedad civil en la Unión Europea.*

Por favor, clasifica cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones de 1 a 4 según la importancia que tenga para usted.

1 = Nada importante

4 = Muy importante

Abreviaturas:

UE = Unión Europea

Mecanismos más accesibles para que el ciudadano participe en el sistema de gobierno de la UE a título individual: \_\_\_\_\_

Democratizar el sistema de gobierno de la UE a través de su representación en instituciones locales / regionales / nacionales: \_\_\_\_\_

Democratizar la UE otorgando más poder al Parlamento Europeo: \_\_\_\_\_

Mantener la UE tal y como está de tal forma que pueda centrar sus esfuerzos en superar la crisis financiera: \_\_\_\_\_

Cualquier otro comentario:

\_\_\_\_\_

*Muchísimas gracias por participar 😊*



**Appendix H: Survey for Spanish civil society organisations (English Version) (participants were involved in the 2012 General Assembly Meeting for Youth Organisations)**

**13 – 15 July, 2012**

**The role of the citizen and Civil Society Organisations**

*Prologue:* This is a study undertaken by a postgraduate student (Kirsten Mander) from New Zealand, which asks *can civil society democratise a system of governance?* Kirsten is focused on Spanish civil society and its ability to democratise the European Union by providing the “citizen” greater access to participation. Kirsten would like to invite you to participate in a short multi-choice survey for the purposes of data collection. All answers will remain strictly confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of this thesis. Please circle the desired choice in blue or black ink and return to Kirsten.

*Classification*

Are you: Male ☐ Age: 15-18 ☐ 18-24 ☐ 25-50 ☐ 50-70 ☐ 70+ ☐  
Female ☐

What is your occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

What is your reason for attending the CJE\* General Assembly Meeting? \_\_\_\_\_

Are you a Spanish national citizen? Yes ☐ No ☐

*Questions regarding the European Union*

1). Citizens of the European Union understand what it is and how it functions.\*\*

|                              |                 |                |              |                           |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                     | <b>2</b>        | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>     | <b>5</b>                  |
| <b>Strongly<br/>Disagree</b> | <b>Disagree</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>Agree</b> | <b>Strongly<br/>Agree</b> |

**\*Consejo de la Juventud de España**

**\*\*There is no definition of European citizen in European Union documentation, but Citizenship of the Union is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as ‘any national of a Member State is a citizen of the Union.’**

2). The European citizen is involved in decision-making processes of the European Union.

|                              |                 |                |              |                           |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                     | <b>2</b>        | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>     | <b>5</b>                  |
| <b>Strongly<br/>Disagree</b> | <b>Disagree</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>Agree</b> | <b>Strongly<br/>Agree</b> |

3). I would like to see the European Union focus more on citizen participation.

|                              |                 |                |              |                           |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                     | <b>2</b>        | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>     | <b>5</b>                  |
| <b>Strongly<br/>Disagree</b> | <b>Disagree</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>Agree</b> | <b>Strongly<br/>Agree</b> |

*Questions regarding local civil society (organised groups of civilians)*

4). How important should local civil society be in a transnational governance system?

|                          |                          |                          |                          |                          |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Very<br/>Much</b>     | <b>Generally</b>         | <b>Some-<br/>What</b>    | <b>Not<br/>Very</b>      | <b>Not at<br/>all</b>    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

5). Local civil society organisations promote the social rights of individuals, for example the right to participate in international governance matters where relevant

|                          |                          |                          |                          |                          |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Very<br/>Much</b>     | <b>Generally</b>         | <b>Some-<br/>What</b>    | <b>Not<br/>Really</b>    | <b>Not at<br/>all</b>    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

6). In order to be democratic, an international system of governance should adopt bottom-up governance strategies. That is to say, the system should focus on local institutions (such as the CJE) more than focusing on high-level institutions (such as the European Parliament)

|                              |                 |                |              |                           |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| <b>1</b>                     | <b>2</b>        | <b>3</b>       | <b>4</b>     | <b>5</b>                  |
| <b>Strongly<br/>Disagree</b> | <b>Disagree</b> | <b>Neutral</b> | <b>Agree</b> | <b>Strongly<br/>Agree</b> |

*Question on involvement of local civil society in the European Union*

Please give the following statements a rank from 1-4 in terms of their importance to you as a citizen.

1 = Least Important

4 = Most Important

Key

EU = European Union

Accessible ways to participate in the EU governance system: \_\_\_\_\_

Democratise the EU governance system by focusing on local/regional/national institutions: \_\_\_\_\_

Democratise the EU by giving more powers to the European Parliament: \_\_\_\_\_

Leave the EU to focus on the financial crisis: \_\_\_\_\_

Any other comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*Thank you very much for your participation 😊*